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Introduction 
 
 
On Tuesday, 27 April 1965, in the House of Assembly an event known as “Black 
Tuesday” struck the capital city of Nassau, New Providence in The Bahamas.1 A political 
furor arose in response to the failure of the ruling government to accurately determine 
voter distribution and boundaries. 2  In frustration, the leader of the opposition motioned 
towards the mace, shouting, “This is the symbol of authority, and authority in this island 
belongs to the people.” With a burgeoning crowd below, he then lifted the mace in front of 
the Speaker, and threw it down from the window of the House. “Yes, the people are 
outside,” he said to the Speaker and fellow members of the House, “and the mace belongs 
outside too!” 3 
This symbolic political gesture and other rhetorical devices will be examined to 
understand how The Bahamas became conceptually known as a “black” nation or “Black 
Bahamas”. Coined myself, a “Black Bahamas” is defined as a cultural framework that discounts 
citizenship as a definitive marker of Bahamian national identity. It fashions members of 
Bahamian society with darker skin pigmentation (who are in the majority of the population) as 
symbolically included in the popular imagination of an authentic Bahamian national identity.4 
Moreover, it excludes non-black Bahamians of intermediate shades as not belonging to this 
imagined national community. 5 The primary question addressed in this thesis will be how 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Michael Craton and Gail Saunders, Islanders in the Stream: A History of the Bahamian People, Volume Two: From the 
Ending of Slavery to the Twenty-First Century (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998), 340. 
2 Michael Craton and Gail Saunders, Islanders in the Stream, 340. 
3 Nassau Tribune, April 27, 1965, quoted in Craton and Saunders, Islanders in the Stream, 341. 
4 Patricia Glinton-Meicholas and Joylon Smith, How To Be a True-True Bahamian: A Hilarious Look at Life in The 
Bahamas (Nassau, Bahamas: Guanima Press, 2001), 110. I use Glinton-Meicholas and Smith’s humorous 
understanding of “white” exclusions and “black” inclusions of Bahamian national identity. They claim, “If you 
desire to be a true-true Bahamian, being called ‘white’ is the kiss of death.” 
5 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 
1991), 6. 
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political discourse and response to it played a role in the construction of this popular discourse 
and consciousness of Bahamian national identity. 
Until the year 1967, control of economic, political, and social realms in The Bahamas 
remained in the hands of a light-skinned Bahamian mercantile oligarchy. This oligarchy was 
named “Bay Street”, for the street in the center of downtown Nassau from where they 
maintained their commercial and governmental domains.  In the general election of January 10, 
1967, however, government shifted to political leadership by individuals with darker skin tones, 
much like the majority of the population.6 Lynden Pindling, the main actor in the events of 
“Black Tuesday”, became leader of this new political order. It is argued here that Pindling and 
the Progressive Liberal Party (PLP) from which he governed, were catalysts in the shift from 
the popular consciousness of The Bahamas into one of a “black” nation. Gaining Bahamian 
independence from Great Britain on July 10, 1973, the party continued in power for twenty-five 
years until August 1992. Thus, their political rhetoric and symbolism remained dominant for a 
generation of Bahamians from 1973 through 1992.   
This thesis investigates what forms of black political discourse took hold in The 
Bahamas during the transformation of power in the mid-twentieth century and under the 
leadership of Pindling and the PLP. It examines the articulation of blackness as a form of 
political manipulation by the ruling government from 1967 to 1992 rather than as a means of 
elevation of the darker-colored majority in socioeconomic terms. As a student of both history 
and anthropology, I recognize the need to place such events in the language of cause and effect, 
as well as offer analyses of its construction through discursive practices. Using both fields of 
thought, however, I develop that the Pindling government’s discourse acted as a catalyst, or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The Nassau Guardian, January 10, 1967; Nassau Tribune, January 10, 1967. See section below on more detail of 
demographics of the Bahamian population.  
Lee  7 
	  
agent of change in the way that average citizens came to think and talk about their national 
identity. 
At its most pedagogic level, my thesis underscores the fluidity of racial 
conceptualizations, the ways in which both class and race are at the crux of socioeconomic 
division and hierarchies of power within Bahamian society, and how racialized political 
discourse has influenced a racialized national discourse that simplifies the complexities that 
exist in reality. Moreover, on a broader scale, my thesis offers an additional region to 
investigate the power of political symbolism to engender a sense of national identity. It also 
places historical foundations and present-day Bahamian formations of Black Nationalism and 
black power within the broader context of the Anglophone Caribbean, many African nations, 
and the United States of America. 
 
Terminology and Demography of Race and Color 
 I attempt to deviate from racial categories of “white” and “black” as much as possible 
throughout my paper, given that I see race as a social construction rather than biological fact. 
Racial dichotomies limit the mixtures of shades of pigmentation within phenotypical skin color 
and oversimplify the existence of intermediate groups within Bahamian society. Nonetheless, I 
maintain that race, whiteness, and blackness hold important significance within the political 
and social consciousness of Bahamian society. I continue to use it with a frame of reference; 
however, I insert quotation marks surrounding the labels of “white” and “black” when necessary 
to expose their ambiguities. Moreover, I describe skin pigmentations of Bahamians in terms of 
their degree of darkness and lightness so that the reader may gather the nuances of racial 
constructions.7 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Anton Allahar, ""Race" and Class in the Making of Caribbean Political Culture," Transforming Anthropology 10, 
no. 2 (2001): 17. I follow the pattern of using quotation marks through Allahar. 
Lee  8 
	  
 The demography of the Bahamian population in racial terms is also problematic. 
Although it is common for everyday Bahamians to put into percentages that 85 percent of the 
population is of African descent and 15 percent is “white”, these ratios do not adequately 
illustrate the more fluid categorizations of race, nor do they stipulate demographical 
accuracies.8 First of all, the geography of The Bahamas as an archipelago of approximately 
thirty inhabited islands across 5,500 square miles has resulted in the dispersal of Bahamian 
populations that have lived in relative isolation from each other.9 Each has separate 
relationships and varied demographics to the capital city of Nassau, New Providence and their 
inhabitants have different experiences and constructions of race. Secondly, there is no up-to-
date statistical analysis of racial demography that exists, given that the last census that 
included racial categories was in 1953. 10 Although this data was temporally and quantitatively 
skewed11, it also posits questions as to why matters of race have been attached to political 
rhetoric when there are no structural policies in place to ensure a more equitable resource 
allocation to the communities that need it most – particularly the darker colored lower class 
majority.  
 
Methodology 
The primary research for this investigation involved a combination of archival and 
ethnographic components. In the summer of 2011, I engaged in archival research at the 
National Archives of The Bahamas that pointed me to structures of Bahamian society divided 
along both color and class lines. Specific sources included, but were not limited to, legal and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Nicolette Bethel, "Navigations: The Fluidity of National Identity in the Postcolonial Bahamas" (diss., University 
of Cambridge, 2000), [Online]. 
9 Bethel, "Navigations”. 
10 Bethel, "Navigations”. 
11 Bethel, "Navigations”. The categories solely included of “European”, “African”, and “Mulatto” (mixed race) at the 
time. One of the reasons why the 1953 census had its limitations was through the existence of ethnic immigrant 
groups such as Greeks, Chinese, and more recently, immigration of Haitians, Jamaicans, and Guyanese, and a large 
degree of emigration by Bahamian nationals. Its ratios of racial demographics are thus temporally and 
quantitatively skewed. 
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governmental records, and public records such as newspapers. I also collected numerous 
Colonial Office documents from the British National Archives at Kew in London, England to 
gather a more thorough timeline of events and to gain a sense of what were colonial ideologies 
of racial politics at the time of the PLP’s emergence. 
I also engaged in ethnographic and oral history interviews that tackled racial 
worldviews and personal experiences of “black” and non-black Bahamians in the island of New 
Providence. Such research included structured and unstructured interviews, surveys, and 
participant observation of political discourse for the purpose of triangulating the events of the 
late twentieth century into the experiences of individuals in the present. I gathered contacts 
and conducted interviews and casual conversation with over twenty-five Bahamians from ages 
eighteen to ninety-three years of age, and from a range of socioeconomic and racial 
backgrounds about their Bahamian identity.  
 Being a light-colored Bahamian individual myself, my personal background and identity 
posed as both useful and problematic to my investigation. Other than being more culturally 
attuned to Bahamian dialect and etiquette while conducting my ethnographic research, I was 
able to play ignorant in order to receive thorough oral histories from older, mainly darker-
colored individuals about the hardships they experienced in the days prior to PLP emergence. 
Moreover, I was able to use my skin color to play off the stereotype that “all ‘white’ Bahamians 
are anti-PLP” to provide unspoken security in discussions with certain individuals who 
understood the impact of their racial rhetoric in a more negative light. In order to quell any 
suspicious of me being a “white Bahamian that just wants to tear apart the legacy of the PLP” 
or one who “just wishes for a return to Bay Street rule”, I used open-ended and general 
questions as much as possible. Questions included:  “Can you tell me what ‘being Bahamian’ 
means to you?” or “What do you remember about independence (or other notable decades, 
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famous figures)?” I would then let them be the first to initiate a discussion about racial politics 
and use a series of snowballing questions thereafter. Out of privacy and compliance with the 
ethics of the American Anthropological Association and the Institutional Research Board of the 
University of Richmond, I have replaced most of my interviewee’s names with pseudonyms. 
This can be noted by the use of their fabricated names in quotation marks. 
I write with disappointment that more of my initial ethnographic data did not make it 
into my final document; however, their rich and varied interpretations gave me valuable insight 
to continue my archival and secondary research. Their understandings of Bahamian national 
identity also helped to conceptualize my thesis in clearer terms. I found that many older light 
colored Bahamians were hesitant to talk about Pindling or the PLP period, but young 
Bahamians were eager to discuss what their thoughts and experiences. I found a number of 
contradictions in the rhetoric and the reality of the ways in which average darker-colored 
Bahamians live. Many are still just as disenfranchised as they were prior to the PLP. Thus, not 
much has changed, except the anti-white rhetoric and racialized blame game. My paper 
demonstrates ways in which the racialized rhetoric remains amidst continued social inequities 
in the political and economic realm.  
 
Literature Review 
 I organized my search for secondary literature on this project on the basis of its regional 
and topical relevancy to social and political Bahamian history in the post-emancipation era of 
the mid-nineteenth century until the emergence of the PLP. I also gathered studies on political 
mobilization, race, class, and identity in The Bahamas and other parts of the Caribbean in both 
historical and anthropological contexts. Secondly, I organized my search on the basis of 
theoretical relevancy to the questions of Black Nationalism and consciousness, racial politics, 
and discourses on race, class, and national identity from other parts of the world. Thirdly, I 
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compiled anthropological literature on the impact of political rhetoric and metaphoric 
symbolism to invoke specific kinds of emotions and thought-processes among its citizens. This 
section highlights a small handful of key literature from each category. 
My most used regional source from The Bahamas is Michael Craton and Gail 
Saunders’s, Islanders in the Stream: A History of The Bahamian People From the Ending of 
Slavery to the Twenty-First Century (2000). This narrative socio-historical source was 
paramount to the construction of the timeline to social, economic, and political aspects of 
Bahamian life throughout the time periods that I have researched. It is written by two of 
the most reputable and experienced scholars of Bahamian social history (whose independent 
works are also cited in this project) and has served as a backbone to my location of a 
breadth of primary sources and other relevant secondary literature. A criticism, which I 
take knowingly, is that of my over-reliance on this source.  The lack of historical writing 
within the context of The Bahamas is one that has been difficult to compensate. I have, 
however, combined many primary and other secondary references when applicable to 
Craton and Saunders’s findings in attempts to diversify the literature.  
Colin Hughes’s, Race and Politics in The Bahamas (1981) was another valuable source 
of historical context of The Bahamas, politics and social activity with regards to race and 
color. His narrative on the transition of “white” power and “black” power during the mid-
twentieth century is supplemented primarily through the use of newspaper articles, many of 
which are no longer in good condition in The National Archives of The Bahamas. Thus, 
Hughes’ work has provided my study with a timeline of events and further breadth of 
primary sources that I would otherwise have had difficulty locating. Furthermore, Hughes’ 
insight on the social alliances of local colonial and Bay Street officials were also pivotal in 
the fashioning of my second chapter. Nonetheless, its narrative (as well as Craton and 
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Saunders’s) is lacking in the depth of an extrapolation of the implications of political 
transformation of power on the sociocultural and socioeconomic elements of Bahamian 
society.  
This is where my investigation comes in, to fill in the gaps of both time and analysis 
of how racial and political dynamics of this time period have impacted society in the 
present-day. Some notable Bahamian scholars including anthropologist Nicolette Bethel, 
literary authors Patricia Glinton-Meicholas and Ian Gregory Strachan have begun to tackle 
the unscathed territory of the complexities of Bahamian national identity, and the weavings 
of race, color, and class. Nonetheless, more can be done to identify the origins of the 
construction of Bahamian national identity and how the Bahamian nation can move 
forward. I intend for my thesis to be a step in this direction. 
The incorporation of black power literature further aids in my goal of providing a more 
rigorous and contextual study of Pindling’s political projects than has been done previously. A 
definition of black nationalism from Jeffrey Ogbar, and delineations between separatist and 
pluralist traditions within global black power movements from Ogbar, William VanDeburg 
and Bert Thomas have helped to provide a greater theoretical understanding of the origins and 
motivations of the use of blackness by the Pindling government. Lastly, the application of 
anthropological theory including those of notable scholars in the field, Clifford Geertz and 
Victor Turner, on the myriad of forms through which Pindling’s projects have taken, has 
allowed my thesis to be interpreted through the lens of rhetorical symbolism. That is, it 
provides a means for me to discuss the myriad of political symbolism and rhetoric by the 
Pindling government as a means of “black” inclusion and “white” exclusion. Moreover, this 
allows me to use the language needed to explain a large part of my thesis: the political 
constructions of Bahamian national identity into that of a “black” exclusive belonging.  
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Organization of Chapters 
In the first chapter, a narrative history of the post-emancipation period of the early 
nineteenth century until the rise of the PLP during the mid-twentieth century is examined as 
laying the historical foundations of color-coded classes and racial politics within Bahamian 
society. It recognizes the ways in which the Bay Street master class used legislative and 
economic stipulations, and property ownership to maintain their political and socioeconomic 
domination and marginalization of a darker colored majority. Yet it also exposes the growth of 
a middle class of intermediate shades throughout this time period that gained relative leverage 
through education and the franchise, making them socially distinct from the darker majority. A 
comparative analysis of the reform initiatives of the varied class backgrounds against Bay 
Street domination that began in the mid-twentieth century offers a more complicated 
understanding of power, privilege, and poverty within the historical foundations of Bahamian 
society. This chapter identifies that the existence of a middle class, from which the PLP 
emerged, clouded a racial dichotomy that oversimplified the power dynamics of color and class 
that were in existence. 
In the second chapter, the ways in which race, color, and class had been understood by 
local colonial officials in the mid-1960s is investigated; as well as how they perceived the PLP 
prior to their electoral victory in 1967. Their perspective provides an opportunity to discuss the 
colonial non-racial interpretation of the region’s challenges. The investigation also allows for a 
moment of introspection into the ways in which colonial ideology allowed for the mainstay of 
Bay Street rule for more than a century, and the ways in which an over-emphasis on class 
opposition is equally as problematic as ones of race and color. Furthermore, this chapter serves 
as a counter argument to the inverse reaction of racial interpretation within the PLP’s political 
projects. 
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In the third chapter, the ways in which blackness was employed by the PLP 
government are examined as a means of consolidating an electorate of the darker colored 
popular classes. Prior to 1967 before its electoral victory, and in consecutive elections until 
1992, the dominant ideas or motifs throughout their campaigns were those of the “white” 
minority as modern-day slaveholders and the heroic narrative of the PLP as the irrefutable 
emancipator of the “black” majority. Within the context of their political symbolism, this 
chapter debates the motivations of these motifs within the framework of various black power 
traditions, and also questions its consequences given highly publicized corruption and limited 
improvement in the quality of life of the darker colored majority. This chapter also inserts 
anthropological theory of political symbolism to investigate the power of the PLP 
government’s motifs to generate a social discourse and understanding of socioeconomic 
division in binary oppositions of “white” exploitation and “black” suffering. As the fulcrum of 
my thesis, I explore the ways in which these motifs have generated a national discourse in 
which “blacks” are symbolically included and “whites” are symbolically excluded from 
conceptualizations of Bahamian national identity. I demonstrate the limitations of their rhetoric 
and the ways in which a racialized “black” Bahamian national identity has been fruitless in 
providing real liberation of the nation’s darker-colored majority. 
In the fourth and final chapter, sociocultural residues of racialized symbolic rhetoric and 
oppositional binaries of the political projects of the previous Pindling government are 
investigated through discourses of Bahamian national identity in the present-day. More 
specifically, features of the construction of a “black” orientation of Bahamian national identity, 
and the polarization of “white”, “light-skin” and non-black Bahamian others are explored. The 
chapter gives voice to what the framework continues to look like and feel like to Bahamians 
who do not fit the “black” stereotype, both in terms of skin color phenotype, dialect, and 
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behavior. It also examines the justifications of Bahamian national identity as being “black” in 
character and excluding non-black elements through evasive memory of “white” minority rule, 
resentment for continued economic power of such groups, and voluntary polarization of non-
black Bahamians within the national community. I find such discourse to be problematic given 
that it continues to assume racial categories through a definitive class lens, and does little to 
pinpoint areas needing development in the economic structure of Bahamian society, particularly 
among the darker-colored popular classes. The discourse also prevents a more productive and 
inclusive national body for Bahamians of all shades. I wonder what forms of imaginations of 
Bahamian national identity would have taken place if another form of political rhetoric and 
transformation from Bay Street supervened. 
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Chapter One 
 
Historical Foundations 
Origins of Bay Street and the Rise of the Progressive Liberal Party 
 
Chapter Objectives 
 
 From emancipation to the establishment of the Progressive Liberal Party (PLP), 
changes ensued that would allow for the growth of a middle class of darker to light colored 
Bahamians. Predominance of a lighter-colored Bay Street elite and a larger darker-colored 
majority remained from the nineteenth to mid-twentieth century. But an emergence of an 
affluent middle class of intermediate shades throughout this period served to complicate social 
dynamics within Bahamian society. This chapter seeks to understand the nature of 
socioeconomic power prior to the PLP as an interchange of class and color. 
 First, I explore the modes of power whereby the mercantile elite known as Bay Street 
grew in the decades following emancipation in the early nineteenth century until the mid-
twentieth century. Their authority left a legacy of political, economic, and social 
marginalization for relatively all African-descended Bahamians. Yet, I debate a simple 
delineation of “white” and “black” racial groups in respective hegemonic and marginalized 
realms. Through property ownership, the franchise, and educational opportunities, a middle 
class of intermediate shades also emerged. This exposes more complicated class-based and 
color-coded social dynamics moving into the twentieth century as the PLP emerged within The 
Bahamas.  
Second, I examine the path to reform leading to the rise of the PLP in the latter half of 
the twentieth century. I seek to find difference in earlier initiatives such as mobilization of 
working class darker colored Bahamians (including a riot, and labor union strike) in contrast to 
the committee and political formations of middle class Bahamians of varying shades. Lastly, I 
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use this historical framework to discuss the emergence and ideologies of the PLP. Comprised of 
many members of an affluent, educated darker colored middle class, I debate that the primary 
issue of socioeconomic struggle to be conflated in blackness as inadequate.  This conflation 
conceals the real issues of both color and class domination and marginalization at work after 
emancipation until the rise of the PLP. 
 
Origins of Bay Street 
Political and Economic Domination in Post-Emancipation Era 
 
 The domination of Bay Street began in the era of post-emancipation. In 1808, the 
British crown abolished the transatlantic slave trade, allowing for one sixth of its then current 
slave population to receive formal freedom through manumission. By 1811, a system of 
apprenticeship was also instituted throughout the British colonies of the Caribbean whereby 
former slaves could be employed by their previous owners in hopes for a smoother transition 
from slave status to emancipation.1 Finally on August 1, 1838, all forms of slavery and former 
slave apprentices were made fully free.2 Nonetheless, there was little change in the relationship 
of former slave owners and slaves in the post-emancipation era in the British colony of The 
Bahamas or elsewhere in the British Caribbean.3 The structures of post-emancipation itself 
allowed for further entrenchment of the political and economic power of the master classes. 
 There is some scholarly debate among historians as to whether or not former colonizers 
and the British Colonial Office had shared ulterior motives of continuing the hegemony of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 July 14, 1834, CO 23/91, 289-91; Royal Gazette, June 27, 1834; Balfour to Spring Rice, September 13, 1834, CO 
23/91, 380-81; Royal Gazette, August 6, 1834, quoted in in Michael Craton and Gail Saunders, Islanders in the 
Stream: A History of the Bahamian People. From the Ending of Slavery to the Twenty-First Century, Vol. 2 (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 2000), 3. 
2 Minutes of the Privy Council, November 28, 1838, CO 23/103, 171-71; Government Notice, November 1838, CO 
23/103, 241; March 12, 1836, C.O 23/96, 244-74, quoted in in Craton and Saunders, Islanders in the Stream, 3.  
3 Colebrooke to Glenelg, August 8, 1835, CO 23/93, 44; Royal Gazette, August 1, 1835. in Craton and Saunders, 
Islanders in The Stream, 13-14. Governor Colebrooke wrote that former slaves must “provide their own subsistence 
to their employers”. Moreover, Judge Robert Sandilands encouraged “negroes to work hard, be loyal, and grateful 
for their boon.” A large class of landless and dependent laborers derived from this structure. 
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“whites” in the colonies. Historian William Green, a specialist in British slave emancipation, 
outlined that the objectives of emancipation by the Colonial Office in London and local master 
classes had similar motives: “the colonies should continue to pursue plantation agriculture” and 
“political control of the colonies was safest if kept out of the hands of uneducated former 
slaves”.4 Yet, Bahamian historians Gail Saunders and Michael Craton wrote that certain 
legislative attempts to deny franchise to former slaves were vetoed by the Colonial Office under 
the institutional objectives of emancipation to provide equitable societies.5  
Despite the Colonial Office’s more formal denunciation of discrimination and political 
hegemony of the Bay Street oligarchy, The Bahamas was one of the few colonies exempted 
from a conversion to Crown Colony rule following emancipation. Historian Deborah Weeks 
pointed to the larger resident population that existed in The Bahamas as quelling the fears of 
the Colonial Office, and by not requiring any upset or change to the hegemony that was so 
successfully established.6 This left the local mercantile oligarchy, famously labeled as “Bay 
Street” or the “Bay Street Boys”, to project a form of political control that reasserted restrictive 
and politically discriminative measures beyond emancipation and into the mid-twentieth 
century. In either side of the debate, the formal rejection of discriminatory practices towards a 
former slave population did little to shake the continued domination in The Bahamas and 
elsewhere in the British Caribbean. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Green, William A., British Slave Emancipation: The Sugar Colonies and the Great Experiment 1830-1865, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1976), 164, quoted in Deborah G. Weeks, Movement of the People: The Relationship between Black 
Consciousness Movements, Race, and Class in the Caribbean, Thesis, University of South Florida, 2008, 15  
5 Craton and Saunders, Islanders in The Stream, 3. A September 1838 circular was distributed among British West 
Indian governments by the Colonial Secretary for guidelines on how to approach new dynamics in a post-
emancipation society. 
6 Weeks, Movement of the People, 105. According to Weeks, The Colonial Office did not require a conversion of the 
Bahamian colony into Crown Colony Rule due to the presence of a substantive “white” minority. 
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The Bay Street oligarchy was identified as “the most narrow-minded ruling class in the 
entire English-speaking Caribbean” according to historian Gordon Lewis.7 Through the same 
system of representative government practiced since 1729 during slavery, the “white” elite 
maintained political control.8 The nearly century-old franchise law of 1729 stated that only free 
males over the age of twenty-one, who owned property and had paid fifty point duties prior to 
the current year were able to vote.9  Yet after the abolition of the slave trade in 1807, the 
franchise law changed to also allow freed slaves the right to vote only if they were able to meet 
the property requirements. The language of race and color was not explicitly used; however, 
the obstacle of property ownership continued to limit the franchise through a color line. 
Despite the changed law requirements, members of the Bay Street elite maintained their 
political influence.  
By 1834, however, there were four members of Assembly in The Bahamas who were 
identified as “Negroes”.10 Their ability to meet the property-owning and tax-paying 
requirements for the franchise demonstrated an early existence of a micro elite of “black” and 
“brown” Bahamians. That is, it demonstrated an elite subset of “black” Bahamians with a higher 
degree of social and economic status was distinct from the poorer “black” majority through 
class status and ownership of property. Nonetheless, such persons only represented a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Lewis, Gordon K., The Growth of the Modern West Indies (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968). 312, quoted in 
Weeks, Movement of the People, 105. 
8 Whittington Bernard Johnson, Post-Emancipation Race Relations in the Bahamas (Gainesville: University Press of 
Florida, 2006), 16. There existed an appointed Governor, an advisory Council appointed by the Governor, and 
elected representatives of each district, and/or island (if not New Providence). 
9 Colin A. Hughes, Race and Politics in The Bahamas (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981; Nassau: Media 
Publishing Ltd, 2010), 12. Citations refer to Media edition.); James Martin Wright and George Burbank Shattuck, 
History of the Bahama Islands with a Special Study of the Abolition of Slavery in the Colony. (Baltimore: Friedenwald, 
1905), 521. 
10 Hughes, Race and Politics, 3; Craton and Saunders, Islanders in the Stream, 18. Craton and Saunders write the few 
non-white members of the House of Assembly was “drawn from the most respectable and conservative elements in 
their classes (if anything, promoting the interests of their own marginal micro-class”. Moreover, that they “never 
numbered more than a fifth of the members of the House of Assembly before the mid-twentieth century”. 
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microcosm of the otherwise poor, and thus politically inactive, black majority.11 Predominantly 
“white” male property owners retained the majority of seats in the House of Assembly for yet 
another century. It was through franchise control that Bay Street prevented more “blacks” from 
also asserting political power.  
Another critical mode of Bay Street rule fell along the vein of economic control. 
Imperial policy and local elites accepted liberal economic principles of laissez-faire whereby 
market forces were allowed to flow “naturally” through the concept of “free trade 
imperialism”.12 As stated by historian Michael Craton, “It was chiefly through the control of the 
local economy that Bay Street sustained its hegemony.”13 Informal modes of bribery and 
patronage, exploitative wage labor through the import-export industry, and dependency on the 
master or elite class through the credit system, combined with the more obvious economic 
advantages through the monopoly of the most fertile and attractive lands. 14 The dominance or 
capitalization of all enterprises and branches of trade, boatbuilding, and boat ownership further 
provided a means for the oligarchy to informally maintain its power.15 Although not explicitly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Craton and Saunders, Islanders in the Stream 17; Johnson W. B., Post-emancipation Race Relations in the Bahamas, 
16; Hughes, Race and Politics, 12; Wright and Shattuck, “History of the Bahama Islands” p. 527. An account of the 
1834 election by Wright and Shattuck: “The election in some of the Out Islands were nominal. In some of these 
only a few electors would assemble to vote and the poll was easily controlled. In closer settlements the poor 
inhabitants were dependent on the merchants for their necessaries and were generally indebted to the latter, who 
could control their votes”. 
12 Craton and Saunders, Islanders in the Stream, 55. Michael Craton, "Bay Street, Black Power, and the Conchy Joes: 
Race and Class in the Colony and Commonwealth of the Bahamas, 1850-2000," in The White Minority in the 
Caribbean, ed. Howard Johnson and Karl S. Watson (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 1998), 76.  
13 Michael Craton, “Bay Street, Black Power”, 76. 
14 Bahamas Argus, June 24, 1835; Nesbitt to Grey, September 7, 1847, C) 23/94; Black to Holland, March 15, 1867, 
CO 23/229 via Howard Johnson, “The Share System in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries,” in  The 
Bahamas in Slavery and Freedom (Kingston: Ian Randle, and London: James Currey, 1991), 55-68. Circulation of 
cash was scarce in the import-export industry. Laborers grew dependent on merchants’ economic and social 
control through a credit system until the early 20th century when the opportunity for wage labor in New 
Providence increased. Free wage labor system worked in the favor and self-interest of land owners. Former slaves 
became sharecroppers to their previous owners or others, relying on merchant landlords for cash, clothing, 
seedlings, on biased credit terms. See also Craton and Saunders, 46. Johnson, Post-Emancipation, 36-37. Lewis, The 
Growth of a Modern West Indies, 312. Johnson, Howard, The Bahamas in Slavery and Freedom, 101, 115, 116. Weeks,  
The Movement of the People, 101. 
15 Johnson, The Bahamas in Slavery and Freedom, 1-109. Johnson responds to Nigel Bolland’s deduction that elite 
“white” oligarchies across the British Caribbean intentionally created a monopoly to practice discrimination. 
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racial or discriminatory in nature, the Bahamian ruling class was still able to mold a stronger 
leverage of affluence and wealth, capitalizing on the financial weaknesses of the less-fortunate 
black majority.16 
Although I will not account for Bay Street as “the most narrow-minded ruling class” in 
comparison to other British Caribbean colonies, I will defer to Green’s opinion. The ruling class 
of Bay Street was certainly narrow-minded to say the least. Their control of the political 
franchise and the economy laid the foundations of discrimination and historically rooted 
marginalization of lower classes and darker-colored members of Bahamian society. 
Nonetheless, these modes of domination through control of the economy and franchise 
restrictions were never put forth in legislation in explicitly racial terms. In both the property 
voting requirements and laissez faire economic characteristics, there was no legal restriction on 
the basis of race and color. Nonetheless, their discriminatory practices were inextricably tied to 
racial oppression due to the difficulties of former slaves to gain economic independence from 
their former owners. One Bahamian historian, Whittington B. Johnson, made the naïve 
argument that because of the structural discrimination in place, the transition to emancipation 
and overall social relations in The Bahamas were “sanguine” in comparison to the American 
South.17 While the color prejudice of “white” Bahamian elites did not extend to physical 
violence against former slaves as it did in the American South, it would be a mistake to ignore 
the implicit marginalization of former slaves and non-elite Bahamians through the restrictive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Johnson claims that the dominance of trade and shortage of cash allowed for exploitation through informal forces 
of the economy. 
16 Shaw-Lefevre to Glenelg, Februrary 1, 1839 BSP (1839), 25, 107, Part 1, 36. Governor cites  workers being 
“forced to work in servile conditions”.; Bahamas Acts 53 Geo 11, c. 8 (1812), 308-14; 2 Geo IV, c. 16 (1821), 3338-
43; 6 Will IV, c. 11 (1833), 54-60. Former slaves were subject to Vagrancy Acts whereby unemployment was not 
allowed, citing any person as an “idle vagabond”, “without visible means to support” or any means to “gainful 
employment”. This demonstrated the exploitative element of the master class, forcing former slaves into unfair 
working conditions because they were the only ones offered to them in Craton and Saunders, Islanders in the 
Stream, 19. 
17 Johnson, W. B., Post-Emancipation Race Relations in The Bahamas, 12–13, 14–15, 111, 112, 120–21, 139–40. 
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franchise and economic mobility of the Bay Street elite.18 Although Bay Street’s domination 
operated along the lines of class oppression, it also implicitly operated through color 
discrimination and oppression. Despite the absence of structural or legal racism, there was still 
no legislation in effect to protect the rights of “blacks” or former slaves within Bay Street’s 
political and economic systems. 19 Thus, although Bay Street operated with no explicit use of 
race or color, it was still implicitly rooted in color prejudice. The absence of intentional aid or 
inclusionary political and economic systems exposed Bay Street’s indifference to the needs of  
the darker-colored majority. 
Nonetheless, the darker-colored majority was not a monolithic group. Class distinctions 
introduced by the election of a micro-elite into the House of Assembly showed basic class 
differences; however, ethnic differences can also be illuminated. Between 1808 and 1838, 
approximately 6,500 Africans were released into The Bahamas following the closing of the 
transatlantic slave trade.20 A significant number of liberated Africans used the apprenticeship 
system and vied for similar or the same jobs from the master class after the transition to 
emancipation. Thus, with the addition of more people into the pool of disenfranchised, darker 
populations within Bahamian society caused a greater strain on the availability of employment 
and labor. 21  The added segment of liberated Africans brought an even greater demographic of 
darker-skinned population into the majority dominated by a lighter colored Bahamian elite. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Bridget Brereton, review of Post-Emancipation Race Relations in the Bahamas. By Whittington B. Johnson. 
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2006., The Journal of American History  94, No. 2 (September 2007): 552. 
Johnson cites the non-existence of legally sanctioned segregation and violence, lynching, hate groups, extralegal 
harassment in his argument.   
19 The Nassau Guardian, February 8, 1873; May 12, 1875, September 11, 1875; Johnson, The Bahamas in Slavery and 
Freedom, 1-109; O. Nigel Bolland, "Systems of Domination After Slavery: The Control of Land and Labor in the 
British West Indies After 1838," Comparative Studies in Society and History 23, no. 4 (1981): 593-600. 
20 Rosanne Marion Adderley, "New Negroes from Africa": Slave Trade Abolition and Free African Settlement in the 
Nineteenth-Century Caribbean (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 3; Gail Saunders, Bahamian Society 
After Emancipation (Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2003), 76; Johnson H., The Bahamas in Slavery and 
Freedom, 63. 
21 Adderley, “New Negroes From Africa”, 3. Saunders, Bahamian Society After Emancipation, 77. Johnson, H, The 
Bahamas in Slavery and Freedom, 59-61.  
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De-Facto Segregation: Spatialization of Power 
 
An additional element of Bay Street domination could be evidenced by the physical 
realities of de-facto segregation. Although residential, educational, and religious aspects of 
social stratification grew along similar color lines of light-colored privilege and dark-colored 
marginalization, more was at work than racial difference. There still were prevalent 
distinctions of varying shades and acceptance of middle class “blacks”, “browns”, or “near-
whites”, locally known as “Conchy Joes”.22 These class and color distinctions further complicate 
a narrative of Bahamian history that places the Bahamian people into a straitjacket of black and 
white racial dichotomy. As noted by Craton and Saunders, “All Bahamian nonwhites suffered 
from segregation in housing, education, work, and ordinary social intercourse, backed by a 
color-conscious legal system.” The presence of both non-white, and near white, but also lower 
class whites being subject to Bay Street domination highlight the importance of recognizing 
the layers of Bay Street rule. Moreover, this underlines how Bahamian society has historically 
been divided through race, but also shades of color and hierarchies of class.23 
The spatial layout of housing and commercial sites represented the pinnacle of de-facto 
segregation within the residential population of the island of New Providence. As described by 
Craton and Saunders, the population was “almost evenly divided between the dominant whites, 
‘middle-class’ browns, a tenacious fringe of black laborers, mariners, domestics, and 
craftsmen”.24 Elite “white” Bahamians and expatriates, and at times, wealthy light 
complexioned near white Bahamians, resided in low-density housing located on the 
northeastern and northwestern parts of the island.25 Similarly, they maintained their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Craton and Saunders, Islanders in the Stream, 32; 92. 
23 Craton and Saunders, Islanders in the Stream, 32; 92. “Poor whites separated from slave descendants, but also 
suffered social and economic deprivation.” 
24 Craton and Saunders, Islanders in the Stream, 92. They also refer to the middle classes as “high yellow” and 
“brown”. 
25 Craton and Saunders, Islanders in the Stream, 92. 
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commercial interests and monopoly on trade through ownership of shops, banks, and docks in 
the downtown Bay Street area.26 Middle class “high yellows” and “browns” and other light-
complexioned Bahamians also lived in relative privilege in areas close to the downtown area 
and main streets to the west and north of the island. On the other side of the spectrum, all-
black settlements were primarily located outside the southern boundary, where living 
conditions were cramped and crowded. They were built upon swamps and mangroves, and 
their location was isolated from downtown areas of Bay Street and the center of commercial 
activity. Poor white “Conchy Joes” also lived nearby – often with discomfort by both parties. 27  
De-facto segregation also continued in religious sectors. The domination of the Bay 
Street elite was shown through the centralized locations of their churches compared to those of 
other intermediate and lower class groups. For example, the congregation of the St. Andrew’s 
Presbyterian Kirk located in the center of town was exclusively “white” and the congregation of 
Wesley Methodist Chapel in the heart of Grant’s Town was exclusively “black”. Moreover, 
churches including Trinity Methodist Church and Ebenezer Methodist Chapel were set-up in 
such a way that allowed entrance to colored middle class and, at times, poorer “black” 
Bahamians.28 Yet equality was not assured. Many interviewees throughout my research, for 
example, remembered how “blacks” and “coloreds” (mixed race) were only allowed to enter 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Johnson, The Bahamas in Slavery and Freedom, 17. This control of the land is the reason why Craton and 
Saunders describe the group that was formed  “a white Bahamian agrocommercial oligarchy”. Fittingly, this group 
of elites came to be known as “Bay Street” or “The Bay Street Boys” - a term of identification connected to the 
power that they possessed through land and property ownership. Parallels can be made to the formation of similar 
white oligarchies within other colonies of the British West Indies after emancipation, including the white “Front 
Street” oligarchy of Bermuda and the white “plantocracy” of Barbados. 
27 L. D. Powles, The Land of the Pink Pearl; Or, Recollections of Life in the Bahamas, (London: S. Low, Marston, 
Searle, & Rivington, 1888), 146-147. in Craton and Saunders, Islanders in the Stream, 84. Central locations of all-
black, outlying settlements in New Providence included Grant’s Town, Bain Town, Fox Hill, Carmichael, 
Gambier, Adelaide.  
28 Craton and Saunders, Islanders in the Stream, 92. 
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through a certain back door, and sit in a designated area in pews separate from the “whites” 
who were present.29 Separate cemeteries were also maintained.30  
With regards to education and access to social services, segregation and preferential 
treatment toward elite “whites” was also visible. Limited allocations of colonial funding were 
provided to the newly formed Bahamian Board of Education in 1935.31 Thus, there was a 
minimal level of schooling for former slaves’ children. Moreover, full control over educational 
policy was given to local government officials through an 1847 Education Act.32 Despite the 
official legislation of compulsory education for male and female children until twelve years of 
age through this Act, there were inadequate standards and methods of teaching that caused 
illiteracy to become rampant among the working class black majority.33 Even with the 
existence of a number of private schools, most nonwhite individuals either could not afford the 
fee or were not allowed enrollment.34 Secondary education fees were too high for the working 
class black majority, let alone higher education, which required enrollment overseas.35 
Educational discrimination persisted throughout the 19th and mid-20th centuries and was a 
significant reason for the continued rule of the Bay Street oligarchy.36 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Teazel Bowe, interview by author, May 2011; M. Munroe, interview by author, June 2011, 2011; James Catalyn, 
interview by author, July 2011.  
30 Weeks, Movement of the People, 103; Craton and Saunders, Islanders in the Stream, 133. 
31 Circular of Colonial Secretary Lord Russell, March 1841, in Shirley C. Gordon, ed. A Century of West Indian 
Education (London: Longmans, 1963), 38. 
32 Bahamas Act 10 Vic 1, c. 10 
33 Bahamas Act 10 Vic 1, c. 10. Law cited a “System of Popular Education and Training, [and] scholastic 
Establishment,” however this was not executed for most of the population. Craton, History of the Bahamas, 200-
201. Historian Craton has explained that the lack of education for the majority “stalled” reform until the 1960s. 
34 Weeks, Movement of the People, 103; Craton and Saunders, Islanders in the Stream, 133. 
35 Circular of Colonial Secretary Lord Russell, March 18, 41, in Shirley C. Gordon, ed. A Century of West Indian 
Education (London: Longmans, 1963), 38. 
36 Bahamas Government, Report on the Census of 1891 (Nassau, 1892); Bahamas Government Report on the 
Census of 1901 (Nassau, 1902). The percentage increase of literacy was only 2 per cent from 1891 and 1901. In 
1901, 48.7 per cent of the population was recorded as “literate”, however there were marked differences between 
the categories of white, black, and colored. Moreover, the definition of literacy was a bare minimum. It did not 
infer post-primary education or ascribe to the qualifications eneded for professional, clerical, or government 
employment in the colony. 
CO 23/145, 213-14. Colonial officials responded to census reports with complacency, assumed a significant 
amount of the population were literate and sufficient money was being spent on education. In Saunders, Bahamian 
Society After Emancipation, 29.  
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Fluidity of Racial Binaries 
Neither the “white” minority nor “black” majority were monolithic groups.37 Both 
groups consisted of persons of varying levels of social class. Thus, more was at work than 
simply “white” power and race discrimination in the operation of the Bay Street rule. Even the 
generalization of Bay Street belonging to the “white” minority is subject to interpretation. 
While the Bay Street oligarchy was mostly comprised of fair-skinned or “lily-white”38 
individuals, some members were of mixed descent. 39 Such individuals were also elected 
members of the House of Assembly. Families of nearwhite backgrounds often achieved this 
relative degree of affluence and social mobility by the end of the 19th century through property 
ownership or education. 40 A micro-elite of “colored” or “mulatto” Bahamians of mixed 
European and African ancestry also began to achieve a relative degree of affluence and social 
mobility by the end of the 19th century through property ownership or education.41 Some were 
successful in small businesses (such as boatbuilding, carriage-riding, restaurants, shipment of 
goods to the out islanders, grocery and dry good establishments) that allowed them to live a 
middle class lifestyle through working the laissez faire system.  
Moreover, other “white” or near-white “Conchy Joes” were similarly separated from Bay 
Street spheres of influence if occupying middle and lower rungs in society.42 Although near-
whites, poor “whites”, or “Conchy Joes” continued to reap benefits of property ownership that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Weeks, Movement of the People,103. 
38 Gail Saunders, interview by author, June 2011.  The skin color description of “lily white” implies the racial 
meaning ‘pure’ white, Caucasian, or of European descent. 
39 Saunders, Bahamian Society After Emancipation, 90. Some members of the Bay Street Boys could technically be 
considered “Conchy Joes”, but because of their superior class status, their mixed backgrounds were often 
overlooked. 
40 Charles Ives, The Isles of Summer, Or, Nassau and the Bahamas (New Haven, CT: Author, 1880), 292. Charles Ives, 
Isles of Summer,; or Nassau and the Bahamas (New Haven: Ives, 1880), 292. An American visitor to the island 
remarked on the ambiguity of Bahamian whites’ claims to white purity.  
41 Johnson, W. B., Post-Emancipation, 58. Saunders, Bahamian Society After Emancipation, 1. 
42 Weeks, Movement of the People, 102. 
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allowed a certain degree of affluence that was above the ever-more marginalized population of 
former slaves, many still lived in desolate conditions. The outer islands were especially known 
to house settlements of exclusively white Bahamians that were in deep poverty. Thus, there is a 
degree of consideration that must be given to demonstrate that power held by The Bay Street 
Boys did not imply total “white” power or ultimate privilege. Individuals of varying degrees of 
hue cut across race and class lines as elite and non-elite sectors of Bahamian society.  
The first half of the twentieth century did little to change the domination of Bay Street 
or improve the living conditions of the majority of the darker-colored lower class population. In 
1901, the majority “black” population was still in the lowest ranks of the social, economic, and 
political hierarchy.43  While there was a considerable growing middle class of varying shades of 
color, upward mobility was rare.44 A portrait taken of members of the House of Assembly in 
1950 demonstrated not much had changed in the first half of the century, as only seven out of 
twenty-seven members of the House of Assembly were a visible mix of black and brown shades 
of skin color. (See Fig. 1)45 The political hegemony, tied closely to the ownership of property, 
was still intact. For this reason, historian Deborah Weeks’ coined this period of slow change as 
“Waiting For The Bahamas to Reach”. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Johnson, Post-Emancipation Race Relations, 50. 
44 Weeks, Movement of the People, 102. 
45 Craton and Saunders, Islanders in the Stream, 305. 
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Figure 1: 1950 House of Assembly 
Courtesy of the National Archives of The Bahamas 
  
Part of the reason for the slow change in Bahamian society was the continued barrier to 
education. Comparing the colony of The Bahamas to other colonies of Trinidad and Jamaica, 
Weeks reasons, “the educational system…lagged far behind the rest of the West Indies”.46 At 
the start of the 1900s, a meager quantity of forty-four primary-level government schools 
provided compulsory education throughout the Bahamian archipelago.47 Even by the late 
1960s, as remembered by an elderly Bahamian, education in the peripheral “Out Islands” was 
limited to crammed, one-room schoolhouses.48 In both the capital island of New Providence, 
and even more grossly in the peripheral Out Islands, hundreds of Bahamian schoolchildren 
continued to be illiterate, and received little to no form of schooling.49 Still pendant on the 
limited Education Act of 1847, the Bahamian majority was without much education beyond 
classic literacy or primary education levels. For this reason, later generations of former slaves 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Weeks, Movement of the People,,104.  
47 Weeks, Movement of the People, 104. Olga Culmer Jenkins, Bahamian Memories: Island Voices of The Twentieth 
Century (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000), 180. 
48 Weeks, Movement of the People,104; Jenkins, Bahamian Memories, 180. 
49 Weeks, Movement of the People,104; Jenkins, Bahamian Memories, x. 
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continued to have little leverage to change their economic standing to leverage against the Bay 
Street mercantile elite.50  
 
A Growing Middle Class 
 The first half of the twentieth century did, however, provide an improvement in 
education that brought significant benefit to the Bahamian middle classes. In 1923, the 
establishment of the first public secondary school, Government High School, increased access 
and availability of educational advancement to many youthful members of darker-colored and 
intermediate shades of middle-class Bahamians. It also opened opportunities for further 
educational advancement in tertiary studies abroad.51 Many children of such middle class 
families, including Lynden O. Pindling, the future prime minister, attended Government High 
School and pursued higher education abroad after graduation.52 It was through these 
educational opportunities outside of the colony that many gained exposure to nationalistic 
sentiment, decolonization, and black power movement and became prominent leaders for 
reform by mid-century.53 This did not change Bay Street’s overwhelming domination of the 
lower class; darker-colored majority who still could not afford advanced schooling. 
Nonetheless, increased educational opportunities paved the way for a burgeoning darker-
colored middle class who would begin to develop professional careers and hold more 
authoritative positions within Bahamian society.  
Although the “black” middle class was slowly burgeoning in the first half of the century, 
the entrenchment of Bay Street grew deeper. The Bay Street elite expanded upon earlier forms 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Craton and Saunders, Islanders in the Stream, 107, 172. Bolland, Nigel O. The Politics of Labor in the British 
Caribbean: The Social Origins of Authoritarianism.. 433. 
51 Weeks, Movement of the People, 105. 
52 Judy Munroe, Interview by author, July 2011. Attended school with Pindling and other future Government 
ministers. 
53 Weeks, Movement of the People,105; Craton and Saunders, Islanders in the Stream, 107. Content of this black 
nationalism will be discussed in Ch. 3 
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of de facto segregation through the construction of a large stonewall known as “Collins 
Wall”.54 Located on the borders of the eastern section of New Providence, it surrounded the 
heart of the city of Nassau, including the commercial center of Bay Street and the harbor for 
import and exporting goods. The wall originally served the function of bordering the large 
estate of a Bay Street merchant; however, it became a larger means by which Bay Street 
encapsulated itself within privileged physical spaces. Land within the estate was subdivided 
into plots for commercial buildings, residences, and the “all-white” private school of St. 
Andrew’s.55 Moreover, its adjacent lands were homes to dense, over-crowded quarters of 
southern and western New Providence, predominately of the “black” lower class.56 Thus, 
Collins Wall became physical evidence of the color and class divide under which Bahamian 
society operated.57 It blocked direct entry into the commercial centers for the non-elite, and 
also lengthened the daily commute of many workers. Persons could only enter by using 
ladders, or by using extensive detours from their otherwise direct route to and from the city. 
The impenetrability of Collins Wall by outsiders to Bay Street spoke volumes to the open and 
blatant discriminatory system from which the oligarchy operated.  
As an older Bahamian lawyer who resided in Nassau in the early twentieth century, 
Colin Hughes remembered the time of the Collins Wall as both inconvenient and dangerous for 
non-residents. “Men, women, and children clambered over the wall to go about their daily 
business. Inevitably, accidents occurred; one pregnant Negro woman miscarried after a fall, and 
a Negro boy broke a leg.”58 Yet, neither matters of inconvenience nor danger were points of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Hughes, Race and Politics, 49 
55 Hughes, Race and Politics, 49. 
56 Hughes, Race and Politics, 49. 
57 Hughes, Race and Politics, 49.  
58 Nassau Guardian, 3 May 1955 in Hughes, Race and Politics, 49. In May 1955, 350 residents formed a petition that 
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contention or concern for the Bay Street oligarchy. Even in 1959, the Collins Wall remained a 
fixture within the confines of the city of Nassau. Discussions of opening up a single portion of 
the wall to “shorten long roundabout routes” and “scaling the high wall with ladders and other 
means” were described as a “hot controversy” in a November issue of the Nassau Tribune.59 
Being put to demolition in the mid-1960s only after the emergence of the PLP, the Collins 
Wall then became a testament to the enduring operation of Bay Street through self-seeking and 
obstinate means.60   
 The first half of the twentieth century was also punctuated by the growth of the 
tourism industry and world events that allowed for economic prosperity for Bay Street, and 
relatively, to middle classes. 61 Nonetheless, it continued to draw economic disparities between 
the upper class Bay Street elite and the darker colored lower classes to an even wider and more 
extreme level. The consolidation of American investment alone through the tourism industry 
provided increased employment opportunities and wage labor, and even spurred a massive 
emigration of Out Island men to benefit from employment opportunities. Moreover, during an 
era of bootlegging, the Bahamian economy skyrocketed as the colony became a primary source 
of smuggling alcohol to the United States during the Prohibition Era of the 1920s.62 With a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
day and age, who displays such total disregard for her own health and that of the child she carries that she ‘jumps 
over’ a wall – well, a gate isn’t going to solve her problems. 
59 Nassau Tribune. Thursday, November 12, 1959. Nassau Guardian. Wednesday, November 11, 1959 
60 Hughes, Race and Politics, 50.  
61 Haddon-Smith to Harcourt, January 1, 1914, CO 23/273, 4-7; The Nassau Tribune, December 17, 1913, Colonial 
Annual Reports  Bahamas, 1913-14, 20; Asa Pain, General Manager, Bahamas Timber Company to Haddon-Smith, 
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combination of the economic gains through the development of tourism and bootlegging alone, 
the population from 1921 and 1931 increased by 52.3 percent.63 
Economic prosperity of this time period also attracted the settlement of new immigrant 
groups. These included Greeks, Chinese, Lebanese, and Jews, but also expatriate American and 
British “whites”.64 Over time, many immigrants (excluding the “white” expatriates) secured 
niches in industries such as the export of Bahamian sponges, local groceries, and restaurant and 
laundry businesses65 Their descendants have since assimilated into Bahamian society and 
provide an even more complex composition to the population, with the addition of even more 
diversity of shade, and “racial” and ethnic backgrounds. As an added disparity, some 
immigrants even came to own businesses on the outskirts of Bay Street by 1930s.  
Expatriate “whites” were automatically included into the Bay Street sphere of influence, 
and more ambiguous Greek and Chinese immigrants and their families also became socially 
“passable” to a certain degree among the white elite.66  Their presence and legacy as 
immigrants, or much more to the growth of these immigrant groups throughout the twentieth 
century, demonstrate the racial and ethnic complexities involved in the mobilizations on 
socioeconomic improvement. 
As a final extension to the economic power of the Bay Street elite, the colony became of 
strategic importance during World War II after the bombing of Pearl Harbor as it housed an 
antisubmarine and aircraft-staging base from 1942-1945 for Great Britain, the United States, 
and other Allied Powers.67 The economic boom of this period was even more extensive than the 
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65 Craton and Saunders, Islanders in the Stream, 258; 263 
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first, bringing in money, improved air and sea transportation and media communications, and 
improved standards of living to the capital.68 As expected, nearly all socioeconomic benefit 
derived was absorbed ultimately by the Bay Street oligarchy. Yet, the blatant exploitation 
would no longer go unnoticed. The growing foreign presence, and additional (but relative) 
benefits that were extended to new immigrants was the last straw for the growing Bahamian 
middle class. The combination of increased educational opportunity for middle class and 
bitterness over the ever-increasing domination of Bay Street laid the historical foundations of 
reform which began in earnest in the second half of the century. 
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Rise of The PLP 
Early Stirrings of Reform 
 
The early stirrings of reform prior to the emergence of Pindling’s Progressive Liberal 
Party laid important groundwork for what was to come. Events of the 1940s and early 1950s 
revealed distinct differences between the calls for reform from the lower class of “black” 
Bahamians and the formation of more equality-oriented committees stemming from the “black” 
middle class. The manifestation of the divide among Bahamian “blacks” in opposition to the Bay 
Street oligarchy through these varied reforms is crucial in understanding the problematic 
creation of “black” solidarity and an explicitly racial political platform through Pindling’s 
leadership in the PLP (and later of the nation). 
The first major sign that tolerance of Bay Street would no longer be accepted by the 
lower classes of Bahamian society came about in 1942, weeks after a decision had been made to 
convert New Providence into a staging base for the Allied Powers.69  In order for this 
conversion to take place, the local airport required expansion. Since labor would be required for 
the construction, anticipation among local construction workers and unemployed members was 
high. Nonetheless, with a repeated scheme of exploitation, the Bahamian government had 
planned to limit local wages for unskilled labor as well as semi-skilled labor to only four 
shillings per day, compared to the twelve or more shillings per day for British and American 
foreign workers.70 Furthermore, two members of the “white” elite were assigned to be 
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supervisors of the project instead of an experienced US navy general or a local nonwhite 
supervisor.71 
 Local workers objected. A number of darker-colored members of the House of Assembly 
quickly petitioned for minimum wage of eight shillings per day on their behalf; but they acted 
with delay, and work on the project was scheduled to begin before wage objects were 
addressed. Within minutes of the beginning of the workweek on June 1, 1942, local Bahamian 
workers left the construction site on strike and marched toward downtown Nassau with sticks 
and machetes, singing the now legendary lyrics: “Burma Road declare war on the Conchy Joe”. 
Before noon, most shops and business establishments on Bay Street had been looted, or at least 
had their windows or storefronts dismantled, and three fatalities and dozens of injuries among 
the rioters occurred. 72  
The event, now known as the “Burma Road Riot”, has been interpreted as the first 
consolidated effort at defying absolute power and discriminatory practices of the Bay Street 
oligarchy.73 It is interesting to note that only specific shops owned by the Bay Street elite and 
their darker-colored sympathizers were targeted, including targets not located on Bay Street 
that included the home of a “black” policeman and a black-owned shop in the southern 
district.74 While this initial semi-planned initiative resulted in more structural damage and 
fatality than immediate progress or improvement in working conditions, it did spark a greater 
consciousness and public participation in social reform. It is interesting to note that this initial 
stirring of reform was not explicitly racial – i.e. desiring to oust all “whiteness” from leadership 	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in the colony. After all, members of the “brown” and “black” middle class establishments were 
also targeted as contributing to the marginalization of the lower class majority. It was not until 
later acts of reform through Pindling’s PLP that race, not class, became the primary issue. 
 On January 14, 1946, Reverend H. H. Brown’s inspirational sermon became further fuel 
for early stirrings of reform. He wrote: 
“Instead of ‘government of the people, for the people,’ we have ‘exploitation of the many, 
for the privileged, by the few’. That a people has the kind of government that it deserves 
is almost axiomatic. A criticism of the local government is therefore a criticism of the 
entire population.”75 
 
Reverend Brown ‘s criticisms of the Bay Street regime exposed their fictional image of a 
democracy that represented the needs of the majority.  He also warned the population that the 
1942 Burma Road Riot would “seem pale and insignificant in comparison with its successor”, 
predicting that it would only be a matter of time that “ordinary citizens awoke to the 
responsibilities of democracy”.76 As predicted, the decade following Reverend Brown’s 
premonition proved a time when Bahamians of all backgrounds became readily aware and 
prepared to bring principles of class struggle to the colony.  
In December 1950, a group was formed under the name of the “Citizens’ Committee” to 
rally for greater political protection, education for the Bahamian majority, and to expose the 
obvious exploitation which stemmed from the structures of sociopolitical control of the Bay 
Street government.77 As quoted by one of the committee’s founders, dentist Cleveland Eneas, 
the aims of the committee were to: “generally protect, improve, preserve and defend the 
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economic, educational, and political rights of all Bahamians”.78 Specifically, the new group 
campaigned for desegregation of Bay Street restaurants as well as the right to show films in 
local theatres that had been censored for being racially inflammatory for portraying mob 
violence and defiance to whites. They additionally published a bi-weekly paper, The Voice, and 
the occasional paper, Citizen’s Torch throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s.79  
Nonetheless, this early attempt at reform had its limitations. Its aims, though 
commendable, were vague and had little effect in the long run. Its membership of middle class 
nonwhite Bahamians, including three members of the House of Assembly and other pioneer 
lawyers and intellectuals, could also be seen as a weakness.80 Judging from its strongest 
rallying points of desegregation and censorship in social spheres such as dining and 
entertainment establishments, it is difficult to accept the seriousness of their aims to protect 
and fight for the rights of “all Bahamians”.81 That is, their most notable platforms related more 
to a criticism of the lack of social benefit for themselves, middle class black and browns, rather 
than to create more structural ways to combat socioeconomic exploitation of the overall 
majority. While it would be unfair to completely belittle these initial attempts to shake the Bay 
Street regime, it is still interesting to note the subtle difference of protest for increased benefit 
or acceptance of more blacks and browns into the elite community versus protest for genuine 
radical reform based on socioracial equality for the Bahamian majority. This subtle difference is 
key when studying how Bay Street’s political power became dismantled and whether or not real 
reform of society emerged. 
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Taking a more progressive stance, a financial institution named The People’s Penny 
Savings Bank” was opened in November 1952 within the black Bahamian stronghold of Grant’s 
Town.82 Its purpose was to provide a designated haven for the less fortunate in the community 
to learn how to save and be financially independent, given that no “black” or nonwhite 
Bahamian was able to enter or work inside Bay Street banks before this period.83 On opening 
day, nonwhite member of the House of Assembly Leon McKinney made remarks that the goals 
of this initiative were “not to boast of being a bank but rather a school of ‘thrift’ where any man, 
woman or child may take the first step towards self sufficiency by opening an account with an 
amount as small as a penny”.84 Compared to the Citizens’ Committee, the initiatives of The 
People’s Penny Saving’s Bank were rooted in tangible assistance and protection from minority 
rule.  
Moreover, opposition expressed through print media forums was also becoming 
stronger in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Two daily newspapers, The Nassau Guardian 
(founded in the late 1800s and early 1900s by members of the Bay Street elite) The Nassau 
Tribune, (founded by middle class “Conchy Joes”), and one weekly newspaper The Nassau Herald 
(founded by middle class individuals of darker shades) provided news and social commentary to 
Bahamian society. In the form of these two daily and one weekly newspapers, dialogue on 
reform became popular during the mid-twentieth century.85 The Nassau Guardian, supported 
and owned by members of Bay Street, represented the most conservative and elite spectrum of 
society, whereas The Nassau Tribune and The Nassau Herald provided greater opportunity for 
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freedom of expression and disdain of the local regime.86  The Nassau Herald, in particular, 
provided a forum for the nonwhite majority. Referring to The Nassau Herald, Hughes wrote, “In 
the eyes of white Bahamians, [it] was even more subversive of the natural and proper of society 
than was The Nassau Tribune”.87 The role of The Nassau Herald in future communication to the 
nonwhite majority is a key component of my overall analysis. As Craton reflected on the surge 
of reform through print media, he wrote, “Dissent had always had a voice”, but I argue dissent 
in its organized form did not achieve widespread publication and readership until the later 
period of the late 1940s and 1950s.  
The actions of the rioters in the 1942 Burma Road Riot, founders of the Citizens’ 
Committee and People’s Penny Saving Bank, and contributors to The Nassau Tribune and The 
Nassau Herald laid the groundwork for stronger political organization of the Progressive 
Liberal Party, founded in 1953. Yet these earlier stirrings of reform highlighted the lack of a 
“black” united front and lack of shared motivations for reform of Bay Street. While the 1942 
riots and the formation of the People’s Penny Saving’s Bank served the purposes of alleviating 
discriminatory wage labor and bringing financial institutions to the disadvantaged majority, 
the founders of the Citizens’ Committee seemed more interested in securing rights for their 
specific class than overall reform of Bahamian society. 
 
Emergence of the Progressive Liberal Party 
 
 The emergence of the Progressive Liberal Party in October 1953 did not begin as 
reform that was “black” or racial in tone. The founders of the PLP were actually three 
nearwhite “Conchy Joe” Bahamians, namely, Henry Taylor, William Cartwright, and Cyril 
Stevenson, whose leadership and involvement in the party became subsumed in 1955, a few 
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years into the party’s emergence.88 The following overview demonstrates how the party began 
as very multi-racial and inclusive in its inception, but changed with the incoming of many 
persons of the middle class “black” community. 
When the Progressive Liberal Party (PLP) was formed, it desired wider representation 
in the House of the Assembly, equitable education, employment opportunities, lower prices and 
low-cost housing.89 Its first manifesto read:  
The Progressive Liberal Party hopes to show that your big man and your little man, your 
black, brown and white man of all classes, creeds or religions in this country can combine 
and work together in supplying sound and successful political leadership which has been 
sadly lacking in The Bahamas. 90 
 
The PLP was the first political party to be formed in the colony, as the “Bay Street Boys” were 
simply that – a group of men who had mustered socioeconomic and political control, or rather, 
inherited it from their forefathers, and who ruled informally without party politics. Thus, the 
birth of the PLP was in fact a monumental change for the Bahamian society. In 1953, on the 
heels of earlier attempts at reform, the PLP marked the beginning of real political opposition to 
the inequalities that had structured it until this point. Throughout this section, I follow the 
Progressive Liberal Party’s rise to power from its inception in 1953 until its electoral victory in 
January 1967.   
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 The initial ideology of the founding leaders of the PLP was changed dramatically 
through internal dissent and new leadership.91 By May 1955, a new brand of PLP leadership 
emerged through a sector of young dark brown or “black” Bahamian lawyers returning from 
school abroad, notably Lynden Pindling as party leader, Randol Fawkes, as well as a local black 
Bahamian trade unionist, Charles Rhodriguez.92 One way of interpreting the motivations 
behind a changed leadership of the party derives from the historical divisions within “black” and 
“white” Bahamians of the middle class, as both had attempted to gain affluence amidst the Bay 
Street hegemony and were at odds with each other.93 A former PLP minister, Paul Adderley, 
who was politically active during the time of this transition, however, provides the motivation 
as a matter of uncertainty over whether the founders could provide an equality-based reform in 
practice. At a presentation given to the public in 2011, Adderley also noted: 
Black unity could not be achieved by the mulatto leadership of the PLP.  They had given 
it life, but black and white unity it could not achieve. The white man refused to be 
changed.94  
 
In slightly different language, Craton and Saunders recognize the transition to new party 
leadership as demonstrating “reverse racism” and “deeply-bred distrust” between “coloreds” and 
“whites”. 95  Weeks, Craton, and Saunders all understand that the main reason for the division 
of the party leadership came from an ideological disagreement on the transformation of the 
party into a racialization of the party’s platform.96  In either interpretation, a color divide 
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certainly occurred.  The party’s first chairman, Henry Taylor was gradually demoted as a 
figurehead until his resignation in 1963.97  
The undercurrents of internal dissent and the changes from white and “colored” 
leadership to “black” leadership continuously make scholars of Bahamian history and ordinary 
Bahamian citizens alike question whether or not the PLP then became a “black man’s party”, a 
party for the dark-colored majority. I argue with evidence through their political propaganda 
following this change in leadership that they did in fact create a “black Bahamas” or a notion of 
Bahamian identity that included “black” members of the Bahamian community and excluded 
non-black members in Bahamian society. The early transition to black leadership was one of the 
first signs of evidence of this construction. 
By the mid-1950s, the PLP successfully petitioned the House of Commons for one-day 
elections, but the political organization was still young and there were other individual and 
group efforts to bring about reform that were unaffiliated with the PLP.98  
A grouping of political moderates of all shades assembled together as the Bahamas 
Democratic League and motioned resolutions of reform against the segregated Collins Wall 
and discrimination in public places.99 The anti-discrimination resolution, led by nearwhite chief 
editor of the moderate Nassau Tribune, Etienne Dupuch, provided yet another scandalized 
exposure of the unjust Bay Street control. One account in particular, by Bert Cambridge 
revealed the double standard of entry into Bay Street hotels. He testified, “I have worked in 
hotels on this island and I know that common prostitutes are admitted to places in Bay Street 
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because they are white, and decent colored people are refused admission”.100 In typical fashion, 
the proposed resolution in the House of Assembly was ‘handled’ through a select committee 
who passed it in late February 1956. As a result, Nassau Hotels immediately provided public 
statements that their doors were open to all races.101 The contribution of the Bahamas 
Democratic League on the passing of an anti-discrimination act in the colony was still only an 
advancement of reform with limited success, as there was little to no legislation to ensure Bay 
Street adhered to their new law, or was penalized for discrimination that occurred.102  
Industrial action also pushed reform along. Emergence of labor movements through the 
form of the Bahamas Federation of Labor and the Bahamas Taxi Cab Union offered various 
tactics in the late 1950s to protest and bring about change in society. From 1950 to 1956, labor 
organizations increased from five to twelve, providing a tripling of membership in labor unions 
as a whole.103 The Bahamas Taxi Cab Union, led by a young, lower class black Bahamian 
Clifford Darling, organized a physical blockade on November 1, 1957 to prevent traffic from 
flowing to and from the airport.104 This initiative, rooted in protest of preferential treatment 
given to “white” taxi drivers, required all airlines to cancel flights for twenty-four hours until a 
truce was made.105 The truce did not last long, however, as both the PLP and the Bahamas 
Federation of Labor joined in to organize an island-wide General Strike on January 13, 1958, 
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the morning of the opening of the House of Assembly.106 Employees from the tourism, 
construction, airport, banking, electrical sectors, and even those unaffiliated with the labor 
unions, refused to work, and joined together in the downtown Rawson Square, below the House 
of Assembly. They continued to strike for sixteen days, causing international media to become 
aware of the situation and an investigation from Alan Lennox-Boyd, secretary of state for the 
colonies.107 As a result of the events of the January 1958 General Strike, a Labor Department 
was instituted within the government of the colony to accept and process workers’ grievances.  
Both the Anti-Discrimination Resolution of 1956 and the General Strike of 1958 
brought uncomfortable local and global exposure of Bay Street hegemony to greater heights.108 
They both resulted in legislative reform and served as stepping-stones for the PLP as they 
campaigned in the political sphere for upcoming elections. Motions from Etienne Dupuch and 
the Bahamas Democratic League were in dialogue with the same kinds of reform, but made 
clear their disapproval of the Progressive Liberal Party’s black-centric leadership and racialist 
mindset. Ties within the leadership of the PLP and the Bahamas Federation of Labor made it 
seem that their aims and ideologies were intricately interwoven. With PLP member Randol 
Fawkes serving as head of the Bahamas Federation of Labor and PLP leader Lynden Pindling 
serving as legal advisor, one would surmise that the advancement of labor movements was 
directly tied to the political agenda of the PLP. Yet, when Randal Fawkes resigned from the 
PLP to form his own Bahamas Labor Party, there was a notable divide between the two 
groups.109  
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As a final push to combat the rise of the PLP and other reform-based initiatives, the 
outdated oligarchy converted into the United Bahamian Party in April 1958. A new era of party 
politics had thus begun.110 Leadership, self-interest in personal wealth, and former modes of 
power hardly changed through formal identification as a legitimate political unit. Nonetheless, 
their conversion into a political party symbolized a new era of party politics. The Bay Street 
oligarchy was vying for power in the same political playing field and on relatively equal terms 
after over a century and a half later of dominance.  
Nonetheless even with advancing reform, corruption and control still dominated 
through Bay Street’s relentless political and economic hegemony. The general elections of May 
1956 and May 1962 were both electoral defeats for the Progressive Liberal Party.111 During a 
by-election in February 1960, the PLP was able to double its representation in the House of 
Assembly with members of the micro middle class of black professionals, and a year later, was 
pivotal in the introduction of universal suffrage.112 These successes in the political arena hinted 
that change was near, but not yet accessible, as the 1962 election demonstrated that the UBP 
had gained victory through winning the majority of seats in the House of Assembly despite the 
PLP having received the higher percentage of electoral votes.113  
Leading to the general election of January 1967, the years of the 1960s became a game 
of tug-of-war between the ruling UBP and the growing oppositional force, the PLP. In early 
1964, the UBP successfully achieved the rights of internal self-government for the colony, 
allowing for all activities of Government (apart from Foreign Relations, Defense, and Internal 
Security) to be under the responsibility of local Government Ministers. 114 As a means of 
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garnering leverage against its growing opposition, the Bay Street oligarchy wielded the request 
for internal self-government as a strategic move. It allowed its political arm, the UBP fewer 
checks and balances from imperial powers on their stronghold of the colony. For this reason, 
Colin Hughes labeled this time period a “the years of white power” where “whites still 
dominated the colony”.115 
In retort, the PLP began to appeal even more to darker-skinned, working class 
Bahamians who comprised the majority of the Bahamian population. They did this through 
modification of its members, and an increased revamping of campaign tactics and black power 
political rhetoric.116 It was no wonder that it was at this time that PLP cofounder Henry 
Taylor resigned, and other moderates who were lighter-skinned members of the middle class 
and nonwhites were similarly removed from the party either voluntarily or through loss in 
party elections.117  
The PLP also began to embrace rhetoric and tactics of the black power movement 
prevalent in the Civil Rights Movement of the United States, and independence movements in 
countries of Africa and other parts of the Caribbean. Not only did the PLP embrace black 
power ideologies, but leading figures from the movement also embraced the PLP. Notable 
figures including Martin Luther King Jr., Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Adam Clayton Powell 
Jr., and Norman Manley of Jamaica offered financial support, networking, and friendship to the 
PLP and its leader, Lynden Pindling.118 This careful molding of the political platform and 
image into one that nudged a “black” orientation along for legitimacy shows how intrinsic and 	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explicit race became for the future of the Bahamian nation during the latter half of the 20th 
century. Moreover, visits from prominent figures such as Martin Luther King Jr. brought 
legitimacy to Pindling. Many activities enjoyed by King and Pindling were photographed and 
posted in newspapers for mass consumption. In a particular image, King Jr. is photographed on 
a boat with a loose, informal posture and casually wearing a pair of swim trousers.119 These 
ideological, financial, and fraternal bonds with various influential black power theorists and 
activists helped to bolster the PLP’s public image. Its political project surrounding black power 
was absolutely pivotal in the longevity of Pindling’s regime.120 
The PLP pushed forward into more publicized and formal measures of protest and 
petitions on Tuesday, April 27, 1965, a day pronounced as “Black Tuesday”. On this day, 
Pindling strategically moved towards the mace during a formal meeting of the House of 
Assembly shouting, “This is the symbol of authority, and authority in this island belongs to 
the people.” 121 Over frustration in the UBP government’s failure to accurately determine 
voter distribution and boundaries that were representative and fair for more densely 
populated and lower class regions of the island, Pindling then lifted the mace in front of the 
Speaker, and threw it out of the window of the House, where a crowd of PLP supporters 
had been waiting.122  
Members of the PLP opposition also sent an official party delegation to the United 
Nations Committee on Colonialism later that year.123 Led by Pindling, the PLP exposed the 
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123 United Nations, Committee of Twenty-Four, Proceedings, 1965, A/600/aAdd7,86-11; Johnson, Quiet 
Revolution, Appendix A, 157-61. 
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majority of local industries and government contracts as well as the continued endorsement 
by the imperial government.124 Although these initiatives did not bring about direct reform, 
they did bolster the PLP into a favorable position for the 1967 election. 125  
Through a tumultuous series of events and reform initiatives, political government 
transformed in 1967 into one to the Progressive Liberal Party under the leadership of 
Lynden Pindling. It signified the downfall of the Bay Street mercantile oligarchy, and a 
much-needed stride in the removal of the systems of slavery-like discrimination that it had 
thrived upon. Nonetheless, the nuances of the historical foundations of class differentiation 
through racial discrimination in political, economic, and social realms until this momentous 
juncture must not be overlooked. As one anonymous “Colored Carpenter” insisted prior to 
an earlier election in 1962, the rise of the PLP would infer an elevation of middle to upper 
class “black” intellectuals who maintained and exceeded their self-interests over the larger 
“black” lower class majority: 
Not colored people because the blind can’t lead the blind. We are all poor and we have to 
go to the white man for jobs. We know that if we work for a colored man he can’t pay us 
off, so don’t let us look where we fall…So if the PLP gets the majority of seats in the 
House of Assembly, you know that only they and their families will be taken care of.126 
 
While Bahamian society needed a transformation from the inequities of Bay Street minority 
rule, it becomes dubious as to whether or not the middle class PLP members would respond 
to the real issues of both color and class domination and marginalization.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Craton and Saunders, Islanders in the Stream, 341; United Nations Committee of Twenty-Four, Proceedings, 
1965, A/600/aAdd 7, 86-111. The petition included evidence of the UBP Government Premier as “the biggest 
road-builder in the country”, the Minister of Maritime Affairs as “the biggest ship-owner in the country”, among 
others. 
125 Craton, Pindling, 133. Similarly to the 1962 election, the PLP won 51 per cent more votes than the UBP yet 
there was a disparity in the number of seats gained in the general election of 1967. A tie needed to be broken by 
two independents, who decided to side with the PLP. 
126 Nassau Tribune, November 25, 1962, quoted in Cash, Sources of Bahamian History, 291, and Hughes Race and 
Politics, 89. in Craton and Saunders, Islanders in the Stream, 315 
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Figure 2: New PLP Government with Governor Ralph Grey in January 1967 
Courtesy of the National Archives of The Bahamas 
Chapter Summary 
  
This chapter has outlined the varied groupings of people beneath the crust of Bay Street 
power. Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century, there was an overwhelming 
economic, political, and social domination of former slaves through a dependent wage labor 
system, limitations to franchise, education, and commercial and residential living spaces. This 
domination carried on to the mid-twentieth century whereby the large majority of later 
generations continued to receive little education, work unskilled jobs for minimal wages, and 
experience even stronger de facto segregation. 
Nonetheless, this chapter has also underscored how an interpretation of Bay Street rule 
as implied absolute “white” power over all “black” elements of Bahamian society has proven 
itself sorely mistaken. Class and race were very much embedded within the history of Bay 
Street rule. Many poor whites and middle class blacks crossed across such racial and class 
binaries. Small yet significant, the presence of middle classes of various shades of color from 
earlier decades of the post-emancipation era began to expose this simplistic binary to an even 
greater extent. Larger working class reforms such as the 1942 riot and 1958 General Strike 
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made strides in denouncing Bay Street power; however, their means of protest were short-lived 
and limited in terms of enacting real change. Their strides were outdone by more politically 
invested, middle-class initiatives through those involved in anti-discrimination reform, the 
Citizens’ Committee, and finally, through the long-term goals of the Progressive Liberal Party.  
While factors of color and race were intrinsically related to Bay Street’s discrimination, 
an over-reliance of race in PLP ideology has had its implications in the ways in which class 
struggle has been misperceived. From a historical standpoint, the growing presence of a middle 
class “black” groupings affiliated with PLP exemplified how history could be repeating itself, in 
terms of maintenance of a similar class hierarchy that keep larger grassroots “black” lower 
classes in relatively immobile positions. I do not dispute that color was a primary 
discriminative means by which most nonwhite Bahamians suffered politically, economically, 
and socially throughout the post-emancipation era until the mid-twentieth century. I do, 
however, engage in a deeper study of the historical background of the PLP as a conglomerate of 
middle class intellectuals. 
As much as Pindling and the PLP attempted to craft a unified “black” electorate in its 
first decade of becoming a Party, historical patterns prior to its 1967 victory refute this. 
Moreover, from an anthropological perspective, the political representation of blackness as a 
single entity of class struggle problematizes the ways in which color and race have been 
perceived. Most notably, the leadership of Pindling and the PLP in a construction of a unified 
“black” electorate prior to its 1967 victory and 1973 independence, has its implications in the 
way blackness is perceived and imagined in dominant ways within discursive forms, including 
the imagination of a “black” Bahamian national identity.  
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Chapter Two 
 
“There is No Color Bar” 
Politics of Race Through The Eyes of The British 
 
So far we have been looking at Bahamian politics as a bilateral contest. […] But it was also potentially a  
triangular affair , with the governor/Colonial Office being both an additional contestant and,  
in the last resort, holding the ring and set t l ing the rules  for the other two .1 
 
Chapter Objectives  
In confidential letters and intelligence reports on the political situation of The Bahamas 
written by British Governor to the colony of The Bahamas, Sir Ralph Grey and his staff 
between the years 1965-1966, one can gain insight into the politics of race as seen through the 
eyes of British officials. The following chapter explores the implications of class-based, non-
racial language used by British colonial actors at the precipice of Pindling and the Progressive 
Liberal Party’s control of the government. I argue that it is through this prior language and 
non-racial interpretation of social inequalities, shared by colonial and local Bay Street 
authorities, that a backlash emerged in Pindling’s racial political projects. Furthermore, I 
debate that it is through this dialogic reaction that popular imaginations of a racial 
conceptualization of a Bahamian national identity as a “black” identity also came in to play.  
The deterministic narratives of class (through Bay Street and British authorities) and 
race (through Pindling) were problematic given the dominance of both class and race factors 
within the historical foundations and power dynamics outlined in the previous chapter. 
Nonetheless, these debates led to the rejection of a class-based narrative to one that was 
explicitly rooted in color; laying the foundations of the overarching notion of a “Black 
Bahamas” projected by Pindling’s political projects.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Colin A. Hughes, Race and Politics in The Bahamas (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981; Nassau: Media 
Publishing Ltd, 2010), 254. Citations refer to Media edition. Omitted section: […bilateral contest in which white 
and Negro politicians sought to mobilize and deploy electoral support in their respective constituencies.] 
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Color-Coded Class Consciousness 
The transition to internal self-government in The Bahamas in January 1964 allowed for 
the eclipse of direct colonial authority, but colonial officials were still significantly involved.2 
Through this transition, all domestic activities of Government within the colony came under 
the control of local government ministers: members of the United Bahamian Party (UBP) in the 
majority, and members of the Progressive Liberal Party (PLP) and newly formed National 
Democratic Party (NDP) in the minority. 3 Nonetheless, British governor Ralph Grey and his 
staff remained in control of the ministries of Foreign Relations, Defense and Internal Security.4 
In these roles, local colonial officials remained conscious of the growing emergence of 
Bahamian party politics, and more specifically, Pindling and the racial nature of his political 
projects. 
Background notes in preparation for the Queen’s visit in January 1966 sketched out the 
region’s racial politics from the perspective of British colonial officials.5 Officially, the report 
stated, “there is no color bar” between the UBP and the PLP, only “a gap between ‘the haves’ 
and ‘the have nots’”. 6 In parentheses, however, the author specified Bay Street’s UBP, the party 
of “the haves” as “(mostly white, representing big business)”. In contrast, he recognized “the 
other parties” as “the have nots” and again in parentheses that they were “(mainly colored)”.7 
By recognizing the ruling UBP as “the haves” of lucrative, power-wielding forces within the 
economic and commercial sectors of the colony the report drew an image of a strong, wealthy 
and stable unit, and exclusively that of the upper class elite of Bahamian society. Adding the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Colin A. Hughes, Race and Politics in The Bahamas, 35. The Bahamas remained a British Crown Colony from 1717 
to 1969; this implied that residential British governors oversaw activities of the colony and reported back to the 
Colonial Office in London, England. 
2 [Governor?] to Colonial Office, “The Queen’ Visit”, Jan 1966, CO 1031/5152, C474134 
3 Colin A. Hughes, Race and Politics in The Bahamas (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), 35. 
4 Comprising of the Colonial Secretary, Attorney-General, and Receiver-General 
5 [Governor?] to Colonial Office, “The Queen’ Visit”, Jan 1966. 
6 [Governor?] to Colonial Office, “The Queen’ Visit”, Jan 1966. Single quotation marks of ‘the haves’ and ‘the have 
nots’ were placed by me.  
7 [Governor?] to Colonial Office, “The Queen’ Visit”, Jan 1966. 
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racial marker of “(mostly white)”, however, created an image of strength, economic and social 
opportunity towards the “white” upper-class elite. Correspondingly, recognizing the PLP as 
“the have-nots”, also created an image of weakness, poverty, and immobility towards a segment 
of Bahamian society that is “mostly colored” or “black”. 
This interpretation begins to extrapolate how colonial officials attempted to sideline 
racial identity politics through matters of economics and class. By putting racial markers of a 
“(mostly white)” UBP and a “(mostly colored)” PLP in parentheses, the report placed race or 
color as secondary to the underlying issues of class divisions within party politics and social 
dynamics within The Bahamas at large. Nonetheless, the use of racial markers in parentheses 
demonstrated an acknowledgement that race and color was still a dominant means of dividing 
classes into “the haves” and “the have nots”. It is perplexing, then, why Governor Grey and his 
staff denied that color or race is an issue when they themselves spoke of the operation of both 
class and race in their narrative. 
 
Colonial Partiality to Bay Street  
I suspect part of the reason local British officials attempted to sidestep race as a 
dominant system of discrimination is because of their close alliance with Bay Street political 
rule. After all, it is under the broader colonial framework that the Bay Street oligarchy was able 
to thrive and maintain its hegemony in the post-emancipation era throughout the early 
nineteenth to mid-twentieth century.8 Just as resident British colonials were indirectly involved 
in the internal affairs of the 1960s, they were directly involved in the internal operation of 
government within the colony before this. There is no record of any objection to the blatant 
systems of discrimination through which Bay Street governed. The rhetoric of “there is no 
color bar”, then, signals a defense of Bay Street, and the nuances of the historical foundations of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See pages 17-18 of Chapter 1. 
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class differentiation through racial discrimination in political, economic, and social realms up to 
this point. 
In the same letter, the staff of Governor Grey offered some criticisms of UBP 
administration that should have elicited a harsher response if it were not for such colonial 
alliance. Nonetheless, the more lenient response demonstrated their practice of complaisance. 
First, the letter spoke of the lack of “ministerial caliber” among the UBP.9 It mentioned that all 
Bahamian ministers of the UBP Government worked on a volunteer basis. They were unpaid, 
and thus continued to retain their business interests while holding public office.10 As UBP 
ministers comprised of the Bay Street mercantile elite, their primary income and hegemony 
derived from the success of their commercial establishments. The combined powers of holding 
public office plus owning major business interests led to exploitation of governmental authority 
to benefit personal investments. The history of the hegemony of Bay Street’s entrenchment has 
shown this to be true, and the UBP ministers exploited the Bahamian majority through dual 
political and economic power as in the past.  
Nonetheless, operating on this alliance towards Bay Street, Governor Grey’s office 
dismissed any evidence of corruption as fallacy under the argument that the status quo has kept 
the colony in good standing. The letter surmised, “The objections are obvious but the system 
has been working reasonably well, and leading ministers are putting up a surprisingly good 
show.”11 Details of how the governmental operation through UBP leadership was “working 
well” or exactly how ministers were “putting up a surprisingly good show” are not given; 
however, strong economic growth and development within the colony during the twentieth 
century was likely a factor in the governor’s positive report.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 [Governor?] to Colonial Office, “The Queen’ Visit”, Jan 1966. 
10 [Governor?] to Colonial Office, “The Queen’ Visit,” Jan 1966. 
11 [Governor?] to Colonial Office, “The Queen’ Visit”, Jan 1966. 
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At the time of Governor Grey’s administration, the tourism industry was booming. The 
number of tourists traveling to the colony continued to increase from 32,108 to 822, 317 during 
1949 to 1966.12  In prior decades of the 1940s and 1950s, local administration was relatively 
financially independent from the British Colonial Office in supporting its local budget and 
advancing local development.13 The economic boom through the tourist industry came about 
through the ingenuity of local administration and the Bay Street mercantile elite. It is worth 
noting, as Chapter 1 has shown, that the economic successes of the twentieth century occurred 
during a time of incredible poverty and disenfranchisement of the already marginalized 
Bahamian majority. The reported prosperity was not widespread, but rather limited to the 
specific Bay Street elite, relative to a Bahamian middle class of a gamut of skin colors and 
shades. The remarks from the colonial officials ultimately render them ignorant, or at least 
unable to discern major structures of inequalities that were at work. 
The resident staff of Governor Grey and other colonial officials also administered their 
colonial alliance to the Bay Street oligarchy through their complaisance of conservatism. At the 
time of Grey’s governorship, the British Labor Party held parliamentary power in London.14  
Thus, conservatism within the colony should have been denounced given their goals to achieve 
equal representation for working classes on the home front. Nonetheless, such criticisms were 
ultimately deemed unimportant by Grey’s staff. 
In the letter, UBP ministers were reported as having “reluctance to see the full 
development of trade unionism and labor relations”.15 The author admitted that the UBP 
administration was “in certain respects somewhat antiquated” moving forward into the 
twentieth century, but did not offer any further comments to suggest its disapproval. As cited 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Hughes, Race and Politics in The Bahamas, 39; 132. 
13 Hughes, Race and Politics in The Bahamas, 39. 
14 Michael Craton and Gail Saunders, Islanders in the Stream: A History of the Bahamian People. From The Ending of 
Slavery to The Twenty-First Century, Vol. 2 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998), 305. 
15 [Governor?] to Colonial Office. “The Queen’ Visit”, Jan 1966. 
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in Chapter 1, colonial officials introduced a law that made trade unionism legal through the rise 
of reform initiatives in the mid-twentieth century.16 Thus, the broader colonial framework 
allowed for the growth of trade unionism while the British Labor Party was in the majority at 
the time. Nonetheless, the local British colonial office did not write of the conservatism of the 
UBP government (or Bay Street elite) using alarming language. Turning a blind eye, the 
representative of Grey’s staff wrote of the conservatism as a trivial shortcoming of the local 
government compared to its economic productivity. Its focus was on the colony’s achievement 
of a “pre-eminent position” and a standard of living for working classes that was “higher than 
elsewhere” in the Caribbean. The author further wrote, “There are tensions below the surface, 
but given good will on all sides, there is no reason why the Islands should not continue to 
prosper”.17 
The conflicting positions of local British officials reeked of cooperation to Bay Street. 
Even when Bahamian labor movements and reform movements for improved representation of 
the working population paralleled those of the British Labor Party on the home front, local 
colonial officials continued to display lackadaisical criticism to the suspicious voluntary (unpaid) 
portfolios and conservatism of the UBP government.  
 
Shared Goals of Discrimination: Colonial and Local Officials 
The elements of race and color appear to be a more significant issue to local colonial 
officials than can be gleaned from their rhetoric. The operation of colonial partiality for the 
UBP Government who, in their words, was “mostly white” illuminates shared motivations of 
discrimination between the two groups. That is to say, just as Bay Street maintained its 
hegemony on the legal fiction that neither race nor color was a factor – or rather, that laissez 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See page 42 of Chapter 1. 
17 [Governor?] to Colonial Office. “The Queen’ Visit”, Jan 1966. 
	  	  
Lee  56 
faire economy or franchise through property voting did not have underlying motivations to 
marginalize the “black” majority – they did. Similarly, just as local colonial officials 
conceptualized race and color as non-issues – they were. 
The close alignment of Grey’s local administration to Bay Street was not new. Local 
colonial and governmental affiliations were rooted in the history of Bahamian societal 
developments and racial inequalities. Even as late as the 1940s, darker-colored Bahamians were 
forbidden to “cast a shadow” in Government House, home to the residing British governor and 
site of banquets and celebrations of British and Bay Street socialites alike.18 Moreover, political 
commentators and journalists saw the affiliations between resident British and local 
government officials as commonplace. Their close social relationships were so rudimentary that 
Bahamian political analyst, Colin Hughes posited British officials in the twentieth century as 
“socialites rather than socialists”, and identified that their “contacts were with Bay Street”.19 
Another article in the oppositional Nassau Herald newspaper in February 1957 framed the 
British Colonial Office as “dancing to the tune set by Bay Street” and for “seeing Bahamian 
affairs only through the special eyeglasses provided by the country’s despotic leaders”.20 
Because of leniency and lackadaisical responses of Grey’s administration with the 
disenfranchising practices of UBP Government, I believe that these interpretations were on 
target. As stated by Hughes in the opening caption of this chapter, I believe the social dynamics 
were a triangular affair, with both colonial officials and the local oligarchy working together to 
maintain dominion, and discriminate non-elites in the process. 
Both local colonial officials and the Bay Street elite negated the existence of a color bar 
and conceptualization of the social inequalities in order to continue their partnership and rule 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 [Governor?] to Colonial Office, “The Queen’ Visit”, Jan 1966 
19 Hughes, Race and Politics in The Bahamas, 39. “Bay Street”, Location of downtown Nassau where UBP ministers 
and other members of the upper-class white elite held commercial establishments. 
20 “Despotic Leaders Unable To Face New Way of Life”, The Nassau Herald, 23 Feb 1957. 
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over the Bahamian majority. It did not matter if claims of such reform initiatives were relevant 
and paralleled the ideologies of the British Labor Government. Both colonial officials and the 
UBP appeared satisfied to exclude non-whites from their world of prosperity, even if only 
through their indifference to act otherwise. 
 
Maintaining The Status Quo 
The denial of a color divide by the local colonial office served the purpose of 
maintaining the status quo, which deemed “colored” segments of society as illegitimate sources 
of power. This became increasingly evident through the prolific comments of concern in 
monthly Intelligence and Security Reports by Governor Grey from December 1965 to July 
1966 that exercised caution for the growing emergence of the PLP through Pindling’s 
leadership.  
Colonial scrutiny of PLP-led public meetings was one way that British local officials 
exercised this caution. For example, in December 1965, one hundred persons were recorded as 
attending a public meeting compared to a growing audience of three hundred in March 1966.21 
While the recording of numbers at a political meeting seems to be standard reporting data, the 
details served the dual purpose of gauging how active the Party was or was becoming, and also 
if they were gathering numbers of people sufficient to achieve electoral support that could 
overthrow the UBP.  The Governor and his staff also recorded the names of individuals who 
spoke, and the content of their speeches in relation to their allegiance or opposition to the 
established authorities. The records specifically pinpointed the extent to which the messages of 
PLP spokesmen counteracted the Government and British officials. For example, in the 
December 1965 public meeting, it was mentioned “The speakers criticized government”, and in 
March 1966, “speeches were anti-Government, critical of the Governor and of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Intelligence Report, December 1965; Intelligence Report, Mar 1966, CO 1031/5152, C474134. 
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Commissioner of Police.”22 Records also included plans for additional meetings. The running 
theme of scrutiny throughout the intelligence reports was how the purpose of the meetings and 
overall objectives were to include race and color discrimination in its opposition to local 
government. The PLP’s use of race diverged from the resident colonial officials’ own 
conceptualization, and their continued growth would jeopardize the status quo operative 
system of discrimination.  
On a number of occasions, the PLP was reported in the media such as The Bahamian 
Times and by speakers at various public meetings as having the intention to “exploit issues”, 
“play the race issue throughout recent debates in the House”, and continue “exploitation of the 
racial theme”.23 The use of the word “exploit” implied that the PLP was using race unfairly for 
its own benefit to win electoral support. The comment casted the PLP as a manipulative 
political party that was playing with race, trivializing it for its own political purposes versus 
communicating an issue that presented reality. On quick glance, one might assume that colonial 
interpretations support my overall thesis of Pindling’s use of race to deceive the broader “black” 
Bahamian public to create a unified electorate and ultimately a unified “black” national unit. I 
would argue against this hasty assumption given the evidences of colonial partiality to Bay 
Street, disregard for blatant signs of corruption within UBP Government, and ignorance of the 
interplay of historical color discrimination in the delineations of class differences. Despite 
similar ends, our means to achieve these ends are very different. My motivation for recognizing 
and understanding the roots of the political constructions on the basis of race differ quite 
dramatically from that of local colonial authorities. 
The antagonism from local colonial officials stemmed from an absolute denial of racial 
causal factors, and a fear of an absolute understanding of the fate of the colony’s inequalities 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Intelligence Report, December 1965; Intelligence Report, March 1966. 
23 Intelligence Report, February 1966; Intelligence Report, March 1966;. The Bahamian Times, the renamed 
version of The Nassau Herald newspaper media. 
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through race. While I already state that both arguments are over-deterministic, this dialogue 
was still prevalent. After all, Governor Grey and his officials denied a legal color bar, but local 
politicians saw one. In a letter enclosed with a June 1966 Intelligence Report, Governor Grey 
wrote: 
The month was again quiet, but the PLP emphasis on racialism, which has now been 
taken up by the Bahamas Federation of Labor, is disturbing. The PLP no doubt see in 
racialism a means of getting sufficient cohesion among the voters of African descent, who 
are in the majority to bring about the overthrow of the present Government. It is a 
dangerous means.24 
The last line of the PLP’s use of race as a ‘dangerous means’ implied fear held by the Governor 
that the Opposition could gain power within Government. The tone of impending danger of the 
PLP was rooted in fear of the possibility of destabilization of economic prosperity and loss of 
the political status quo of Bay Street rule through UBP administration.  
The colonial residents’ fear firmly rested in change of the status quo, decline of the 
economic successes within the colony, and overall positive report on governance through Bay 
Street elite. Yet, on a darker note, the fears of  “racialist” ideologies by local colonial officials 
also rested upon a possibility of the  “mostly white” administration to a “mostly colored” 
government administration. There is no explicit evidence to confirm officials’ views on color or 
racial hierarchies; however, they certainly were concerned about a change in government in 
terms of color. In a handwritten note on the margins of another Intelligence Report, Grey 
wrote, “If racial propaganda is effective, with coloreds outnumbering whites 4:1, the next 
election could bring defeat to the UBP.”25 Thus, while the official rhetoric demonstrated a 
rejection of a color bar, Governor Grey himself continued to equate divisions in racial terms. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Ralph Grey to Chief Registrar’s Office, Bahamas Security and Intelligence Committee, No. 22. Personal, 15 July 
1966, CO 1031/5152, C474134. 
25 Ralph Grey to Foreign Office. Date unknown. CO 1031/5152, C474134. 
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Through his delineation of the “coloreds” defeating the UBP, he framed the mobilization of a 
specific color group against a political party.  
Colonial authorities hoped to protect a “mostly white” UBP from the growth of any 
non-white elements. Race and color mattered to local colonial authorities, and were the main 
reason why the conservatism and administrative shortcomings of the UBP administration were 
not seen as problematic. PLP ideology, objectives and political platform were also easily 
dismissed on this basis. Grey further wrote,  “this continued propaganda [of the PLP]...could 
make a nasty incident out of some small happening which would otherwise be of no more than 
passing interest.”26 The Governor too easily overlooked the propaganda of the PLP as 
stemming from the very real, and still operative systems of racial discriminations within the 
colony. His final comment that the PLP’s claims of racial discrimination would otherwise be 
“some small happening” or a  “passing interest” further exposed the colonial practice of 
complacency from which the Bay Street oligarchy was able to operate.  
On another occasion in June 1966, flippant remarks were made toward local trade 
unions for the similar intention of disregarding their grievances.27 The Governor provided a 
narrative of attendance at a social function hosted by the Trade Union Congress. He claimed 
that one of the concluding speakers made remarks that “It was no longer good enough for the 
worker to live merely on fish and rice,” and that champagne was then served to all who were 
present to applaud the remarks and aims of trade union. Additionally, he described that toasts 
were made to the Queen (in her honor), and also to himself and his wife.  Grey responded to 
this series of events, quite dismissively, particularly of the giving of champagne: 
It is fair to say that torrential rain limited the number present to about fifty. Even so the 
use of champagne – though very kind – did not suggest a general condition of want.28  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Grey to Foreign Office. 
27 Governor Ralph Grey to Colonial Office, Secret, Personal, 16 June 1966, CO 1031/5152, C474134. 
28 Grey to Colonial Office, 16 June 1966.  
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In his response, the Governor dismissed the socioeconomic grievances made by trade union 
representatives. He slipped this narrative in to suggest that the work of trade unions was 
contradicting their claim to support and provide for the working class. The example was quite 
tactful. He could have been noting that the seemingly extravagant purchase of champagne was 
feasible only because of the existence of a more affluent middle class group of “black” 
Bahamians. Thus, the Governor could have been aptly exposing class difference between the 
hosts of the function and the working class majority that they claimed to represent. Yet, in 
Grey’s anectode, it seems as if elite “black” leaders were being mocked for their pretentious 
consumption of expensive champagne. Moreover, Grey’s objections were again working to 
undermine or delegitimize any claim that threatened the status quo of Bay Street rule by local 
colonial officials. 
 
Summary 
This chapter has outlined colonial patterns of complacency toward the Bay Street elite 
while showing evidence of their social ties to their administration. The fear of the growth of 
“racialism” through Pindling’s leadership, and mockery of pretentious consumption of 
expensive champagne by “coloreds” has also demonstrated further colonial partnership and 
alliance with Bay Street. Colonial officials also showed apt understanding of the correlation of 
class divisions by delineating them as “mostly white” versus “mostly colored”. Thus, when 
Governor Grey and his staff of local colonial officials asserted a lack of a formal “color bar,” it 
did not imply that the colony was not organized by race or characterized by less systematic 
racial categorization and discrimination. Rather, it was to offer its stamp of approval on its 
organization and allegiance to the Bay Street oligarchy that was still in existence. Political and 
labor platforms which revealed truths of racial discrimination, were deemed protests that 
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“would otherwise be a passing interest” in the colony. Local colonial authorities and Bay Street 
government knowingly participated in such systems of discrimination. 
The confidential nature of the letters and intelligence reports written by local officials 
to the Colonial Office in London exposed deceitful politics of race yet denied that racial 
discrimination was an issue for current power holders. It wasn’t an issue for either colonial or 
local Bay Street “white” elites. Pindling’s political platforms, however, saw this as a central 
argument in their contestation for legitimacy. It was through such antagonism that Pindling’s 
political platforms grew increasingly racial in content during his rise to power in the decade 
prior to 1967. Moreover, it was through this antagonism that a backlash of the political 
construction of a “Black Bahamas” came into existence, as Pindling’s government engineered 
the newly independent nation from 1967 to 1992.  
What goes around comes around, as the common adage goes. The backlash that ensued 
as a response to the politics of race is key to understanding the emergence of Pindling’s 
political projects that followed. It responded to former ideologies that did not include color or 
race. It created a dialogue for a transformed government that recognized the political, 
economic, and social marginalization of a majority “black” population.  In short, new political 
articulations of blackness were a reactive inverse of the colonial and Bay Street’s 
conceptualizations that negated race and color as problematic issues in Bahamian society.29 
Such discussion is still reticent in today’s Bahamian society and popular imagination of 
Bahamian national identity. Latter generations still wrestle to understand and debate the 
meanings of racial discriminations of the past and present and the ways in which race has been 
presented by the PLP as the key discriminatory force.30  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
30 This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
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The realities are a combination of the two ideologies, whereby both class and race are at 
play. Thus, choosing one or the other fails to understand the complexities that exist both in 
terms of political power and social systems at work within the Bahamian community. 
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Chapter Three 
 
“Remember Your Chains”1 
The Symbolic Power of Slavery in Political Rhetoric 
 
“These are the Names! Remember Your Chains! Boycott! Join The PLP!”2 
 
Chapter Objectives 
 The rhetoric of black power was at work in The Bahamas throughout the final half of 
the twentieth century; and its effects on the consciousness of a “Black Bahamas” are still being 
felt today. This chapter offers a historical overview of Pindling’s leadership as Premier and 
Prime Minister of The Bahamas from 1967 to 1992. It also examines the specific motifs of Bay 
Street as slave masters within the political projects of the Progressive Liberal Party to inform a 
collective identity of a “black” Bahamian identity. These motifs were instilled during the 
formative years before the Party became elected, in its early years of Pindling’s government, 
and later well-established years of the 1980s until the Party’s defeat in 1992.3 They included an 
assortment of motifs of overpowering whips and chains of the black Atlantic slave tradition, 
imagery of the master-slave relationship, and the Christian narrative of the story of Exodus, to 
provide a certain symbolic narrative of black suffering and black victimization within the 
present-day Bahamian society. Using familiar aspects of Bahamian legacies of slavery as well as 
the dominance of Christianity in The Bahamas, the Progressive Liberal Party was able to pull 
many Bahamians into a collective web and achieve political longevity. 
 After providing an historical overview of the leadership of the PLP Government, their 
long-running political motifs are assessed through the comparative lens of broader black power 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1Nassau Herald, March 29, 1958, 2, 3. 
2 Nassau Herald, March 29, 1958, 2, 3. 
3 Formative years refer to the roughly 1956-1967, shortly after Pindling became leader of the Party. Early years 
refer to post-1967 election and pre-drug scandal. Later years refer to the final years of Pindling’s government, 
after the Drug Commission of Inquiry of 1984 until the Party’s defeat of 1992. 
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traditions. I debate what kinds of black power rhetoric were at work when such motifs were 
being conceptualized in its original stage. Moreover, I look at how such slavery motifs were 
influenced by various traditions of the black power movement within the United States and 
broader Caribbean region.  
Second, this chapter examines the symbolic power of Pindling’s political rhetoric 
through the lens of anthropological theory. I examine the two-fold purpose of Pindling’s 
articulation of symbolic framework of slavery to convince and persuade a collective “black” 
political and national framework, and isolate non-black and other intermediate groups from 
belonging to it.  
Third, this chapter combines theoretical frameworks of black power ideology and 
political symbolism to incorporate a fuller study of the various forms of black power, and also 
the symbolic power by which motifs were used in Pindling’s political projects throughout the 
second half of the twentieth century. With special inclusion of the ways in which Pindling’s 
political delegates, supporters, and opponents reacted to the recurring motifs, I investigate the 
implications of Pindling’s symbolic rhetoric on the popular consciousness of a “Black Bahamas”.  
As the fulcrum of my thesis, I establish specific ways in which black power and symbolic 
rhetoric within the political constructions of the Pindling Government contradict itself in 
practice. Moreover, I demonstrate how these contradictions have impacted the popular 
consciousness of being both a “black” Bahamian people and nation. 
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Pitfalls with Progress in Pindling Government: 1967-1992 
The January 1967 election brought victory for the PLP. 4 The PLP victory signified the 
first moment in Bahamian history where its Government was representative of the majority of 
the country’s people. Furthermore, the 1967 victory represented a monumental and positive 
transformation of the historical and political hegemony of the Bay Street oligarchy. The lower 
class majority connected with and supported Pindling’s leadership, and brought the party its 
political legitimacy in the election of 1967.5 The achievement of independence from Great 
Britain on July 10, 1973, however, was the strongest and most monumental achievement under 
the Pindling Government.6 The legacy of the Pindling Government in providing both the 
means to oust Bay Street rule in 1967 and achieve imperial rule in 1973 gave the political party 
much longevity. Thus, Pindling and his government were consistently reelected until their 
eventual defeat in 1992.7 At the time of his departure, Pindling had been the longest standing 
leader in the Western Hemisphere, surpassing all other nations except Fidel Castro of Cuba.8 
Nonetheless, Pindling and the PLP achieved legitimacy and electoral support through 
racial means, pinning Bay Street men as slave masters to portray a simplistic racial dichotomy 
of political, economic, and social divides within Bahamian society. The extent to which 
blackness was used as a political tool to unite the majority at the polls and to portray whiteness 
as antithetical to political and national progress is undeniable. While Bay Street had dominated 
the majority of the population in the similar master-slave dichotomies, the issue of class and the 
rise of a dark-colored middle class throughout the twentieth century has been noted to expose 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Colin A. Hughes, Race and Politics in The Bahamas (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981; Nassau: Media 
Publishing Ltd, 2010), 119-21. Citations refer to Media edition. 
5 Hughes, Race and Politics, 119-21, 216, 230-41. 
6 Paul Albury, The Story of The Bahamas (London: Macmillan Caribbean, 1975), 23-84. 
7 Nassau Tribune, July 10, 1973; Nassau Guardian, July 10, 1973; Bahamas Dateline 2 (June-August 1977), 7 (may-
June 1982). General 1987 election, Bahamas Dateline 11 (June-July 1987); Bahamas Index and Yearbook, 1993, 131, 
135.  
8 Jayson Blair, "Sir Lynden Pindling, 70, Prime Minister Who Led Bahamas to Independence," The New York 
Times, August 27, 2000, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/08/27/world/sir-lynden-pindling-70-prime-minister-
who-led-bahamas-to-independence.html. 
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limitations or credibility to this argument. Given that many PLP members also derived from 
similar educated middle class “black” backgrounds made the symbolic rhetoric of a unified 
“black” electorate a fragile construction. My research shows that suspicions of class division 
were warranted, as Pindling’s government failed to lend full government machinery to improve 
the livelihood of the more disadvantaged, darker-colored lower class. Thus, the rhetoric was in 
certain respects, a scam. 
The early years of Pindling’s governance were promising for the Bahamian majority; 
however, internal corruption and mismanagement of the treasury throughout the late 1970s 
and 1980s quickly undermined early advancements.  Immediately following the 1967 election, 
budgetary adjustments allowed for a primary focus on education, followed by health services 
throughout the island (including milk and lunch programs), public works, and lastly, tourism.9 
Government ministers were salaried so as to prevent conflicts of interest. Increased 
employment opportunities and desegregation in the social and economic spheres also benefited 
the historically marginalized “black” Bahamian community. Due in part to Pindling’s 
championship in early social and economic reform, the PLP received wide support and 
unprecedented margins in the polls.  
Despite Pindling’s early championship for The Bahamas and the “black” majority, 
subsequent years of his governance were rift with economic and social ill that inhibited further 
progress and reform. By the time of independence, seventy-five per cent of the poorest and 
most densely populated settlements in Nassau still had inadequate infrastructure for running 
water, and eighty-five per cent of household incomes were spent on food and housing.10 The 
outer islands were also neglected and seldom visited by their political representatives, and 
infrastructure remained substandard. Crime increased to a horrific level, putting The Bahamas 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Michael Craton and Gail Saunders, Islanders in the Stream: A History of the Bahamian People. From the Ending of 
Slavery to the Twenty-First Century, Vol. 2 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2000), 350. 
10 Craton and Saunders, Islanders in the Stream, 357. 
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on the map as having the highest crime rate per capita in the world, including major violent 
crime and burglary in 1979, and the development of highly organized youth gangs by the late 
1980s.11 Primary and secondary education, while being much more readily accessible to the 
majority, was of poor quality in government schools.12 It is in these deficiencies that one begins 
to see the pitfalls of the political projects of the government. Herein also lies the speculation of 
the PLP’s commitment to the “black” majority once Bay Street and colonial opponents were no 
longer political threats. 
The economy plummeted in a few short years after Pindling came in to power. In 1970, 
for the first time ever, the government treasury experienced a shift from being in a state of 
surplus to a deficit of nearly $12 million.13 By 1972, tourism numbers also declined, and eight of 
the largest hotels in Nassau suffered $8 million in total losses. As is common for leaders with 
little experience in running a newly independent country, social and economic ideals initially 
set by the PLP Government were hardly realized or successfully implemented. 
The most blatant pitfall of the Pindling Government came in 1984, when the Prime 
Minister was indicted for involvement in widespread drug trafficking throughout the islands of 
The Bahamas. An international commission of inquiry uncovered that the trafficking of cocaine 
and marijuana had soared since independence and reached dangerous levels after a decade had 
passed.14 Nearly all Out Islands of The Bahamas were found to be involved in some degree of 
trafficking, and PLP Government officials were, if only minimally, implicated for their inability 
to stop it.15 The evidence of the commission cited “widespread official corruption” within 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Bahamas Dateline 9 (April 30, 1984): 1-2; RBPF Annual Report of the Year 1984 (Nassau: RBPH, 1985); Bahamas 
Dateline 9 (January 21, 1985): 3. Craton and Saunders, Islanders in the Stream,  411. 
12 Craton and Saunders, Islanders in the Stream, 411. Failure rate of 40.2%. 
13 Hughes, Race and Politics, 194. Hughes reported that by 1992, national debt was $1 billion. 
14 Report of the Commission of Inquiry, Appointed to Inquire into the Illegal Use of the Bahamas for the Transshipment of 
Dangerous Drugs Destined for the united States, November 1983-December 1984 (Nassau: Bahamas Government, 
1984), 1-10. 
15 Appendix II, List of Exhibits, ACP Lawrence Major’s Reports, “Illegal Activites, Andros Island,” January 17, 
1977; “Illegal Activities Through the Bahamas,” March 12, 1979, Appendix VIII, Persons arrested, drugs seized, 
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Pindling’s cabinet and the Bahamian police. At least $3.5 million could not be accounted for in 
the personal bank accounts of Pindling himself.16 Therefore, no official charges could be made 
against him. “We can still trace drug-related corruption right up to Pindling’s door,” one 
American intelligence official confessed in 1986, “but not through it.”17 The alleged fraudulent 
use of government money and increased national debt, the exposure of internal corruption and 
undercover drug trafficking industry by the Commission of the Inquiry of the 1980s, and rise in 
social ills such as crime underlined major pitfalls of PLP reform under Pindling’s leadership. It 
also heightened suspicions as to what forms allegiance did the Party hold for the betterment of 
the Bahamian majority.  
The pitfalls of corruption and large acquirement of personal wealth by government 
ministers combined with a declining economy from 1967 to 1992 contradicted Pindling’s 
political promises, public image, and political rhetoric. His legitimacy and political power 
provided more financial cushion for a rising group of middle class of darker-colored Bahamians 
who were affiliates of the regime.18  Meanwhile, the needs of building infrastructure and 
providing tangible support for the marginalized majority continued to fall asunder, suggesting 
a similar pattern of heedless Bay Street leadership of the recent past. Nonetheless, a large 
segment of the Bahamian population, most notably of grassroots sectors, found themselves 
attached to the symbolic power of the rhetoric of Pindling’s Government. The following 
section reveals reasons for this continued political support. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and locations, January 1981-June 1984, ibid., 86-97; Craton and Saunders, 382. “The 1984 Drug Commission 
found that Prime Minister Pindling had received…five times his official salary between 1977 and 1983, including a 
$750,000 gift…, $437,000…for nominal services, $250,000 from an American benefactor, and #181,00 from 
‘unidentified sources’…but it could not be proven that any of these monies were drug-related.”  
16Wall Street Journal, January 22, 23, 1982; NBC broadcast, November 5, 1983; “A Nation for Sale,” The Miami 
Herald Special Report (articles dated September 23-October 10-1983, n.d. (1983); Report of the Commission of Inquiry, 
section 18, pp. 352-60. 
17 Joel Brinkley, "Drugs and Graft Main Issue in Bahamas Vote," The New York Times, June 14, 1987, Corruption 
sec., http://www.nytimes.com/1987/06/14/world/drugs-and-graft-main-issue-in-bahamas-vote.html?src=pm. 
18 Please note that I do not wish to generalize that all darker-colored upper to middle class Bahamians were 
affiliated of Pindling’s regime or that all members of Pindling’s cabinet were involved in the pitfalls of drug 
corruption and financial management; however, a large majority were. 
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Origins of a Bahamian Black Power Agenda 
The discriminatory relationships imposed by generations of light-colored Bay Street 
elite rule made an inverse Bahamian black power agenda across class lines plausible by Pindling 
and his darker-colored supporters. As discussed in Chapter 1, Bay Street maintained its rule 
through political, economic, and social discrimination toward all non-white persons or near-
white persons that were not a part of the mercantile elite. Moreover, parallels with “white” 
power holders in the epoch of slavery and emancipation until the mid-twentieth century are 
indisputable as non-whites continued to be discriminated against in the franchise and political 
arena until mid-twentieth century.19  Thus, Pindling’s articulation using metaphors of master-
slave imagery within a political strategy of black power was highly conceivable. Predicated on 
the visible political discrimination of most non-whites prior to Pindling’s emergence, the 
rhetoric was set on fire. 
Pindling was heavily influenced by the wider web of the black power movement 
throughout his implementation of Bahamian black power political rhetoric to the broader 
Bahamian public. The black power movement itself involves a number of traditions that 
Pindling pulled from. Having received financial support, friendship and camaraderie from 
leaders of varied traditions (including Martin Luther King Jr. of the United States Civil Rights 
Movement and Kwame Nkrumah of the Black Nationalist independence movement in Ghana) 
Pindling’s rhetoric must first be positioned and set apart from this framework or wider web of 
black power or Black Nationalism ideologies.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Nicolette Bethel, "Engendering The Bahamas: A Gendered Examination of Bahamian Nation Making, or 
National Identity and Gender in the Bahamian Context," The International Journal of Bahamian Studies 12, no. 0 
(February 28, 2008). Bethel’s use of “political color” is deliberate. It does not provide a determinative analysis that 
the racial binary of “white” vs. “black” was operative in social settings, whereby intermediate groups are seen as 
socially distinct from other groups. Nonetheless, I would still take Bethel’s point a step further, to highlight that 
such intermediate groups were often economically distinct or advantaged. See rise of “black” middle class and 
middle class membership of the PLP in Chapter 1 for more explanation. 
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 Various scholars have provided their take on the differences and similarities of various 
traditions within the ideology of black power.20 One historian, Jeffrey Ogbar has provided a 
definition of Black Nationalism that is workable for study in the Bahamian context: 
The most viable definition is one that includes group consciousness among black people and the 
belief that they, independent of whites, can achieve liberation by the creation and maintenance 
of black institutions to serve the best interests of black people. Territorial separatism and/or 
racial exclusivity are essential to this definition.21 
The motivations behind Pindling’s articulation of black disenfranchisement connect well 
with Ogbar’s definition. Moreover, the timeframe of the mid-1950s when Pindling gained 
leadership of the Party was also the time of mass movements of resistance to white supremacy 
and the time of resurgence of black nationalist activity around the world. Being sponsored by 
Kwame Nkrumah from Ghana meant that Pindling was certainly aware of this growing form of 
black power ideology as he began his own political projects. In a 1970 editorial of The Nassau 
Guardian, for example, an anonymous writer criticized the PLP for “excessive quoting” of 
Nkrumah in its party meetings.22 
In a repeated political cartoon from The Nassau Herald in the 1958, for example, a 
headline read, “These Are The Names!!...Remember Your Chains.”23 It then proceeded to list 
the names of constituency representatives of the United Bahamian Party and likened them to 
slave drivers. The illustration below the message further depicted the UBP as “forces of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See Jeffrey O. G. Ogbar, Black Power: Radical Politics and African American Identity (Baltimore, Md: Johns 
Hopkins Univ.Press, 2005); William L. VanDeburg, New Day in Babylon: The Black Power Movement and American 
Culture, 1965-1975 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992; Bert J. Thomas, "Caribbean Black Power: From 
Slogan to Practical Politics,," Journal of Black Studies 22, no. 3 (March 01, 1992): 392-410, Sage Publications, Inc. 
21 Ogbar, Black Power: Radical Politics and African American Identity, 3. 
22 Nassau Guardian, 7 November 1970.  
23,Nassau Herald, 29 March 29, 1958. 
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tyranny” that were enslaving “the Bahamian negro” brandishing a spiked mallet and large 
shackles.24  
The motif of a master-slave relationship within a framework of black nationalism served 
a dual purpose in Pindling’s projects by providing group consciousness and “black” solidarity to 
combat the Bay Street elite, and also serving to alienate non-blacks as enemies. Like in Ogbar’s 
definition, territorial separatism or racial “black” exclusivity was at the core of Pindling’s 
framework. For this reason, when Pindling gained leadership, he was instrumental in 
reconstructing the government and political rhetoric to serve the interests of the Bahamian 
“black” community. This exclusivity alienated non-black Bahamian elements from being 
considered a part of the cultural framework of national identity. Ultimately, it had its 
consequence in constructing a “Black Bahamas”. 
 Violent elements of the revolutionary Black Nationalist tradition or territorial separatist 
tradition were neither appropriate nor operative in Pindling’s political projects.25 With the 
exception of the events of “Black Tuesday”26, at no point in the emergence of Pindling as leader 
of the Party, transition to Government in 1967, or independence in 1973 was violence used to 
achieve Pindling’s aims. Moreover, physical violence or bloody conflict was never used, which 
compared to other Black Nationalist movements was quite a feat.27 
 Non-violent black power movements followed a tradition of pluralism or integration. 28 
Leaders of this tradition, including Martin Luther King Jr., practiced “community control” 
whereby local “black” constituencies would act as a support base for black empowerment and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24.The Nassau Herald, November 30, 1959. 
25 William L. VanDeburg, New Day in Babylon: The Black Power Movement and American Culture, 1965-1975 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 112. 
26 Nassau Tribune, April 27, 1965; The Nassau Herald, April 27. One this day Pindling through the mace outside of 
House of Assembly in protest. See Introduction, 5. 
27 See Introduction, 5. The mace incident of Black Tuesday is discussed there in greater detail. Lack of violence is 
why Pindling’s rise to power has been coined a “Quiet Revolution” by Doris Johnson,  
28 Jeffrey O. G. Ogbar, Black Power: Radical Politics and African American Identity , 112-113; William L. VanDeburg, 
New Day in Babylon: The Black Power Movement and American Culture, 1965-1975 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1992), 112. 
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participation at state and national levels.29 Unlike nationalist traditions that could be 
retaliatory and racially exclusive, pluralist forms of the black power movement worked to 
galvanize racial solidarity without self-determination or separation from “whites”. Sometimes, 
these movements were purely cultural movements, cultivating racial pride and strength, while 
others still hoped to improve economic, educational, and political institutions without 
alienating other groups in the process.30 
 I would argue that Pindling’s black power rhetoric adapted to certain elements of both 
traditions. Although not violent, Pindling’s projects provided a cultural polarization within 
Bahamian society under a similar tradition of Black Nationalism. A notion of self-determination 
was at the core of Pindling’s political project, whereby similar language was used in slavery 
motifs about the need to emancipate or liberate the majority black Bahamian population from 
modern-day, slavery-like economic, political, and social inequality. At the same time, however, 
Pindling swayed to more pluralist traditions of bringing improvement to the disadvantaged 
majority on a national level through political forum. Officially, this political forum through the 
PLP’s founding platform of 1953, promised a multi-cultural framework.31 Even in the 
transitions to a noticeably dark-skinned portfolio of ministers and plethora of propaganda of 
motifs at the onset of Pindling’s leadership, the Party was described as a Party “for all 
Bahamians”.32  Thus, Pindling’s political project of black power operated on a tandem of official 
rhetoric of pluralism or integration while also displaying separatist and racially exclusionary 
propaganda by means of repeated and varied motifs of slavery. 
 The differences of bringing American black power traditions into The Bahamas, a 
darker-colored majority population, was also a dilemma within Pindling’s own political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Jeffrey O. G. Ogbar, Black Power: Radical Politics and African American Identity , 112. 
30 VanDeburg, New Day in Babylon: The Black Power Movement and American Culture, 1965-1975 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1992), 113. 
31 See pages  38-40 of Chapter 1. 
32 The Nassau Guardian, October 23 1953, Hughes, Race and Politics, 36-39. 
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projects. Moreover, it was a dilemma for many rising black majority governments throughout 
the Caribbean that came into existence during the mid-twentieth century. 33 It was a dilemma 
due to the difference of demographics of darker colored people between the two regions, with 
American black power operating as a minority movement and Caribbean black power as the 
opposite. Historian Walter Rodney, considered the Father of Caribbean Black Power, identified 
three major components in the transference of American black power traditions into a 
Caribbean context: 1) a break with imperialism which has been historically “white racist”, 2) the 
assumption of power by the “black” masses in the islands, and 3) the cultural reconstruction of 
the society in the image of “the blacks”. 34  Much like my previous analysis of Pindling’s 
melding of both separatist and pluralist traditions of the black power movement, Rodney 
demonstrated a shared desire to emancipate and empower “blacks” throughout the Caribbean 
during this time period through similar means. He identified that this Caribbean black power 
was achieved through political legitimacy as well as a cultural reconstruction of nationhood 
centered on blackness. The combination of both traditions was what made Caribbean Black 
Power so much more powerful on the political and cultural trajectory of newly independent 
Caribbean nations.  
Pindling’s black power political projects discretely conveyed separatist goals, “black” 
government, and political or public dominion over the society. Without claiming an official 
black power rhetoric or violent means, Pindling was able to exercise the symbolic power of its 
political propaganda and image of “black” power through an all-black government. This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 "Marcus Garvey," in The Birth of Caribbean Civilization: A Century of Ideas about Culture and Identity, Nation and 
Society, comp. O. Nigel. Bolland (Kingston Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2004), 326.. Garvey promoted the 
notion that, “A Negro needs a nation of its own and must emancipate itself to be truly respected: build its own 
government, industry, progress, art, science, literature, culture.” 
34 "Walter Rodney," in The Birth of Caribbean Civilization: A Century of Ideas about Culture and Identity,Nation and 
Society, comp. O. Nigel. Bolland (Kingston Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2004), 487. Rodney speaks as a scholar 
who self-identifies as black and has adopted a black power mindset, Rodney both embodies and defends its ideals. 
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effectively administered black power political objectives while having reasonable cultural 
impact on nation building of the budding independent nation of The Bahamas. 
 
Political Symbolism in Bahamian Nation Building 
 Without physical violence attributable to separatist forms of black power, Pindling35 
used the symbolic power of political rhetoric to construct a culture of fear and resentment for 
the “white” minority as slave masters, undeserving of being included in the Bahamian nation. 
As discrimination deepened throughout the early 20th century, the PLP achieved political 
legitimacy in its electoral victory in January 1967 through racial means.36 Moreover, the 
political rhetoric that accompanied Bahamian independence in July 1973 was also through 
similar means. According to Bahamian anthropologist Nicolette Bethel, the political rhetoric 
was  “an overwhelmingly racialist one,” and “‘binaristic’, dealing with whites and blacks and 
making little mention of intermediate groups”.37 Pindling’s symbolic rhetoric of slavery in the 
years prior to independence and nation building in the decades following provide evidence of 
this.  
 In order to assess the range of motifs of Bay Street as slave masters that were used by 
Pindling to inform a collective “black” electorate and national community, I turn to theoretical 
studies of symbolic rhetoric from an anthropological perspective. The power of political 
rhetoric and the relationship between rhetoric and ritual in the process of power acquisition 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Pindling, leader of the Party will be used as representative of the Party and Government. Nonetheless, political 
constructions were not solely his design but also crafted by his political partners. 
36 Bethel, Nicolette. "Engendering The Bahamas: A Gendered Examination of Bahamian Nation Making, or 
National Identity and Gender in the Bahamian Context" The International Journal of Bahamian Studies [Online], 
Volume 12 Number 0 (28 February 2008). 
37 Bethel, Nicolette. "Engendering The Bahamas”, [Online]. 
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and legitimation in political campaigns have recently been adopted into anthropological 
thought.38  
 In looking at Pindling’s political rhetoric (in electoral campaigns) that was predicated 
on the symbolic power of slavery, there was a deliberate attempt to make the electorate see a 
racial binary. Using theoretical language from various anthropologists, Pindling’s campaigns 
provided a “rhetorical and symbolic arena” whereby both voters and candidates were able to 
participate “ritually” in the complexities of the metaphoric symbolism of his political rhetoric.39 
These rhetorical events produced by Pindling could be seen as “cultural performances” or 
“plastic dramas” that amalgamated Bahamian history and social divisions into racial binaries.40 
Notions of rhetorical events such as “plastic dramas”, Geertz noted, “synthesize of people’s 
ethos and worldview”.41 Thus, Pindling wanted society to absorb these racial binaries, 
metaphoric symbols of slavery motifs, and collective black struggle as truth. 
 Pindling’s symbolic rhetoric served the ultimate goal of acquiring and maintaining 
political power and legitimacy. Victor Turner was the first to translate the study of symbolic 
rhetoric in relation to political action.42 Turner emphasized that symbolic rhetoric in politics 
stressed loyalty and obligation, and exposed conflict as the most fundamental and prominent 
aspects of society to a frightening degree.43 This can certainly be seen within Pindling’s 
political projects, as the rhetoric of slavery served to corner the Bahamian electorate into 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 James R. McLeod, "The Sociodrama of Presidential Politics: Rhetoric, Ritual, and Power in the Era of 
Teledemocracy," American Anthropologist 101, No. 2 (1999): 360. Studies became prominent in mid-twentieth 
century. 
39 F. G. Bailey, Stratagems and Spoils: A Social Anthropology of Politics (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), quoted in 
James R. McLeod, "Ritual and Rhetoric in Presidential Politics," Central Issues in Anthropology, 9th ser. (1991): 29-
46. 
40 M. Singer, "The Cultural Pattern of Indian Civilization," Far Eastern Quarterly, 15th ser.: 23; Clifford Geertz, 
Person, Time, and Conduct in Bali: An Essay in Cultural Analysis. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 3, 
both quoted respectively in McLeod, “The Sociodrama of Presidential Politics”, 359. 
41Geertz, Person, Time, and Conduct in Bali), 3, quoted in McLeod, “The Sociodrama of Presidential Politics”, 359. 
42 Victor W. Turner, Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1974), 13-59, quoted in McLeod, “The Sociodrama of Presidential Politics”, 359. 
43 Turner, Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors, 35, quoted in McLeod, “The Sociodrama of Presidential Politics”, 359. 
	  	  
Lee  77 
taking sides, most poignantly stressing obligation from the majority “black” electorate to be 
loyal to the PLP. Continuing on, Turner emphasized that political rhetoric was “symbolic 
manipulation by design, playing on deeply held beliefs in the electorate”.44 Thus, in many ways, 
the collective memories of Bay Street domination worked in the favor of Pindling’s political 
rhetoric. Although it was a political construction, its historical relevancy was able to resonate 
in the consciousness of much of the popular classes.  
Nonetheless, later theorists have added even more tentacles to the understanding of the 
power of political and symbolic rhetoric. Beyond its relevancy and relationship to real conflict 
at work in Bahamian society, the political constructs have intensified such conflicts and made 
them even more authentic in the popular consciousness and legacies of a “Black Bahamas”. 
Theories by Kertzer underscore the deliberate construction of political rhetoric for mass 
consumption in societies at large, “created and orchestrated for quantitative effects”.45 The 
construction, Kertzer continued, “follows certain culturally prescribed forms whose built-in 
logic makes the course of argument predictable.” 46 Furthermore, he explained that “makes the 
message uncontestable – framed in such a way as to be seen inherent to the way things are”.47 
The recurring motifs of slavery by Pindling served this purpose, exacting an imagination of 
black victimization and continued struggle, and white demonization and the continued need of 
their banishment from political and overall cultural realms of Bahamian society.  
As a summative theoretical framework, the power of slavery in Pindling’s political 
rhetoric had two deliberate functions in the construction of a “Black Bahamas”: black solidarity 
and white alienation. The framework could finally be interpreted through a theoretical lens of 
the rhetorical symbolism of inclusion and exclusion:  “to incorporate the in-group symbolically 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Turner, Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors, 35, quoted in McLeod, “The Sociodrama of Presidential Politics”, 359. 
45 David I. Kertzer, Ritual, Politics, and Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 108, quoted in McLeod, 
“The Sociodrama of Presidential Politics”, 359. 
46 Kertzer, Ritual, Politics, and Power, 108, quoted in McLeod, “The Sociodrama of Presidential Politics”, 359. 
47 Kertzer, Ritual, Politics, and Power, 108, quoted in McLeod, “The Sociodrama of Presidential Politics”, 359. 
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and exclude the out-group symbolically”.48 Pindling’s symbolic construction of slavery was a 
means to provide implicit racial binaries and tensions as absolute, and to solidify fundamental 
aspects of black collectivity and white alienation within Bahamian society. Through the implicit 
acts of Pindling’s rhetorical symbolism of slavery grew the basis of Pindling’s political 
legitimation and conceptualization of the nation as a “Black Bahamas”. 
 
Symbolic Power of Slavery in Political Rhetoric: 1957-1992 
 Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, Pindling’s political rhetoric and 
projects adhered to the symbolic power of slavery amidst widespread electoral support. His 
rhetoric resonated well – and with good reason – with many persons of African descent who 
experienced political disenfranchisement, and economic and social discrimination on the basis of 
their exclusion from the Bay Street “white” merchant oligarchy. Nonetheless, his political 
rhetoric drew a thin line between a call for black empowerment (following the pluralist 
tradition of black power) and more symbolic and implicit call for black autonomy and cultural 
ownership of the Bahamian nation (following the separatist tradition of black power).  
 
Formative Years: Political Cartoons 
In the formative years of Pindling’s political projects, violent visual imagery of master-slave 
relationships were repeatedly published as sketch drawing cartoons in local newspapers.49  
These cartoons allowed the PLP to vividly provide a picture of black marginalization by the 
elite minority that was easily digestible for literate and illiterate Bahamians alike. The epitaph, 
“Remember Your Chains!” from the chapter’s title and opening quote derive from one of these 
earlier cartoons, first published in a March 1958 edition of The Nassau Herald. (See Figure 3)  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 G. Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations (New York: Free Press, 1955), quoted in McLeod, “The 
Sociodrama of Presidential Politics”, 366. 
49 Hughes, Race and Politics, 245-255; Craton and Saunders, Islanders in the Stream, 307. The Nassau Herald, 
newspaper company that was often identified as the mouthpiece of the PLP, it had a readership of primary black, 
working class Bahamians.  
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Figure 3: “Remember Your Chains,!” PLP Advertisement, The Nassau Herald , March 1958 
 
This cartoon listed names of representatives of the United Bahamian Party, and using the 
command, “These are The Names! Remember Your Chains!” effectively equated the UBP 
Government as slave masters. Recalling Geertz’ theory of symbolic rhetoric as “plastic 
dramas,” this particular cartoon demonstrated how this master-slave imagery was seen as the 
quintessential means through which individuals should view their culture. Below this 
inscription and list of names was a cartoon illustration that depicted a large, burly, grotesque-
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looking man raising a spiked mallet and large shackles toward a small, noticeably darker 
character. The smaller, powerless-looking man, labeled “the Bahamian negro”, made the 
cartoon explicitly racial and offered the conflict between masters and slaves as the fundamental 
division of Bahamians in its history at the time. Recalling Geertz’ theory of symbolic rhetoric as 
“plastic dramas,” this particular cartoon demonstrated how this master-slave imagery was seen 
as the quintessential means through which Bahamian individuals should view their culture, at a 
time of political and cultural transformation. 
Another cartoon stating “Your Freedom Depends on How Tight Your Grip and Faith 
in the PLP” also predicated on the symbolic power of slavery. (See Figure 4)50  
 
Figure 4: “Your Freedom Depends on How Tight Your Grip and Faith in the PLP",  
Nassau Herald, September 1957, Courtesy of The National Archives of The Bahamas 
Again, a dark-colored man was pictured as suffering through discriminatory systems of the 
“white” minority or Bay Street oligarchy in similar master-slave dialectic. Using symbolic 
imagery of  “quicksand of enslavement”, the darker-colored man was pulled from forces of  	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““white oppression”, “labor exploiters”, “freedom killers”, and “negro haters”, among others. 
The PLP was depicted as the heroic figure with the potential of metaphorically breaking the 
chains of tyranny and pulling the weak “Bahamian Negro” out of suffocating forces of racial 
oppression and economic exploitation at the hands of the white minority.  
In a new era when opposition to the “white” Bay Street regime was being voiced, 
Pindling was able to capitalize on the Bahamian history of enslavement and present-day racial 
inequalities in a way that defined their political identity as liberators from white power, racism, 
and modern-day slavery. The metaphor itself linking the legacy and memory of slavery to the 
socioracial inequalities in the modern mid-twentieth century was an understandable one for 
many. Furthermore, the majority electorate proved to resonate with it through their consistent 
reelection of Pindling over the next twenty-five years. In both cartoons, there was an emphasis 
on the need for the Bahamian public’s active involvement in the pursuit of outdoing the evil 
deeds of Bay Street power. The first asked the readership to boycott the Bay Street regime, and 
in the other, to vote in support of the PLP. Just as the man was compelled to take initiative by 
grabbing one end of the rope, individuals experiencing racial and socioeconomic discrimination 
were encouraged to take initiative to combat forces of enslavement by voting the PLP into 
government. The deliberate political function of the symbolic rhetoric of slavery then becomes 
apparent for my analysis, as Pindling was attempting to bring symbolism into the 
consciousness of the popular electorate.  
 During this period of Pindling’s emergence and political rhetoric of slavery, there were 
many individuals who continued to apply such metaphorical language in their discourse of 
political and socioeconomic divisions in Bahamian society. In one instance, a resident of 
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Adelaide Village, located on the southern region of New Providence wrote, “But times have 
changed! Oh, how they have changed! I’ve got a little education…I have learned Freedom.”51 
The author continued his letter by paraphrasing the mentality of Bay Street power 
holders refusing to educate “black bastards” because education would be considered dangerous 
to the maintenance of their slavery-like oligarchic rule.52 The final line of the author declaring 
that he has “learned Freedom” could be interpreted as an association with the slavery-themed 
language of freedom and liberation by Pindling’s political projects. Written in 1962, several 
years after Pindling’s political cartoons and other motifs of slavery came into existence, it 
would not be far-fetched to assume that the symbolism and metaphors of slavery became 
readily applied and expanded upon by the popular electorate through this political forum. 
 
The Figure of Pindling as Black Moses and The Story of Exodus 
The use of symbolic rhetoric of slavery by Pindling continued into the 1960s with the 
addition of the biblical narrative of Exodus. The narratives metaphorically linked the political 
plight and struggle of black freedom in The Bahamas to the biblical account in Exodus of the 
liberation of Israelites from the system of slavery by the Egyptian Pharaohs. Moreover, 
Pindling began being metaphorically characterized as the “Black Moses”, liberator of “black” 
Bahamians from the entrenchment of Bay Street slave masters. 53 
In one of the final PLP conventions prior to the January 1967 election, the keynote 
address was given to religious leader Reverend Dr. H. W. Brown who “urged all delegates to 
Go Forward” and “likened the struggle for freedom in The Bahamas to the exodus of the Jews 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 “Letters from Adelaide Village No. 1: We Know Freedom Is Every Man’s Right”, The Nassau Herald, January 7, 
1962. 
52 “Letters from Adelaide Village”, The Nassau Herald, January 7, 1962. 
53 Ian G. Strachan, Paradise and Plantation: Tourism and Culture in the Anglophone Caribbean (Charlottesville: 
University of Virginia Press, 2002), 120; Allen Dwight. Callahan, The Talking Book: African Americans and the Bible 
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from slavery in Egypt”.54 Reverend Brown specifically pointed out parallels of the story of the 
emergence of PLP leadership to that of Moses, and the reluctance of some “black” Bahamians, 
to “travel the road to freedom” and “trust God” like the Israelites struggled to do.55 Almost in 
denial of the irony, the election date announcement of January 10, 1967, correlated with the 
tenth day of the first month when God freed the Children of Israel, and Reverend Brown and 
the PLP joyously capitalized on this during their campaigning.56  
Even after the 1967 victory, the PLP Government continued to utilize the Exodus motif 
as a means to sustain its symbolism within the consciousness of the Bahamian black majority. 
As noted by Bahamian scholar Ian G. Strachan, all elections until their defeat in 1992 were 
carefully called on dates that could be numerically added up to ten.57 Moreover, the language 
and personality cult of PLP Leader, L. O. Pindling as the Black Moses who was able to outdo 
the pharaohs of white Bay Street and bring forth the Promised Land of justice for and 
representation of the Bahamian “black” majority, was perhaps the most poignant means by 
which the PLP-Pindling government was able to remain in power.58 Even today, his legacy as 
the Black Moses and the understanding of the PLP in this biblical language continues to be 
used in popular imaginations. 59 
Pindling’s symbolic rhetoric followed a similar train of thought in relation to the 
liberation of the “black” majority and banishment of the “white” elite power holders. Moreover, 
the rhetoric allowed Pindling an additional forum to mold familiar histories or narratives of 
slavery into the political construction of Pindling as the heroic figure for the “black” majority. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 The Nassau Herald, December 4, 1965. 
55 The Nassau Herald, December 4, 1965. 
56 Strachan, Paradise and Plantation, 122; Exodus 12: 1-3. 
57 Strachan, Paradise and Plantation, 122. 
58 Strachan, Paradise and Plantation, 121. Strachan identifies that the creation of the image of Pindling as the “Black 
Moses” was significantly helped by a narrative account by a PLP cabinet member that was widely read by the 
public and a standard text in Bahamian schools in the 1970s. 
59 Tribute to Sir Lynden Oscar Pindling, dir. The Vendetta Group, YouTube, January 9, 2010, 
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As in in the previous section, individuals have followed similar symbolic language of the 
Exodus narrative and Pindling as “Black Moses” in public discourse. Biblical narratives of 
redemption and liberation were easily identifiable and relevant among a primarily Judeo-
Christian faith-based majority, and the metaphoric links to similar struggles in Bahamian 
society were not difficult.60 
In an article written by an anonymous author, “The Common Man”, in 1966, the 
currency of the Exodus narrative and political symbolisms of slavery were noted: 
The mighty Pharaohs, like the power structures of today in The Bahamas and other parts, 
were determined to keep the Israelites in this condition. For the Egyptian to remain rich 
and powerful, the Israelites had to continue to be their slaves – working in their homes; 
working as builders; and working as laborers of all kinds. Egypt was maintaining her 
power on the backs of the Israelites, but whatever riches flowed into Egypt, very little of 
it found its way down to the Israelites… But, if we wish to break this spell, to go forward, 
and be free, for we shall be free, let us vote as we should, and wait no longer to do so than 
in the coming General Election! It is now that we should work to see that the Negroes are 
in the majority and are now capable of holding the majority of positions in this country. 61 
 
The framing of Pindling’s political action and unified “black” struggle in the symbolic language 
of Exodus, and more broadly, slavery, continued to engage a powerful form of political rhetoric 
and brought the classic themes of bondage and deliverance.62 The word Exodus literally means 
“the way out”.63 With the climatic drowning of Pharaoh’s army at the hands of Moses and his 
staff stretched over the Red Sea, the Israelites escaped. There was a two-fold celebration of the 
escape and liberation for the enslaved Hebrews, and also for the eradication of Pharaoh’s 
tyranny.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Strachan, Paradise and Plantations, 120; Callahan, The Talking Book, 96. 
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62 David William Kling, The Bible in History: How the Texts Have Shaped The Times (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), 204. 
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The framing of Pindling’s legacy within the personality cult of “Black Moses” resonated 
then and continues to resonate in the present day among popular classes of Bahamians.64 The 
final consequence of this resonance is how the symbolic rhetoric identified the Bahamian nation 
as belonging to the liberated “black” majority. Through this rhetoric a popular understanding 
of the Bahamian nation emerged. This understanding has reasoned that the nation has become 
“black” in composition due to previous historical bondage and perceived deliverance through 
Pindling, and the monumental transition from “white” minority rule. With strong resonance 
and following from the majority of the population, and endorsement by government 
authorities, the cultural framework of a “black” Bahamian national identity and simplistic racial 
binaries within Bahamian was able to grow. 
 
The Later Years: Television and Radio Broadcasts 
Carrying on into the late 1970s and 1980s when the political party was well seated as 
the ruling government of The Bahamas, Pindling continued to use symbolic rhetoric of master-
slave narratives of the black Atlantic slave tradition and the biblical narratives of Exodus in 
cyclic television and radio broadcasts during election seasons. Most notably, the content of 
such broadcasts included 1976 African-American television mini-series Roots, dramatizing the 
multi-generational legacies of slavery in the American South, and a 1956 movie The Ten 
Commandments, retelling the biblical narrative of Exodus.65  
Although such broadcasts entered the Bahamian scene at a time when the PLP 
Government had been using slavery metaphors for roughly two decades, dissemination 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Pindling’s obituaries referred to him as the “Father of the Nation” and the “Black Moses”. See for an example:  
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Marvin J. Chomsky, and Et. Al. (Burbank, CA: Warner Home Video, 2007), DVD. The Roots television series 
premiered in 1977 and was an internationally acclaimed success. Adapted from book: Alex Haley, Roots (Garden 
City, NY: Doubleday, 1976). 
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continued via mandatory showings for government school children in the late 1970s, repeated 
broadcasting on the sole state-owned television station, and airing of selective audio clips over 
the sole state-owned radio stations throughout election seasons in the 1980s. The purpose of 
maintaining political power and furthering longevity were identical to that used in the past; 
however, after twenty years of repetition, the symbolism and racial dichotomy had long since 
been recognized by the Bahamian electorate.  
This symbolic construction of Bahamian societal conflict into racial binaries and a 
defined “black” Bahamian body continued to be problematic as it related to an 
oversimplification of the more nuanced shades of color, differentiations of color and class, and 
an uneasy transplant of an American racial dichotomy into a Bahamian context. 
Moreover, the evidence of internal corruption in the Pindling government and continued 
economic entrenchment of Bay Street began to be exposed in local and international media.66 
The media attention made a mockery of Pindling as a liberator of the black majority and his 
promise of bringing black empowerment and benefits to all Bahamians. Correspondingly, 
opposition to Pindling’s leadership and symbolic rhetoric of slavery grew to more pronounced 
levels with the exhaustive use of slavery in the 1970s and 1980s. The symbolic power of slavery 
as a form of political manipulation also began to be called into question by previous supporters 
of Pindling’s regime. I confer that this time period gives further evidence of the problems of the 
“Black Bahamas” framework and the extent to which there was a growing opposition to its 
ideology at the same time that it was being adopted into popular consciousness of many (often 
lower class) others. 
  The mini series Roots was adapted from the 1976 family history novel by Alex Haley 
who provided a multi-generational understanding of the brutality, oppression, and hypocrisy of 
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the American institution of slavery.67 The narrative was captured through the eyes of Kunta 
Kinte, a young African man brought to the United States through the slave trade, other slaves 
he came in contact with, and his future daughter, grandson and great-grandchildren.68 As a 
separate entity, the television series of Roots was a tremendous stepping-stone whereby non-
black and African slave-descended populations within the global community were able to 
visualize and reflect on the most basic components of the institution of slavery; that is, the 
multi-generational loss of freedom and agency solely due to the “black” color of one’s skin. Yet 
as a tool for the state project of the PLP Government, Roots provided an additional public 
forum to promote more of the same: a powerful connection to the oppression of slavery among 
the Bahamian “black” majority, and solidarity against the “white” elites who had run the 
country prior to majority rule.  
The oversimplification of Pindling’s articulation of blackness as a monolithic group, or 
rather, as a unified “black” Bahamian body that excluded “white” or non-black outsiders was 
even greater than before in the context of the dissemination of Roots. An example of the 
discomfort felt by an intermediary light brown-skinned Bahamian woman by the name of 
Ingrid when she disdainfully recalled, “When Pindling sent all the damn schoolchildren to the 
Dundas Theatre to watch Roots” as being the most powerful memory of cultural exclusion and 
separation from darker-colored Bahamians.69  In her recollections of being bussed along with 
fellow classmates to watch consecutive episodes of Roots in the late 1970s, she felt disconnected 
from the rows of other children that were primarily black. Even though her skin exposes a 
degree of African ancestry, its lighter tone and her wispy or “soft” hair features point towards 
an additional mixing of European ancestry that brings ambiguity and a disconnect from a 
darker “black” Bahamian. The dilemma of Ingrid’s personal experiences reinforces that a unified 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Phillip P. Wander, "On The Meaning of "Roots"" Journal of Communications, 12th ser., 27, no. 4 (1977): 64. 
68 Wander, "On The Meaning of “Roots””, 64. 
69 “Ingrid”, Interview by author, June 2011. Emphasis placed by me. 
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“black” Bahamian identity constructed by the PLP government left segmented non-black and 
non-white Bahamians out of the mix.  
Ingrid’s experiences also demonstrated the problematic nature of Pindling’s symbolic 
rhetoric through racial binaries of “black” and “white”. Transplanting Roots, an enactment of 
American-based slavery, within a Bahamian context of political rhetoric, overlooked 
fundamental differences between the demographics of each region.  While the geographical 
regions share a basic history of the same institution of slavery, The Bahamas (and the 
Caribbean at-large) has fundamentally distinct understandings of race and color.  The varied 
histories and more elaborate socioeconomic stratification of color that has emanated from the 
presence of a black majority versus a black minority was a crucial difference in the 
transplanting of Roots in a Bahamian context. Overriding these fundamental differences made 
the simplification of a unified “black” Bahamian body and the exclusionary “white” or non-black 
outsiders even greater than before.  
 The final media outlet used by Pindling to engage in a symbolic association of present-
day inequalities in The Bahamas to the memories of slavery involved the replay of Roots and 
The Ten Commandments70 on the airwaves of the government-owned radio and television 
stations during election seasons in the mid to late 1980s and early 1990s.71 The frequent play of 
specific sound bytes from these films over the radio airwaves during election times further 
exposed how common slavery motifs of master-slave relationships and biblical narratives of 
Exodus remained closely connected to the political craft of the PLP Government. These final 
media outlets also demonstrated how the Pindling Government continued to consolidate a 
unified “black” Bahamian national identity that was not operative in the realities of Bahamian 	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Anne Baxter (Hollywood, CA: Paramount Pictures, 2006), DVD. 
71 “Ingrid”, Interview by author, June 2011; “Ann”, Interview by author, August 2011; “Fredrick”, Interview by 
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society. Moreover, through allegations of drug corruption and little tangible changes in the 
infrastructure or discriminatory practices of earlier years, the Pindling Government exuded 
unreliability and irresponsibility. The majority of the popular classes remained in positions of 
disadvantage. Thus, while doubts in the PLP government were mounting, Pindling’s political 
projects continued, even taking on more virulent forms. 
 The state-owned and monopolized radio and television network, Zephyr Nassau 
Sunshine (ZNS) frequently aired advertisements for video cassette recordings of Roots and The 
Ten Commandments for sale at a local record store.72 The advertisements comprised of film 
sound bytes of Kunta Kinte being whipped with a cord of animal hide, and Moses exclaiming 
“Let my people go!” Even in 2011 when I was conducting my research, Bahamians and others 
who were living in The Bahamas during this time had vivid memories of the content of these 
advertisements due to its intense airplay and repetition. 
  One of these recollections came from a fair-skinned or “lily white” naturalized Bahamian 
woman who explained to me, “I recall hearing these commercials every morning when getting 
ready for work, in my car, and anytime – day and night – when my radio was on.”73 Not 
surprisingly, the interviewees with the most vivid recollections of the racially charged sound 
bytes came from light brown and fair skinned members of Bahamian society, who would have 
felt the most ostracized upon hearing and seeing them. Yet, in my opinion, what was more at 
stake in the dissemination of the advertisements was the unfair and simplistic racial dichotomy 
for “white” brutality and “black” suffering. It concealed much of the class-based warfare in 
operation through the PLP and Bay Street rule.  
The specific selection of Kunta Kinte being whipped from Roots further protracted 
Pindling’s key themes of black suffering and bondage as a symbol of discrimination, and 	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73 “Ann”, Interview by author, August 2011. 
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deliverance from the hands of Bay Street by Pindling’s government. The repetitive sound of the 
whip on Kinte’s bare body as he screamed in pain made this particular symbolic political 
rhetoric even more virulent than slavery motifs used in the past. With the power of radio and 
constant repetition throughout days and nights of election seasons, these sounds and symbolic 
rhetorical devices were deliberately created for mass consumption. Unlike other forms such as 
cartoon imagery, the audiovisual and audio broadcasts on the state-owned television and radio 
channels throughout the 1980s and early 1990s were nearly inescapable. Repeated at such an 
exhaustive rate, the symbolic rhetoric served to remind the Bahamian electorate of what the 
Pindling government wanted them to remember – that is, the primary issue of binary white 
repression and black oppression mentality. Harking on the dehumanization and imposed 
brutality that Kinte experienced as a slave, the potent rhetoric was a desperate plea by Pindling 
to keep slavery and its symbolism resonating in their consciousness.  
The repeated commercial sequence also returned to the familiar heroic biblical narrative 
of Exodus and Pindling as the Black Moses, fighting to bring the disadvantaged majority into 
an improved way of living.  The audio recording repeated the famous echo of Moses, “Let My 
People Go!” Conflating this biblical rhetoric with notions of black familiarity and solidarity 
between Pindling and the electorate, and shared resentment toward a certain kind of black 
suffering through the repeated echo of slave whippings supported the fundamental archetype of 
Pindling’s political rhetoric.  
Thoughtfully and purposefully, the violent and emotional scenes were chosen for their 
dramatic ability to resonate in the consciousness of the majority electorate. Furthermore, 
combining primary slavery motifs of master-slave narratives and the Exodus narrative into one 
mass media blitz implied a recycling of the overall virile and potent form of symbolic power of 
slavery in the final years of Pindling’s rule. The media message worked to reinforce already 
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cemented metaphors of slavery and bondage, yet its virility waned with the growing suspicions 
of corruption within Pindling’s government. In its aftermath, the virulent symbolism actually 
worked against the metaphors of Pindling and his Government as the political force to bring 
deliverance to the disadvantaged majority.  
 
Aftermath of Slavery Motifs: Frustration Versus Die-Hard Loyalty 
 In the aftermath of Pindling’s exhaustive use of slavery motifs throughout six 
successive general elections from January 1967 until August 1992, Bahamians were marked by 
either frustration or die-hard loyalty to the regime.74 The existence of a tandem of both 
repulsion and wholehearted allegiance to Pindling’s political projects demonstrated how its 
symbolic rhetoric did not hold true for all Bahamians. Nonetheless, I would argue that the 
political rhetoric and symbolism of slavery already reached the level of popular consciousness. 
On the basis of successive electoral victories over the span of a quarter of a century, the 
construction had resonated and been cemented into the worldview of many. Thus, frustration 
with the political rhetoric was not only evidence of the growing bankruptcy of its symbolic 
power, but also a frustration of the popular consciousness of those who were deceived by 
Pindling’s framework. 
 In an article published by The Nassau Tribune in July 1992, a journalist reported on the 
voluminous phone calls to the newspaper company complaining of weekly broadcasts of 
“racially inflammatory programs” on the ZNS television station.75 The journalist wrote about a 
certain caller, “she resented the fact that they thought she was so ignorant that they could ‘try 
to hide their incompetence behind race’”. Several other callers also complained about their 
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resentment of being targeted as poorer, dark-skinned Bahamians. “You tell Pindling for me,” 
shouted one caller to the journalist, “I might be black, but I ain’ fool.” Another caller stated, 
“Yes, I am grass roots and I am poor, but I got my senses.” The journalist further summarized 
other callers’ reasons for the anger: 
They were angry because they knew that they were being insulted; they felt that they 
were being treated like fools; they wanted to know what racial problems in the fifties and 
sixties had to do with unemployment, crime, missing money from the Treasury, and all 
the other problems that plague the Bahamas today.76 
 
The journalist went on to communicate his or her own opinion: 
Pindling won once before on the race issue, and he may be trying to use it for another 
win during desperate times. […] The truth of the matter is that they [the PLP] are a 
bunch of walking hypocrites and anyone who follows them is indeed a fool.77 
 
 In all of the commentary involved in this article, including the statements by callers and 
the journalist him or herself, there was a common frustration with Pindling’s age-old symbolic 
rhetoric of slavery and continued use of racial conflict as the primary issue for contestation. 
Even for the callers whose backgrounds identified them as part of Pindling’s main support 
group of darker-colored, lower class, poor, or grassroots, had become disillusioned by the 
symbolic rhetoric, referring to it as unfair manipulation. By all parties, the common frustration 
derived from Pindling’s failure to engage in an accurate diagnosis of discriminatory frameworks 
that continued to disadvantage the majority of the darker colored lower classes and grassroots 
Bahamians.  
 In contrast, the symbolic rhetoric waged by Pindling still proved to hold resonance and 
powerful meaning to a large gamut of darker-colored, lower class Bahamians. Even today, long 
after Pindling’s eclipse from politics, the PLP’s most devoted supporters derive from older 	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generations of Bahamians who lived through Bay Street’s more blatant entrenchment and 
shared in celebration when Pindling assumed power in 1967. Despite the limited benefits or 
changes in socioeconomic dynamics, the physical transformation of the political sphere was 
sufficient for them to cling to Pindling’s ideals, and appeal to the symbolic rhetoric of slavery 
that his political projects adhered to. A number of persons I came in contact with in my 
research reflected on this die-hard loyalty that many individuals in their grandparents’ 
generation continue to have. The legacies of “The Bay Street Days”, the heroic narrative of 
Pindling’s emergence as leader, and the victorious transformation of The Bahamas eclipse any 
critique of his leadership or of his symbolic rhetoric as the emancipator of the darker-colored, 
popular classes of the “black” majority. “My Grammy will always be PLP,” one friend of mine 
declared to me in a casual conversation one day, “just because she actually lived through it all, 
she will never change her vote”. 78 Another said to me, “The ‘old set’ will always vote PLP. 
Nothing you can say or do will change their minds. “79 And lastly, a friend of mine whom I will 
call “Kenneth” further opened up to me about the reasons for a seemingly relentless core of 
PLP supporters in older Bahamian generations: 
I live in Grant’s Town, the place where former slaves actually lived and their generations 
still live. It’s one of the poorest and most isolated settlements on the island. No other 
political party even tries to touch them. Because of slavery and Bay Street, they will 
always remain die-hard loyal followers of the PLP.80 
 
For a particular electorate that remains on the margins of socioeconomic class in The Bahamas, 
the initial transformation of government from that of a “white” minority” to one of Bahamians 
that looked like the majority of Bahamians was sufficient enough to feel empowered and loyal 
to Pindling’s regime. Even without significant improvement to their livelihood, the notion of a 	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“Black Bahamas”, that the nation belonged to the “black” majority, was sufficient enough to 
take hold of Pindling’s political rhetoric and its symbolic power of slavery. 
 
Summary 
 The symbolic power of slavery in Pindling’s political rhetoric lasted throughout the 
second half of the twentieth century. Its symbolism was relevant enough to historical 
foundations of Bay Street entrenchment that it created a strong electorate contingent, which 
gave Pindling and the PLP political longevity from 1967 to 1992. Nonetheless, Pindling’s 
symbolism translated beyond political realms to understanding dynamics in the everyday lives 
and popular consciousness of the Bahamian majority.  The meanings of being Bahamian have 
been delineated as a racial binary. “Black” Bahamians are symbolically incorporated into the 
national or cultural belonging to a Bahamian identity through Pindling’s political and collective 
rhetoric of black victimization and later black empowerment and vindication through 
Pindling’s electoral victories. Lighter-colored Bahamians, alternatively, are symbolically 
excluded through Pindling’s political rhetoric of white oppression, brutality, and relentless 
desire to exploit the darker-colored Bahamian majority for their own personal and business-
related interests.  
 The symbolism has become complicated due to the presence of many intermediate 
groups that cut across racial and class lines both before and after Pindling’s emergence as 
leader of the PLP, rise to power in 1967, and national independence in 1973. Neither “white” 
nor “black” groups, which fit neatly in Pindling’s master-slave narratives, were as clear-cut as 
the symbolism intended for the Bahamian majority to believe. Many intermediate groups fell 
between the cracks, phenotypically and racially ambiguous to an exacting racial dichotomy. 
Moreover, the narrative was not an accurate historical interpretation of Bay Street 
entrenchment. For over one and a half centuries, both local and colonial officials of light 
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complexions sustained hegemony after slave emancipation that was much like the systems of 
discrimination in the previous slavery era in the colony. Nonetheless, a significant number of 
near-white Conchy Joes also struggled under the regime and, alternatively, some middle class 
darker Bahamians were able to achieve relatively high levels of education and financial security 
that separated them socioeconomically from the broader “black” majority as the colony moved 
closer to mid-twentieth century.81  
The symbolism also has become complicated due to its deliberate function to manipulate 
an idealistic image of Pindling and the PLP. Through its political symbolism, the notion of 
Pindling as the central force to save or emancipate the Bahamian majority from longstanding 
discrimination and marginalization by the Bay Street elite has been mass consumed by 
Bahamians for nearly half a century. Even decades after Pindling departed from rule, the 
symbolic framework continues to have its resonance in the consciousness of many Bahamians. 
The symbolism ineptly glazed over the elite black power, wealth, and social privileges that 
became part and parcel of Pindling’s regime. The corruption of the drug trafficking trade, 
increase in national debt, and lack of capital improvements to the infrastructure of poorer black 
communities throughout the final decades of the twentieth century alluded to the more 
manipulative and deceptive elements at work in Pindling’s political projects. As much as the 
symbolism appealed to the plight of the black majority, the real actions of Pindling’s 
government did not prove to adhere to this image. Instead, the idealist image served the basic 
political function of attaining political power and legitimacy, with limited dedication to such 
groups after election times. 
Lastly, Pindling’s symbolic framework became complicated in its implicit transference 
from political discourse into one of national discourse; or rather, the building of a “black” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 See pages 28-29 in Chapter 1. 
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political entity that has translated into the building of “black” Bahamian national identity. Used 
as an emblem of what the Pindling government conceptualized as the fundamental conflicts in 
Bahamian society, the political symbolism has become even more powerful. The rhetoric of a 
unified blackness and shared black struggle grew as a part of national discourse. It operated at 
the simplified level of black inclusion and white exclusion in the new independent era of The 
Bahamas. Using Geertz and Turner’s theories of symbolic rhetoric as “plastic dramas” in the 
context of Pindling’s political and nationalist projects, what is noted is an artificial construction 
of binary racial oppositions that was not fully supported by the nation’s history or present-day 
socioeconomic and racial dynamic.  
The projection of slavery-themed symbolic rhetoric by the Pindling Government was a 
deliberate “cultural performance” of what they wanted Bahamians to conceptualize as the sole 
marker of cultural and socioeconomic divisions in Bahamian society. While the symbolism has 
its basis in very real patterns of black oppression and inequality throughout the history of The 
Bahamas, the inverse reaction of black empowerment with white resentment and exclusion had 
its limitations. It had its limitations in providing a comprehensive image of what it means to be 
Bahamian, and the recognition that Pindling and the PLP were unable to fully transform the 
discriminatory class-based systems that brought about the construction in the first place.  
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Chapter Four 
 
On Being Bahamian Today 
Popular Imaginations of a “Black” Bahamian National Identity 
 
When describing oneself as a Bahamian, one either flashes one’s skin color 
as a badge of identity, or else one defends oneself for not having that badge;  
for in the popular imagination, to  be  Bahamian is  to  be  black. 1 
 
Chapter Objectives  
 The popular belief “to be Bahamian is to be black”, as exposed by Bahamian 
anthropologist Nicolette Bethel in 2003, has persisted until the present-day.  Through the 
words of Bahamians both young and old, and an amalgam of skin colors and shades that 
comprise the nation, this chapter gives voice to the challenges of non-black Bahamians who 
continue to struggle to ‘feel Bahamian’ or to culturally identify with being Bahamian. Putting 
into context the evasive memory of white oligarchic rule by Bay Street and continued economic 
advantage of many “white” or “light skin” or otherwise non-black Bahamian families in the 
present-day, the challenges for non-black Bahamians to orient themselves into an orbit of 
cultural inclusivity can be easily understood. It could even be argued that these challenges are 
deserved or even expected given the circumstances.  Yet, studying the relative nature of this 
phenomenon provides a greater learning opportunity in place of declaring its reality as 
objective fact. 
 This chapter continues the work of my thesis on the political constructions of a “black” 
Bahamian national identity, yet does so in a more contemplative light. Using Benedict 
Anderson’s conceptualization of a nation as  “an imagined political community”, I contend that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Nicolette Bethel, "On Being Bahamian," Blogworld: Nicolette Bethel's Blog (web log), May 26, 2003, 
http://nicobethel.net/blogworld/2003/05/on-being-bahamian/. 
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many Bahamians have popularly imagined a Bahamian identity that is “black” in nature.2 
Through Anderson’s discussion of “institutions of power”, notably print capitalism that permits 
the conceptualization of a nation, I contend that mass production and long-term use of 
Pindling’s political projects allowed for fictive commonalities and shared narratives of 
blackness to take hold. Bahamian national identity is dependent on this consistent othering, 
whereby fictive commonalities of legacies of slavery are linked to contemporary “white” 
privilege by all African-descended Bahamians as a result of being deliberately promoted in 
Pindling’s era of rule.3 Nonetheless, the progression of a popular imagination of any national 
identity, including a “Black Bahamas”, requires conscious effort by both political and non-
political actors to maintain its existence.4 
Unlike prior chapters, the goal of this chapter is to explore features of the construction 
of a black orientation of Bahamian national identity rather than exhaust the evidence for the 
construction through the history of Bay Street and 1967 majority rule. With or without resolve 
of the origins factored in the construction of a “Black Bahamas”, the perception of Bahamian 
national identity as being black in character underscores many aspects of Bahamian society. It 
dictates discourse and dialogue, and often times it molds relationships among Bahamians of 
various backgrounds and shades. Whether it is through the evidence of history, present-day 
context, or by the political project of the Pindling government in the earlier years of nation 
building, this conceptualization has come to fruition. Using Evelyn Higginbotham’s theory of 
the metalanguage of race, blackness has become a euphemism to discuss other social and power 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 
1991), 6. 
3 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 6. Anderson goes on to describe the nation and its traditions as “invented”, and 
held together by “narratives” that identify a unique entity that is “inherently limited and sovereign. See other 
nationalist theorists also see nation-building as an invention or construction, quoted in Bethel, Nicolette. 
"Engendering The Bahamas: A Gendered Examination of Bahamian Nation Making, or National Identity and 
Gender in the Bahamian Context" The International Journal of Bahamian Studies [Online], Volume 12 Number 0 
(28 February 2008). 
4 Robert John Foster, Nation Making: Emergent Identities in Postcolonial Melanesia (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1995), 5, quoted in Bethel, Nicolette. "Engendering The Bahamas”, [Online]. 
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relations within the Bahamian national community. 5The notion that “race has constituted a 
discursive tool for both oppression and liberation” is duly embraced within the popular 
consciousness of a “black” national identity.6 Nonetheless, the means in which race has become 
a dominant discourse in understanding power differentials and claims of national belonging 
conceal the processes through which it was created. The symbolic power and black political 
rhetoric of Pindling’s government continues to have currency in the construction of a “black” 
Bahamian national identity.7 
The following chapter shares experiences of what this black orientation, or popular 
imagination of a Bahamian national identity as a “black” identity continues to look, and feel like 
to Bahamians who do not fit the stereotype. These experiences will foster an investigation of 
the implications and complications of this singular “black” identity for a Bahamian people of 
diverse identities, backgrounds, and shades.  
 
Meanings of a “Black Bahamas”: Cultural Identity Versus Citizenship 
 The central feature of the construction of a “Black Bahamas” is differentiation between a  
“black” Bahamian national identity versus a denial of legal Bahamian citizenship to non-black 
individuals. Following Anderson’s theories of an imagined community, many Bahamians have 
grouped themselves into a like-minded community or nation through the black race. There are 
automatic exclusions and inclusions of the larger Bahamian population due to this 
conceptualization. The process of othering, then, alludes to development of the popular notion 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham, “African-American Women’s History and the Metalanguage of Race,” Signs: 
Journal of Women in Culture and Society 17, no. 2 (Winter 1992): 251: Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1980). Higginbothom uses Foucault’s concept of “technologies” which are “used to signify 
the elaboration and implementation of discource (classificatory and evaluative) in order to maintain the survival 
and hegemony of one group over another.” In the case of Bahamian national identity, the technologies of race have 
allowed race to become a euphemism to discuss continued economic inequalities of Bahamian society. 
6 Higginbotham, “Metalanguage of Race”, 252. 
7 Higginbotham, “Metalanguage of Race”, 267, 268. “Race signified a cultural identity that defined and connect 
them as a people, even as a nation.” “power of race to mean nation. Race as the sign of perceived kinship ties. 
Crucible of the Middle Passage” 
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that Bahamian national identity has separated from the legal status of Bahamian citizenship to a 
more limited conception of the cultural tie of blackness. While citizenship incorporates persons 
who have been born in The Bahamas to a Bahamian parent(s), through naturalization, or 
application at the age of eighteen (if born in The Bahamas to non-Bahamian parents), the 
notion of Bahamian national identity is much less inclusive.8 It discounts legal markers of 
citizenship as deserving of the label of being Bahamian through ascribing to “black” cultural 
norms which include a shared African heritage, a shared dialect, and set of mannerisms, diet, 
method of rearing children, among others. Like in Anderson’s theories of imagined 
communities and intent of symbolic political rhetoric, fictive commonalities present themselves 
as metaphoric exclusion and inclusion of certain individuals. For this reason, challenges arise 
among the white, “light skin” or otherwise non-black Bahamian. For even though they have 
legal citizenship, they are often polarized from the black cultural orientation of Bahamian 
national identity.  
 Many of my interviewees elaborated on this distinction of Bahamian national identity 
apart from Bahamian citizenship, recognizing the paradox of citizenship for virtually all non-
black Bahamians, yet they are not accepted into the cultural framework of being Bahamian. In 
the first instance, James, a brown-skinned professional reflected on the very obvious separation 
of the two classifications:  
On a simple level, being Bahamian is being born in the Bahamas – that’s on a simple level. 
Identifying with being Bahamian means identifying with the culture of the Bahamas.. But 
we have this notion – it’s pretty explicit – that black Bahamians are the real Bahamians. And 
white Bahamians? Where you come from? Whitey! Foreigner!9 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Nationality Act, No. 18 of 1973, The Statue Law of the Bahamas, Revised Edition, 1987 (Nassau: Bahamas 
Government, 1987), Chap. 178, 2126-39. 
9 “James”, Interview by author, May 2011. 
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James capitalized on the central point of the cultural distinctions of Bahamian identity being 
authentically “black” whereas any alternative form is seen as unauthentic.   With good reason, 
Trevor, who could be described as a “bright skin” or “Conchy Joe” Bahamian, continues this 
cultural distinction: “Black is pure, real Bahamian, and white is sort of Bahamian.”10 
Nonetheless, these are notions of a “Black Bahamas”. 
 Even cultural perception of the symbolism in the black color of the Bahamian national 
flag reflects this notion of a “Black Bahamas”. Despite the official symbolism of the black color 
to signify the “strength and vigor of a united people”, many use the lack of color as evidence to 
support this popular imagination of being Bahamian is to be black.11 Black color represents the 
racial unity of the black people of the Bahamas.  Humorously, but also poignantly touching on 
an important point, Lyall, a dark brown college student of economics, gave an interpretation 
that is widely shared among the Bahamian majority. In his dialogue he is referring to me, the 
interviewer: 
Bahamian identity is the black identity. The black color is said to mean the unity of the 
people, but it really means the unity of the black people. So, you [are] probably in the 
ocean or something...12  
Omar, also present for the conversation, reaffirmed Lyall’s explanation of the alternative or 
informal interpretation: “Don’t run from that fact. You are not represented on that flag.”13 
Returning again to the separation of non-blacks from a cultural identification of being 
Bahamian, the popular interpretation of the symbolism of the Bahamian flag demonstrates how 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 “Trevor”, Interview by author, July 2011. 
11 National Symbols, The Bahamas National Archives, section goes here, accessed April 10, 2012, 
http://www.bahamasnationalarchives.bs/National%20symbols/index.html#1. From the report: “The Flag is 
distinctive in its color and design. The black equilateral triangle is superimposed on a horizontal background made 
up of two colors on three equal stripes – aquamarine, gold, and aquamarine. Black, a strong color represents the 
vigor and force of a united people; the triangle represents the enterprise and determination of the Bahamian people 
to develop and possess the rich resources of land and sea. The colors of the flag are symbolic of the land, sea, and 
sun.”  
12 “Lyall”, Interview by author, July 2011.When Lynden says “you”, he is referring to me, who would be identified 
as a “white” Bahamian. Similar remarks were made by: “Lashae” and “Tristan”, interviews by author, August 2011. 
13 “Omar”, Interview by author, July 2011. 
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even national symbols, which officially serve as representations of all individuals with 
Bahamian citizenship, continue this paradox. Despite the formality of something as basic as a 
national flag, the common interpretations of its symbolism are taken to further discredit any 
non-black Bahamian from culturally belonging to a Bahamian national identity. 
 
In The Corporate World 
 One of the environments I found best represented the cultural imagining of the singular 
“black” Bahamian national identity in the reflections of my interviewees was the workplace or 
corporate world.  These small work environments offered a microcosmic look into the 
dynamics of majority “black” and minority “white” relationships on a daily basis – and a breadth 
of specific examples during my fieldwork.  In particular, for twenty-one year old Michael, a 
Conchy Joe, the frequency that he must defend his, for lack of a better word, ‘Bahamian-ness’, to 
the persons he encounters at work attests to this truth of the notion of a “Black Bahamas” in the 
broader national framework.  
Michael, a Bahamian national, is employed in the public sector. His job requires him to 
move to and from various departments and locations in the capital city of Nassau, New 
Providence throughout the day. The experiences of alienation cannot be mistaken. On a typical 
work day, Michael wears a uniform with a very large and prominent Bahamian flag 
embroidered on the upper left side shoulder. At first glance the majority of Bahamian 
employees of these offices automatically assume that he is employed by the United States. This 
phenomenon frustrates Michael: 
After two years, people are still seeing me for the first time. One guy intentionally calls 
me ‘TSA’ [Transportation Security Administration]. It’s like the mentality that because I 
wear this style of uniform, I must be affiliated with US Customs. People continually ask, 
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“US Immigration?” No, Bahamian Immigration! It’s here [pointing to the flag on his 
uniform] and it’s here on my two IDs.14  
 
Michael is employed by the Bahamian Government, and the national flag on his uniform 
overtly broadcasts his probable Bahamian nationality, but because of his lighter skin tone, he 
does not fit the mold of what the popular imagination to be Bahamian is. What is ironic about 
the continual rejection of Michael’s Bahamian identity by his darker-colored coworkers is that 
his skin tone is of a bright or bronze color, is reminiscent of a Conchy Joe, or “white” Bahamian 
of a darker hue. In other places like The United States, Michael’s skin color or racial identity 
would at least be questioned, and more easily lumped into the racial category of “black” due to 
his noticeable “mixed” coloring. In The Bahamas, Michael’s skin tone is still categorized as 
“white” or non-black. There are varying degrees of whiteness and darkness with different 
meanings and levels of cultural inclusivity within Bahamian constructions of racial identity. 
Through a process of lumping together all non-black elements in this Bahamian context, he is, 
therefore, initially not perceived as Bahamian. 
 Even in Michael’s main office, the conversations he has with a female co-worker 
continually cause him to defend his identity: 
She’ll pull out a line, “What you eatin’ for lunch?” I tell her, “I was going by Imperial to 
get a conch snack.” And she would reply, “What you know about conch?” And I’ll go, “I 
consume more conch than anyone on this island.”, an exaggeration but still something to 
show her the ignorance of her question. Or sometimes during the day she’ll say, “White 
people don’t do stuff like that” or “You don’t know about that” or “You don’t do that”. Me 
and her are cool though, even though she racially abuses me all day.15 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 “Michael”, Interview by author, July 2011.  
15 “Michael”, interview by author, July 2011. “ Imperials” is popular restaurant for local Bahamians, located in the 
downtown area. It is frequented by (but not limited to) predominantly Bahamians of the working class due to its 
bargain prices. 
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Although the provoking personality of Michael’s colleague and her manner of doubting or 
denying his knowledge of popular aspects of Bahamian culture due to his whiteness, the 
motivations of her questioning can find its framework in the mentality of a “Black Bahamas”. 
The consumption of the mollusk, conch, and buying lunch at a popular local restaurant 
(Imperials) are classic Bahamian rituals.  By her automatic deduction that he should not be 
taking part in such activities, she is similarly subscribing to this idea that he does not fit the 
culturally “black Bahamian” mold of persons who stereotypically do. The microcosm of events 
in Michael’s workplace alludes to similar experiences of other white, light skin, or otherwise 
non-black Bahamians. In Michael’s case, the cycle of questioning and defending of Bahamian-
ness was set in a casual atmosphere with humorous dialogue. Although subtle and hardly 
malicious, her comments and those that Michael receives when in his uniform still produce 
feelings of cultural exclusion and polarization. 
 In trying to understand more about Michael’s class parity with his coworker, I asked 
him to provide in a follow-up discussion following our interview: 
She made a lil’ less than me. She is a clerk in the [--] Department, and made about 
$18,000 a year, I think she would be somewhere around lower middle class [category] – 
so just a little separation but not too much. I make a lil’ over $20,000 a year and I’d 
consider myself middle class.16 
 
Nonetheless, the incursion of class difference between Michael and his co-worker 
demonstrates that lower class individuals who have little social interactions with non-black 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 “Michael”, Email message to author, April 2011. I asked Michael direct questions about he and his co-worker’s 
socioeconomic class standing and work experience within the department that they shared. Although I did not 
direct his answers, Michael would most likely not speak of class difference in such formal labels in his everyday 
discourse. 
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Bahamians are more inclined to purport the imagination or popular consciousness of a 
“Black Bahamas”. 17 
 
On The Streets 
Another environment that I found conveys an imagining of a “Black Bahamas” is on the 
streets and other public places in the capital city of Nassau. Quite a number of my interviewees 
shared their experiences of being singled out in public places due to their non-black physical 
orientations. As a non-black Bahamian, I have also had similar experiences on numerous 
occasions.  Perhaps targeted, harassing comments made to “white” or non-black Bahamians do 
not strongly support the overall “black “ cultural orientation of Bahamian identity and 
polarization of non-blacks; yet, I would argue that they are not far from lending such support. 
In the experiences shared by my interviewees, they often use examples of being called out for 
the lighter colors of their skin as moments that make them more conscious of their non-
blackness and sometimes uncomfortable in public places as a result. Therefore, although these 
street taunting’s have occurred as isolated incidents or from isolated groups of people on the 
street, the broader patterns of their occurrence in the public sphere lend quite well to a 
discussion of the modes in which a “Black Bahamas” is popularly imagined, expressed, and felt. 
In one case, an individual by the name of “Malcolm” confessed, “I hate driving down the 
road with my windows down because of all of the comments that are screamed.”18 When I 
asked him if he could give any examples of these comments he mentioned the very common 
“white boy!” remark, which could be interpreted either as a joking remark or one that is more 
hostile or discriminatory. In the context of being yelled “white boy!” on a street by a stranger, 
though, I would argue it hostility – or, in the least – mockery of not being “black”.  Sometimes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 “Michael”, Email message to author, April 2011. Also, Michael’s coworker had approximately three more years 
of experience in the office than he did. Thus, she most used her seniority status to continue to ask the kinds of 
provocative questions that she did towards Michael. 
18 “Malcolm”, Interview by author, May 2011. 
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Malcolm also receives comments like, “White boy! You think you’re better than everyone else, 
eh?” This comment further develops what persons on the street are thinking when they see 
someone who is not black. Ironically, Malcolm’s skin color is of an intermediary shade of 
“white” and black”.19 Like Michael, Malcolm is put into the polarizing category of “white”. A 
prejudgment is made that Malcolm, because of his light brown colored skin and the fact that he 
owns or drives a vehicle, is distrustful, and conniving in character.  
These quick judgments reflect something greater as to what whiteness means, - in this 
case, greed, feigned superiority, or corruption -, and how it is quickly seen as suspect. 
Whiteness is in need of being made a mockery of in order to reassert that, at least culturally, 
blackness holds ultimate power and authenticity in the public spheres of Bahamian society.20 In 
this context, Malcolm’s light brown skin is being protested for its superiority or higher 
economic class in the imaginations of lower class individuals on the streets. In this case, 
Malcolm’s family does belong to an upper middle class segment of Bahamians. Yet, light 
colored skin does not always infer wealth. 
 In another case, a much fairer-skinned “white” Bahamian named “Stefan”, gave examples 
of what he has had called out to him in public.21  One time a man shouted out, “You like that 
hey white boy?” as Stefan was exiting a liquor store with alcohol in hand. In our conversation 
Stefan was adamant to provide times he received these comments and responded back to defend 
himself and protest the derogatory remarks made toward him, or rather, his whiteness. In one 
instance, Stefan told me that he stopped walking, looked the person in the eye, replied, “Yes I 
do”, and went on his way.  Unlike Malcolm, Stefan tends to express his frustrations when such 
taunting or bullying occurs through responding versus trying to block the sound or ignore it.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 This again demonstrates the limitations of black and white racial labels within The Bahamas. 
20 See Higginbotham for a discussion of race as a “double-voiced discourse” or “global sign…that speaks about and 
lends meaning to a host of terms and expressions, to myriad aspects of life that would otherwise fall outside the 
referential domains of race”, such as class.  
21 “Stefan”, Interview by author, June 2011.  
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Another occasion, when Stefan was walking towards the annual Junkanoo street parade 
with his mother, a “black” individual called out to his mother, “Where you think you goin’ lil’ 
ole’ white woman?22 It was late evening and Stefan and his mother were walking through an 
isolated alleyway before arriving at a more central location in downtown Nassau. Stefan 
responded, “Bey, that’s my mummy ya know?” The interchange was tense to say the least, as a 
larger group of men appeared behind the first individual in a gang-like manner. On this 
occasion, Stefan and his mother quickly walked away, feeling a sense of insecurity and being 
unwilling to escalate the situation by entering into a dialogue with them. While the individuals 
involved in this incident seemed to be a group of delinquents using race to spark an argument 
or threat of violence, it draws parallels to other, more casual street calling that still 
intentionally demeans others through their whiteness. Stefan, despite being fair-skinned is not 
a member of the upper middle-class, nor does his family own large property attributable to 
families with his similar coloring that are descendants of Bay Street stalwarts.   
 In other dialogues, including some that I have experienced myself, “white” Bahamian 
females are called out at in public in a less threatening manner. Nonetheless, this form of 
catcalling reveals a similar pattern of attributing certain representations of higher class or 
sexual attractiveness to whiteness.23 I have known some women to be called “Snowflake!” while 
driving in their cars, or: “Snow White” or “Aye, white girl! Look here!”.  This kind of street-
calling is more along the lines of gendered street harassment that includes verbal and non-
verbal abuse whereby “black” Bahamian men are trying to elicit attention of a sexual nature.24 
Public places are also environments where other non-black Bahamian minorities, such 
as Chinese-Bahamians, feel the culture of exclusion and alienation. Cheyenne, for instance, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 “Stefan”, Interview by author, June 2011. 
23 In my personal experiences, non-black females are more likely to receive more frequent and obscene catcalls 
than their darker counterparts. 
24 Even so, reasons why “white” Bahamian females are being called out for their whiteness reveals another 
complexity: that whiteness is still praised or celebrated as being more beautiful or attractive than blackness 
	  	  
Lee  108 
shared her experiences of being a child of a dark-skinned “black” Bahamian mother, and a light-
skinned Chinese-Bahamian father. Both of her parents were born in the capital city of Nassau 
and attended Bahamian schools, yet her father is often discredited as a foreigner or an illegal 
immigrant. The following extract provides her reflection on this aspect of her life:  
One time when I was leaving the grocery store with my Dad and someone asked him, 
“Why don’t you go back to where you came from?” He just responded, “Yeah, okay, but 
it’s just around the corner!” He’s really good at brushing it off. To others he’ll say, 
“Guess what? I was born in PMH [a public hospital] just like you”.   
 
It’s like being Bahamian has evolved around solely black Bahamians. Like the revolution 
of identity has been based on one, and the others being secondary. Both my parents are 
Bahamians, but one person’s claim to being Bahamian is discounted because of his 
ethnicity.25 
 
The exclusions of Cheyenne’s father in public spheres may be at first due to his Asian heritage, 
and the even less common understanding that non-European and non-African peoples are a 
part of the Bahamian nation, yet still it reflects the more basic elevation of blackness. For 
explicitly not being “black”, much like the other experiences shared prior, Bahamians are not 
welcome or considered Bahamian “enough”. Non-black Bahamians, then, are often the butt of 
jokes or verbally harassed on the streets due to the centrality of blackness ingrained in 
Bahamian culture – and the simultaneous disempowerment of whiteness in public forums in 
Bahamian society. 
 Throughout these examples of street calling within public spheres, class was 
understood and constructed racially. The territoriality serves as a means to protest the 
continued economic privileges of a white minority, whereby any “white”, “light skin” or non-
black Bahamian is attributable to continued Bay Street economic privilege. Moreover, it serves 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 “Cheyenne”, Interview by author, June 2011. PMH is an acronym for Princess Margaret Hospital, a public 
hospital in New Providence. 
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as a means by which such individuals are seen as suspect within the Bahamian community. 
Through the process of othering, the definitive marker of the “Black Bahamas” framework, such 
persons are antithetical to Bahamian national identity. Nonetheless, the discursive power of 
race operates to obscure more diverse systems of power.  
 
Contradictions of Blackness 
The “Black Bahamas” construct also creates fixed meanings of blackness and whiteness 
that closes off Bahamians who might not fit into the dichotomy. In this fixed image of 
blackness, even “black” Bahamians are polarized in society for not fitting into the cultural 
modes of what constitutes being a “black” Bahamian.  As in the experiences shared by my 
interviewees Eddina and Evan, when one is not accepted as “black” enough by one’s peers for 
various reasons, a similar thought process occurs whereby they are separated from a perceived 
authentic Bahamian identity. 
 I interviewed Eddina and Evan together on their lunch hour at the health facility where 
they work. They both have had challenges in being stigmatized as “white”, or correspondingly, 
“not real Bahamian” despite sharing dark skin tones. In Evan’s experiences, not being “black 
enough” related specifically to his decision to attend university in Canada, and returning to his 
home country with a newfound desire to be involved in academic and professionally stimulating 
environments as opposed to getting involved in delinquent activities which he calls “ghetto”.  
I get told that I’m not a real Bahamian all the time. I have to defend it all the time. My 
family has always criticized me because I want to better my education and want to 
learn. They make fun of how I’ve changed since I’ve gone to school. They call me “white 
boy” or that I don’t “act black” anymore. When it really when it comes down to it, 
though, I’m just not at all “ghetto” anymore. I could have easily gotten into that 
lifestyle if I didn’t have a desire to learn…26 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 “Evan”, Interview by author, June 2011. 
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For Eddina, not being “black” or Bahamian enough was perceived by her work colleagues, and 
pertained specifically to her manner of speaking.  
I remember being at work one time and one of my co-workers asked me if I was 
Bahamian.  So I told them “yes”, but you know in my head I was wondering, “Well why 
are you asking me that?” …Then another co-worker standing nearby asked the other, 
“Well why did you ask her that?”  So the first co-worker was like “Well, you know she 
have nice hair and she’s talk good.”27 
 
 The primary feature of their anecdotes outline how this systematic rejection of 
whiteness within the popular constructs of Bahamian national identity operates even beyond 
skin color, to a careful regulation within the Bahamian “black” community itself. In Evan and 
Eddina’s experiences alone, both are either mocked or questioned about their Bahamian 
identity. In Evan’s case, this mockery is explicitly made through the teasing label of “white 
boy”. I would argue also, that because Eddina is singled out for speaking a form of standard 
English (with tinges of American and British influence) rather than a localized dialect, and soft 
hair (she has some Amerindian ancestry), she too, is being recognized as someone who has 
“white” features in the eyes of her coworkers.  
 Yet, no pun intended, there is a dark side to this way of thinking. Despite the inclusion 
and celebration of all elements “black” in Bahamian cultural and national identity, it seems 
there is little positive association, expectation, or pride in blackness as an entity. This turns the 
“Black Bahamas” framework on its head and exposes it for its contradictions. Furthermore, it 
questions the confidence of the majority of the Bahamian people in their nation. Returning to 
the examples given by dark-skinned Evan and Eddina, certain aspects of their lives caused them 
to be labeled as “white” or its synonymous label as not a culturally authentic or “real” 
Bahamian. Yet, these aspects of choosing education over delinquent behavior, having “nice” hair 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 “Eddina”, Interview by author, June 2011. 
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over “bad” hair, or talking “good” over not talking “good”, have nothing to do with having 
“white” or phenotypically light skin and everything to do with a low expectation and 
imagination of what blackness is.28 Furthermore, it reflects a mentality that the “black” nature 
of the Bahamian majority is naturally doomed for failure, and lacks pride in their appearance 
and capabilities.29  
 Understanding this perceived low confidence in “black” Bahamians by “black” 
Bahamians themselves make the rationale for the polarization of “white”, “light skin” and 
classified “other” non-black Bahamians even more complex.30 For some Bahamians, not all, it is 
almost as if common discourses which single out a person’s whiteness (either through their skin 
tones or behaviors) on the streets, in the workplace, or even within the nuclear family, feigns a 
sense of empowerment. That is, that the act of polarizing a non-black Bahamian boosts the 
confidence and esteem that would otherwise not be present. In other words, holding onto a 
“Black Bahamas” framework could be a means of expressing the insecurities of the Bahamian 
“black” majority, using the weapon of blackness in cultural and public realms, the only realm 
where they feel that they have control.  
Part of the low self-esteem that many black Bahamians hold for themselves, and the 
contradictory “lighter is better” mentality that still exists in the same framework that exalts 
blackness in public spheres validly rests upon the continued economic dominance of “white” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Higgonbotham, “Metalanguage of Race”, 255. Such constructions of race categories in moral categories of 
“good” and bad continue to exemplify race as a metalanguage. The author writes, “Race impregnates the simple 
meanings we take for granted. It makes hair “good” or “bad”, speech patterns “correct” or “incorrect”, discursive 
representation and construction of social relations.  
29 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (New York: Grove Press, 1967), 11.This notion of an inferiority complex 
among black populations within postcolonial societies was popularized by French psychologist, F. Fanon, who 
claimed that it the direct result of economic subordination and the internalization or rather “epidermalization” of 
this inferiority as being directly related to one’s color of skin. 
30 In The Bahamas, the lack of self-esteem of “black” Bahamians. It is popularly known as the Black Crab 
Syndrome in The Bahamas whereby it is rooted in Bahamian culture that “black” persons prevent each other from 
succeeding in a similar way to which crabs climb on top of each other to prevent them from moving. 
Anthropologist Nicolette Bethel has also named it a “bottom of the ladder” syndrome. See Bethel’s for more detail:  
Nicolette Bethel, "On Race," Blogworld: Nicolette Bethel's Blog (web log), May 26, 2003, 
http://nicobethel.net/blogworld/2003/05/on-being-bahamian/. 
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Bahamians and expatriate workers. Yet its weakness is in its perception that financial gains are 
limited to the stereotypical “white” Bahamian minority and that non-white Bahamians cannot 
reach the equal level of achievement because of their non-white color. While it is no coincidence 
that “white” groups in The Bahamas often make up the wealthiest segments of society, I would 
argue that there is less of a defined color bar, as many middle class black and brown families 
and other intermediate groups continue to cut across color and class lines.  The distinctions of 
who are and who can be financially successful is not predicated on color or perceived racial 
markers. These dichotomies, what can or cannot be ascribed to an individual or group due to 
their “white” or “black” color run rampant in Bahamian society, and increase the complexities of 
a continued approbation of a “Black Bahamas” framework. 
 
Voluntary Polarization 
 
It would be unfair to leave the examination of this framework without pointing to ways 
in which non-black Bahamians continue to voluntarily remove themselves from the dark-
skinned majority, therefore rejecting possibilities or alternatives of a more inclusive Bahamian 
community and national identity. I believe the difficulties I experienced in confirming 
particularly elderly non-black individuals as interviewees for my research feeds into a sub-
culture of indifference that many – but not all – fair-skinned Bahamians embody. When I asked 
these individuals if they would be comfortable discussing their memories of the coming of 
Majority Rule and the Pindling era, I received many raised eyebrows, shakings of the head, and 
flat-out rejections on the basis that The Bahamas had been ‘ruined’ during this time period. 
Through this negative outlook of what The Bahamas has become through a change in 
leadership, whether it be because this leadership is “black” in nature or through other non-
racial ways in which the Pindling Government failed to meet their expectations, there is a sense 
of resignation within these individuals as to their role in the future of the nation. 
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I have felt a sense that many “white” Bahamians have intentionally enclosed themselves 
within their own private spheres while growing up in Nassau. In this way, much of the de facto 
segregation of the earlier colonial and post-colonial eras within The Bahamas has remained, 
with the continuation of historically “white” residential, commercial, and social spheres. Many 
later generations of “white” Bahamian families have continued to reside and function in society 
in the similarly closeted fashion of their parents and grandparents, and surrounding neighbors 
and friends  - a matter of social conditioning. I remember hearing my pastor give a sermon that 
asked the question, “How many of us will invite a “black” Bahamian into our homes, eat with 
them and share your lives with each other?”31  He was exposing the tendency for “white” 
Bahamians of today to work alongside “black” Bahamians in the public, corporate sphere and 
the rarity that these interactions create a more intimate level of relationship.  
While I do not want to over-generalize that all “white” Bahamians practice this self-
segregation, there is certainly enough evidence of this to warrant implications of their 
separation. Their tendency to separate offers another layer of reason as to why “white” 
Bahamians themselves do not have a sense of belonging to the Bahamian national entity. After 
all, many are not connected to the Bahamian majority in daily life beyond work or church 
obligations. This voluntary polarization could also serve to support how the “Black Bahamas” 
framework of thinking about who is culturally accepted as being a true Bahamian has come 
about. Some supporters of the Pindling Government who defend the “black” nature of their 
political party have blamed the lack of desire of non-blacks to be involved or associated with 
blacks.32 The argument for the reason why “white” Bahamians aren’t seen as having a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 This sermon was given at a non-denominational church on the island of New Providence in the early 2000’s. 
32 “Solomon Urges Whites To Enter PLP Kingdom”, The Nassau Tribune, April 28, 1989. “Someone said we ought 
to stop and include the white Bahamians,” Dr Eugene Newry told an all black audience. “That’s nonsense! 
Nonsense! Looking around the room, I see not a single Anglo-Bahamian.”, for an example of this. 
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legitimate claim to Bahamian identity is due to their own lack of desire to claim this identity 
and stop living separate lives from the Bahamian “black” majority.  
Another potential reason why many elderly “white” Bahamians do not feel Bahamian 
today is because they do not orient themselves as having an independent national identity 
separate from the former British colonial identity that they once had and benefited from. Prior 
to 1973, all persons born in The Bahamas received British passports and were legally 
considered British.33 Dr. Gail Saunders brought this insight to light when interviewed on the 
concept of the  “Black Bahamas”.34  
Yet, there is an even bleaker side. Apart from the supposed ‘natural’ continuation of self-
segregation in private spheres, or through a closer connection to a British identity than an 
independent Bahamian identity, there is another mode of understanding the voluntary 
polarization of fairer-skinned Bahamians. It lies in the ideological disconnect to the Pindling 
Government, and even the unprovoked or unjustified transition to a “black” majority 
government. Through these rationalizations there grows strong resentment to how The 
Bahamas has become a “Black Bahamas”, and demonstrates that there is still much ignorance to 
be relieved before a more inclusive imagining of the Bahamian people can be imagined. 
In my discussions with a particularly elderly fair-skinned Bahamian couple, John and 
Josephine, they both shared an inability to understand how light-skinned Bahamians are 
continually stigmatized as evil or, in the least, alienated in comparison to darker-skinned 
Bahamians. Josephine in particular commented, “They keep drumming up the past as if they’re 
the only ones that were ever slaves. I mean, we have slavery all over the world.” Her critique 
baffled me, as my previous chapters have outlined the strong corollary of inequalities of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 As a colony of Great Britain, local populations within The Bahamas were not independent citizens until it 
received independence on July 10, 1973.  
34 Gail Saunders, Interview by author, June 2011. She noted, “They did not see themselves as Bahamian. They saw 
themselves as British and felt safe under the British crown”. 
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black Atlantic slave tradition in The Bahamas that transferred into post-slavery eras up until 
the rise of the Pindling Government. Moreover, it is an unfair claim that the existence of other 
forms of slavery around the world makes slavery an acceptable system of domination. The 
triviality in which she described the use of slavery by darker Bahamians was distressing, and 
reflects again the dangerous set of beliefs that many members of Bahamian “white” community 
have with regards to denial of “black” Bahamians attempts to come to terms with their history 
of slavery, and continued disadvantage economically today.  
A common feature of the “Black Bahamas” construct is the well-founded belief that 
“white” Bahamians do not acknowledge the wrongdoings of the Bay Street oligarchy of the 
nation’s early history. In the early 1990s a former Bay Street member, Sir Durward Knowles, 
made the first and only public apology to the Bahamian nation for the corruption and 
discrimination of the age-old Bay Street regime.35 Nearing his 95th birthday, I had the 
opportunity to speak to Sir Durward about his apology, the backlash he received. “People were 
calling my house left, right, and center,” he said. “I had to retract my statement and only 
apologize on behalf of my family [instead of for all of Bay Street].” Ever since he made this 
statement and went on to create a non-profit organization, One Bahamas, that encourages and 
celebrates the diversity within The Bahamas, he feels he has been somewhat ostracized in the 
“white” community. 36 “Many of my old friends don’t talk to me anymore, but I have made so 
many new ones of all different colors because of it.”37   
The strained relationships that happened as a result of Sir Durward’s apology reveal 
some of the inner workings of the “white” Bahamian community. Agitation by his remarks 
envelops the widely shared denial, or lack of empathy for the unjust nature of the former Bay 
Street political and economic rule, and denies the continued economic advantage enjoyed by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Durward Knowles, Interview by author, July 2011. 
36 Durward Knowles, July 2011. 
37 Durward Knowles, July 2011. 
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their descendants in the present-day. Although forms of economic power have expanded to 
include non-white members of society, there remains a deep-seated – and duly recognized – 
sense that corrupt minority power is still in existence today. By refusing to apologize or offer 
remorse over what went on during the long history of “white” minority oligarchic power, these 
individuals continue to polarize themselves and serve as evidence for the over-generalized, anti-
white agenda of a “Black Bahamas” framework.  
 
Summary 
The pivotal function of a “Black Bahamas” framework is to polarize non-white members 
of Bahamian society and keep them from being seen as legitimate Bahamians. Yet as this 
chapter has shown, there are many features within this framework that involve introspection 
and participation from Bahamians of all backgrounds and colors that allow it to continue to be 
in operation today. While darker-skinned Bahamians often make antagonistic comments to 
their lighter-skinned counterparts on the streets, in the work place, or even at the nucleus of 
the family, there also is a strong fixation within social communities to invite or welcome this 
through their confinement in spheres with people that, for the most part, look like themselves.38  
The stain of Bay Street power still remains. It remains in the resentment from the 
darker majority, the arrogance of Bay Street’s children, and in the deep-seated belief in the 
attitudes of color hierarchy, or the concept of “lighter is better” that wreaks havoc in many 
Bahamians of all colors. All of these features block a more productive and unified Bahamian 
people, cognizant of the existence of the many colors that exist in our islands and not engaging 
in acts of polarization. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Examples include rotary clubs, membership-only Nassau Yacht Club, country clubs, certain churches, and 
nightclubs, many of which were constructed and maintained by members of the Bay Street oligarchy in the early 
twentieth century.  
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Nevertheless, the crises of identity that many non-black Bahamians feel are calling out 
for a new way of imagining who does and does not belong. One young woman said to me, “I 
just don’t feel like this is my country.” And another, “Yes, I was born and raised on this island. 
Yes, I’m white. I’m no less Bahamian.” And another, “I’m just as Bahamian as they are.”  
Below the superstructures that provide the groundwork for the operation of a “Black 
Bahamas” framework are those particularly younger Bahamians – like Michael, Malcolm, 
Cheyenne, Eddina or Evan – who have no affiliation or attachments to this way of thinking.  
We are left wondering why these views continue to be strong, if they can ever be alleviated. 
Moreover, we wonder if there are higher powers in the political realm that also contributed 
heavily in its construction.
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Conclusion 
 
I want to see the day when Bahamians of all shades dwell now and again on the 
 tragedy of slavery – not to grow bitter or ashamed or self-righteous, but to keep it in memory 
 as a cautionary tale of what must not be allowed to happen again.1 
 
The popular imagination of a blackness as intrinsic to Bahamian national identity would 
not have materialized to the extent that it has without the endurance of the political projects of 
the Pindling Government. The slavery-infused political constructions of the Government had a 
totalizing effect on the ways in which the broader Bahamian populace understood both race and 
class in solely racial terms. Such constructions were recognized as manipulative tools to conceal 
fallacies of the Pindling government including extensive internal corruption, mismanagement 
of funds, and limited resource allocation to improve the conditions of the poor. Additionally, 
they obscured the continued prevalence of an elite minority of light-skinned Bahamians along 
with a growing middle and upper class populace of Bahamians of all shades.  
This study has elucidated the means by which race and blackness were articulated by 
the Pindling Government to create a defective image of “black” unity and vindication from the 
country’s past. Moreover, it has delved into the contributions of this defective political 
narrative in constructing a popular sense of black pride and vindication, and an imagination of 
Bahamian national identity with “black” insiders and “white” outsiders. The policies of the 
Pindling government did not change or solve pre-existing social divisions of race, color, and 
class. Instead, claiming race as primary in the political constructions of Pindling’s twenty-five 
year rule negated such intricate divisions of power as needing to be undone. Under a newly 
independent Bahamian nation, the totalizing effects of such ideologies of race were even further 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Patricia Glinton-Meicholas, "Uncovering the Bahamian Self," Yinna: Journal of the Bahamas Association for 
Cultural Studies (BACUS) 1 (2000): 108. 
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problematized, as it failed to consider the possibilities of a unified national entity of Bahamians 
of all shades in the future.  
 
Main Findings 
The modes of power exercised by Bay Street in the post-emancipation era of nineteenth 
century laid the foundations for a consistently under-resourced Bahamian “black” majority still 
relevant today. Through evidence of Bay Street power in the franchise, privileged property 
ownership, residential spaces, and education, a superstructure of a racial system of 
discrimination was shown. Nonetheless, this superstructure also existed side-by-side with a 
growing middle class of Bahamians of darker and lighter shades who grew to enjoy certain 
privileges of the franchise and advanced education in the twentieth century. Such modes of 
power patterns a more nuanced socioeconomic composition of the Bahamian population that 
continues to be relevant today.  
More prominently through the affluence of members of the Pindling Government and 
continued prominence of Bay Street in commercial sectors, the patterns of upper and middle 
class-based divisions within both “white” and “black” groupings of Bahamians proved to be 
similarly proportioned to previous eras in Bahamian history. The historical incursions of both 
class and race in the modern-day continue to bemoan the discursive constructions of Bahamian 
society and its restrictions of Bahamian national identity in purely racial terms. 
Nonetheless, the non-racial ideologies of local and colonial elites provided a moment of 
introspection at the very obvious racial means through which Bay Street power operated on a 
larger scale. The denial of race as a problematic factor in the disadvantaged realities of most of 
the population not only demonstrated the rigidity and tenacity from which elite “white” power 
was maintained, but it also alluded to the continuation of similar contempt when political 
leadership transferred to Pindling and his PLP Government. Patterns of indifference and lack 
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of understanding for the political transformation to a more representative government remain 
in the present-day. They reason for self-segregation and isolation of certain upper middle class 
lighter-colored Bahamian families. Moreover, they contend as to why the construction of a 
“Black Bahamas” is met with resistance. The understanding that both class and race are 
intrinsically a part of the makeup of Bahamian society in this paper, however, demonstrates that 
neither should be overlooked. Doing so is detrimental to future progress for Bahamians of all 
shades and class backgrounds. 
The articulations of blackness by the political projects of the Pindling Government from 
1967-1992 provided a trajectory of social analysis that concealed class and race interplay. 
Through exhaustive motifs of chains and representations of the “white” minority as slave 
masters in various mass media forms, the Government was able to mold whiteness as the cause 
for Bahamian economic and socioeconomic disparities. While the symbolism has an 
understandable readability to diagnose the bigoted light-skinned Bay Street elite, the evidences 
of widespread drug corruption and mismanagement of government resources have slighted 
Pindling’s political rhetoric into one of deception. Rather than execute plans to bring 
improvement to the qualities of life for most of the underprivileged majority, this rhetoric 
served primarily as a political tool to bring Bahamian masses into the PLP’s collective web.  
The symbolic power of Pindling’s rhetoric demonstrated how a shared “black” identity 
and suffering became absolute truth for much of the darker-colored poor. Despite the blatant 
corruption of Pindling’s regime, political power in the hands of the darker-colored government 
was substantial enough for Pindling’s six consecutive electoral victories throughout his 
twenty-five year rule. Blackness created fictive kinship ties, and the existence of the first “black” 
government assumed that Pindling’s government would have the best interests of the darker-
colored majority at heart on the basis of a shared race. Nonetheless, the pitfalls of Pindling’s 
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government demonstrated fundamental elements of class difference and class interests within 
Bahamians of various shades at large.  
The implications of Pindling’s political projects on the popular imagination of a 
Bahamian national identity were also considered throughout this study. In my ethnographic 
research on how individuals understand and make sense of their personal Bahamian identity to 
the broader notions of what is culturally or popularly accepted as “being Bahamian”, blackness 
was always used as a primary marker in the latter. In discursive forms within public spaces and 
work environments for instance, blackness was seen as a weapon and a feigned sense of 
empowerment against resent for non-black Bahamian others. In many respects, much of the 
discursive use of race was tied to underlying elements of class that were very much in dialogue 
with the use of race in the political agendas of old. Nonetheless, the degree of inequality is more 
or less the same as it had been in the past. I am often left wondering what kinds of expressions 
of Bahamian national identity and notions of racial and class-based power would have taken 
hold if it were not for the Progressive Liberal Party Government of 1967-1992. If a more 
representative government had taken hold, would the intricate power be exposed?  
 
Areas for Future Study 
My investigation is not without its shortcomings; however, it is my hope that future 
studies can be undertaken which account for these limitations. One of these areas includes the 
incorporation of the gender. Although hardly recognized, much of the contestations of power 
that I follow involve groupings of men, and women’s involvements are rendered quite silent. It 
would be beneficial to include a sub-category of this nature to bring matters of the nation, 
discrimination (both acted upon and lived though), political reform, and popular consciousness 
of Bahamian national identity through this lens of gender.  
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Another possible area of study that should be engaged upon is that of the status of older 
and newer immigrant populations that have fashioned themselves as ethnic groupings beneath 
the racial binary of “white” and “black”. How is their degree of belonging or non-belonging 
within Bahamian society attributable (or not) to political constructions of the past? Moreover, 
how are light-skinned Greek and Chinese Bahamians considered “passable” within “white” 
Bahamian groupings, yet newer immigrants of darker-colored Haitian Bahamians are often 
received with antagonism? What are the limits to a cultural elevation of blackness through 
these additional analytical platforms?  
Lastly, a more thorough analysis of the ways in which matters of class, race, and color 
are experienced in relation to other parts of The Bahamas would be incredibly useful. For 
brevity, Nassau, New Providence (the capital) was the main geographic focus of my study. 
Nonetheless, the peripheral islands of the Bahamian archipelago did not experience the same 
version of “white” power through the Bay Street archipelago, nor were they some of the mass 
consumers of Pindling’s political projects due to their isolated locations. Thus, in the very least, 
a discussion of Bahamian inflections of relationships of the center and the periphery could 
greatly enhance my discussion.    
 
Significance of Study 
 
At the core of this investigation is a call for real change within Bahamian society under 
socioeconomic and cultural terms. A transformation from the multivariate and discriminative 
systems of Bay Street was certainly needed. Nonetheless, change is still needed. The 
transformation of political leadership through Pindling did not effectively bring about real 
reform within the socioeconomic fabric of society and how class and race underpin much of the 
nation’s identity problems today. 
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Speaking to my fellow Bahamians, we must recognize our history. We must recognize it 
for its pains of slavery and wrongdoings of Bay Street, and the psychological scars that remain 
through resentment and polarization of non-blacks in cultural and national terms. We must 
also recognize our history of late, where some of both lighter and darker colored Bahamians 
have remained at the highest levels of economic prosperity. We must understand how class 
continues to underscore our society in a way that has been shafted by overly simplified racial 
rhetoric. And even in the ashes of our history, there exist Bahamians of many colors and 
shades, children of Bay Street, children of intermediate groups, and children of the 
disadvantaged and disenfranchised. The political rhetoric of old was perhaps a leading cause for 
the ways in which race is used to fundamentally oppose certain groups today, but it is we the 
people that maintain it. I do not have the magic remedy to purport utopic ideals of complete 
racial harmony and socioeconomic ideals for all. Nonetheless, I challenge our Bahamian society 
to reflect on our history. Become perplexed like I was at the beginning of my research. Leave 
thinking about the means from which we can move forward into the twenty-first century and 
depart from the framework of a “Black Bahamas”. 
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